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Abstract 
This thesis is concerned with the regional dimensions of Polish EU rural development 
policies. Two major streams in this research, theoretical and practical, correspond to the 
core intertwined research questions: 
" What (if any) policy regionalisation is desirable for EU rural policies in Poland? 
" How should the rural development process be conceptualised with what 
implications for regionalisation of policy? 
This research has a direct policy linkage as under the EC legislation Poland has a 
possibility to implement rural development programmes at "an appropriate geographical 
level". This thesis explores whether the region (at NUTS 2 level) is such an appropriate 
level. 
The thesis is structured around four potential justifications for policy regionalisation in 
Poland: 
1) regionally differentiated rural development patterns across Polish regions; 
2) heterogeneity of regional preferences for rural policies and their legitimacy; 
3) territorial fairness and compliance with regional cohesion objectives, safeguarded 
by specific regionally set policy budgets; 
4) political feasibility. 
In conclusion, a synthetic framework is proposed, based on a complex system approach. 
The thesis sprang from a participant observation experience in setting Polish EU pre- 
accession policies. It adopts a multidisciplinary perspective with elements from 
development economics, economic geography, political studies, regional science, 
sociolinguistics, and policy evaluation leading to a complex system analysis. A 
multiplicity of data has been mobilized: participant observation, secondary statistical 
data, past policy data as well as a series of semi-structured interviews. 
The empirical analysis suggests there is little evidence of the relevance of NUTS 2 level 
for rural policy making in the Polish EU context based on the propositions examined 
Abstract 
here. However, rural policy regionalisation can be more adequately conceptualized as a 
process, not as a policy desideratum. The forces driving policy regionalisation in Poland 
are weakly developed at present, but predicted to gain in force in longer term, implying 
that regionalised policies may become more relevant in the future. 
The theoretical strand of the thesis leads to a formulation of an integrated framework 
for rural policy analysis. The model recognizes that the policy making has a multiple 
rationality, namely actors perform a multiplicity of actions in economic, political and 
cognitive paradigms when setting and implementing policy, embedded in, and feeding 
back to fundamental resource capacities. It is argued that such a conceptualization has 
significant policy consequences, putting the multi-rational policy process rather than 
purely policy outputs at the centre of policy advice and analysis. 
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Executive summary 
1. Research background and structure 
This research has been concerned with the relevance of regions (NUTS 2) for Polish EU 
rural development policy. Two major streams in this research, theoretical and practical, 
correspond to the core research questions: 
" What (if any) policy regionalisation is appropriate for EU rural policies in Poland? 
" How can the rural development process and policy be conceptualized, including 
their regionalisation? 
The EU legislation gives the member states an option to implement their rural 
development programme on "an appropriate geographical level". The definition of "an 
appropriate geographical level" in Poland is interpreted as the voivodships (NUTS 2) 
level. In fact, the very emergence of regionalisation on the rural policy agenda relates 
primarily to the Polish regionalisation reform of 1999. The reform has been undertaken 
in the strong ideological climate of breaking up the centralist traditions associated with 
the communist rule, as well as europeanisation. The competence in rural and regional 
development in Poland, which is a shared, (sometimes interpreted as conflicting) 
responsibility between the regional and central levels, has led to a discussion of the role 
of regions in Polish rural development policy making. 
2. Four research propositions 
A critical appraisal of the decentralization debate (Bardham, 1997; Oates, 1972; Begg, 
1997; Donahue, 1997; Rodriguez-Pose, Gill, 2002) has identified four potential 
justifications for policy regionalisation in Poland: 
1) Regionally differentiated rural development patterns across Polish regions; 
2) Heterogeneity of regional preferences for rural policies; 
3) Territorial fairness and compliance with regional cohesion objectives, 
safeguarded by specific regionally set policy budgets; 
4) Political feasibility. 
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Other potential aspects of policy regionalisation, such as efficiency gains, or transaction 
costs have been left outside the scope of this thesis for lack of empirical data'. The 
examination of the above propositions has structured the present thesis. In conclusion 
an integrated framework for rural development and policy has been proposed and 
applied to the question of policy regionalisation. 
2.1. The validity of voivodships as units to describe differentiated patterns of 
rural development in Poland (proposition 1) 
In search for a workable analytical framework to explore the first specific research 
proposition, two main questions have been raised: what is (rural) development, and how 
it is progressing in space. 
A brief review of (rural) development literature suggests the development prospects are 
a function of both material and virtual resources. The range of views on factors 
facilitating the process demonstrates an evolution from original positions on capital 
(mainly physical) accumulation (e. g. Solow, 1957; Lewis, 1955) towards some "softer" 
explanations of "entrepreneurship" (Hagen, 1962), trade opportunities (Krueger, 1993) 
and capitalisation of competitive advantages (Porter, 1990; Kay 1993), and then, to the 
current focus on innovation and knowledge (Romer, 1986); and institutions (North, 
1998). In case of rural development, an assumption that the prospects for rural 
development are a function of rural resources is debated. Some researchers (e. g. Slee, 
1994) argue that since urban areas are primary determinants of agricultural demand, 
the process is exogenously determined (Slee, 1994), neglecting local impulses or values. 
Others, e. g. Bryden (1998), link the rural development prospects to a unique mix of 
immobile local resources as social, environmental and cultural capital. A more inclusive 
view recognizes the importance of both endogenous and exogenous factors (Lowe et al., 
1995). 
1 This original intention of this thesis (at the research proposal stage in early 2000) was to provide a 
comparison between the centralised SAPARD programme and (partially) decentralised World Bank Rural 
Development Programme. Yet, SAPARD had been considerably delayed and was only launched in mid 2002 
so data on implementation are too scarce for sensible analysis. 
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The question of how to fit a complex dynamics of development processes into the 
meaningful spatial categories appears even more contestable (Marsden, 1995; Weesp: 
1999). A few conceptual categories are offered by literature to describe homogenous 
spatial associations (Murdoch, 1997), three of which are pertinent to our proposition. 
The first fundamental type of spatial differentiation is the rural versus the urban. 
Although questioned by some (e. g. Saraceno, 1994; Murdoch and Pratt, 1993), because 
of close linkages with urban space and internal differentiation (arguably better reflected 
in the term "local"), the term "rural" still remains a key element of our spatial 
vocabulary. Spatial economy models (Leon, 1999) emphasize the added value of "rural" 
beyond a simple descriptive term, as an outcome of agents' search for optimum location 
in relation to the center where activities further away from the center are likely to bring 
lower rents, require less economics of scale and scope and feature lower levels of 
employment, thus corresponding to the peripheral. The second relevant spatial 
differentiation is that between regions, discussed in terms of a classic convergence and 
divergence debate, useful for its identification of spatial-economic forces such as 
diminishing capital returns, knowledge transfer, negative externalities of congestion 
driving convergence (see, e. g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991,1992), competing with 
forces of divergence such as economies of scale and scope, trade specialisation or 
negative causation (Myrdal, 1957; Krugman, 1991). The third is internal differentiation 
of rural areas, using various criteria and various spatial scales. A sample of rural 
typologies has been reviewed: some based on resources (Bauko, Gurzo, 2001), some 
referring to the underlying development models (Esposti and Sotte, 2002, Storti, 2000; 
Ceccato, Persson, 2002; Terluin, 2000; Marsden, 1995; Henry et al, 2001), some for 
policy classifications (CEC: 1997; OECD: 1994). The classifications use varied scales such 
as regions (OECD: 1994), microregions (Bauko, Gurzo, 2001), or local labour system 
(Storti, 2000; Ceccato, Persson, 2002). 
Based on these theoretical considerations a working framework has been developed to 
test our basic proposition about the appropriateness of the voivodship to describe the 
spatial variations of rural development in Poland. Firstly, we assume that the prospects 
3 
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of rural development of a given rural area relates to its overall resource base as well as 
exogenous demand factors. The total rural resource base, made up of physical, human, 
natural, social capital and spatial capital, is visualized on an operational resource 
pentagon. Thus, the main variables along which we analyze rural spatial heterogeneity 
relate to the resource pentagon, as well as to the regional economy (cf. Figure 2.2. ). 
This basic mental construct has permitted a more structured approach to economic 
geographical comparisons, albeit facing problems with measurability, with the relative 
weights of various capital types and complementarities between them still pending. In 
addition, the essential dynamic component is missing from this construct, as, for 
example, Hirschman et al (1969) note that resources (at least those put in productive 
use) are not fixed. Secondly, we argue that the Polish voivodships are a valuable 
descriptor of rural conditions if their resource pentagons are internally similar and 
externally different. Of course the notions of similarity and difference are subjective, so 
any meaningful analysis needs to refer to other levels of spatial differentiation. 
Based on this theoretical framework, a multilevel geographical analysis of resource base 
in Poland has been performed to validate the notion of voivodship in describing resource 
heterogeneity (Chapter 3). Three main dimensions of spatial differentiations have been 
examined: inequality between rural and urban resources and economic structures; 
variation of rural resources and structures between voivodships and homogeneity of 
rural structures within regions. 
The analysis has revealed a multiple level of spatial variation in Polish development 
geography but has rejected the proposition of the relative validity of Polish voivodships 
as an internally homogenous and externally heterogeneous spatial grouping of 
resources. It has been concluded that the key patterns of resource and structure 
inequality lie between rural and urban areas. Within the rural areas, it is the meta- 
regions which capture the principal differences in the resource pentagon. Rural regions 
(NUTS 2) feature considerable internal differentiation in terms of rurality patterns. 
The key inequality lies between the rural and urban levels. The analysis has 
demonstrated a considerable gap between rural and urban incomes (on average 50%) 
4 
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underpinned by poorer economic structures, considerably less business density, higher 
levels of unemployment and underemployment, poorer levels of human capital, and 
weaker access to financial capital. Polish rural areas have functioned as a buffer to 
cushion transition shocks, mostly by absorbing redundant labour in the farming sector. 
Although after 1989, the capital has tended to flow to urban areas following economies 
of scale, only limited spill-overs of urban growth have transferred to rural areas 
The rural resource structures between Polish voivodships are not significantly different 
from each other: the main patterns of difference fall between meta-regions. The rural 
resource index calculated by means of Principal Component Analysis based on the 
available variables relating to the rural resource structures, indicates a variation based 
on four meta-regions. They are based on the North-West versus South-East axis: North- 
Western region (Zachodniopomorskie, Warminsko-Mazurskie, Lubuskie, Dolnoslaskie and 
Pomorskie); Central-Western region (Opolskie, Wielkopolskie, Kujawsko-Pomorskie and 
Slaskie), Central-Eastern region (Mazowieckie, Lodzkie, Podlaskie) and South-Eastern 
region (Lubelskie, Podkarpackie, Swietokrzyskie and Malopolskie). The three meta 
regions roughly reflect the historic divisions between Russian, Prussian and Austrian 
empires in the 19"' century and the territorial shifts after the 1945. However, the 
variables measured with this classification are clearly agriculturally biased. The 
complementary classification, based exclusively on business development, reveals the 
new spatial rural dynamics on the West-East axis, driven by the endowment of spatial 
capital, in particular the proximity of the Western border and metropolitan areas. 
Polish rural voivodships display considerable internal differentiation, although the ANOVA 
analysis shows that the patterns of variations within regions are significantly smaller 
than across regions. The cluster analysis of Polish ruralities has resulted in the typology 
of five major ruralities, underpinned by three major factors: population and farm 
patterns; business development; conditions for agricultural production. The rural profiles 
of regions indicate that Polish voivodships tend to be internally differentiated in terms of 
their rurality structure. 15 Polish regions have at least two different types of rurality. 9 
mid-resource ranking regions (Dolnoslaskie, Opolskie, Pomorskie, Wielkopolskie, Slaskie, 
5 
Executive summary 
Kujawsko-Pomorskie, Mazowieckie and Lodzkie) feature as many as five different rurality 
types. 
Based on this evidence, the first proposition about the relative validity of voivodships 
(NUTS 2) to describe rural heterogeneity is rejected. 
2.2. Regional differentiation of preferences for rural development policy 
instruments (proposition 2) 
The second specific research proposition has been explored using participant 
observation and experience of conducting the regional consultation process for the 
SAPARD programme in 1999, crosschecked for consistency with the regional 
development strategies produced by the regional authorities in 2000-2001. 
The conceptual framework for examining regional preferences for rural policies has been 
formed inductively. It has been argued that, rather than taking them at face value, 
preferences need to be assessed for their legitimacy and validity. 
The theoretical discussion of collective preference formation suggests that the outcome 
is sensitive to changes in the aggregation methods (Doel and Velthoven, 1993; May, 
1954; McLean. 1987; Gerber, Jackson, 1993). For this reason, the legitimacy of regional 
governance (relative to the centre) is not to be treated as tautological but conditional on 
territorial identities (Dardanelli, 1998; Keating, 1999; Rodriguez-Pose, Gill, 2002; Les 
Galle, 1998; Paasi, 2002; Teune, 1992; Raagma, 1986) and participation (Dryzek, 2002), 
which amounts to what Keating (1998) called "bottom-up" regionalism. Discourse 
analysis has been used to examine regional identities (as revealed in regional 
development strategy documents). 
The validity of preferences relate to their internal consistency, revealed through these 
two data sources, as well as selectiveness. The relevant literature indicates that 
collective preferences often suffer from intransivity and fail to appreciate the opportunity 
costs (Doel and Velthoven, 1993; May, 1954; McLean. 1987; Gerber, Jackson, 1993). 
6 
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The empirical analysis has rejected the proposition of regionally differentiating rural 
policy preferences on the grounds of weak regional heterogeneity, legitimacy and 
validity. Preferences revealed by both the regional strategies and the SAPARD exercise 
show limited regional variation, but high inconsistency. Most preferences for the main 
policy measures tend to be relatively homogenous (such as preference for measures 
such as investment in agricultural holdings, marketing and processing measures, rural 
infrastructure, diversification of economic activities). Spatially selective preferences, such 
as development of training, village renewal, and agri-environmental measures, as well 
as water management, afforestation and land reparcelling, have proven to be highly 
inconsistent. In addition, the validity of regional rural preferences can be disputed for a 
number of reasons. The first is inconsistency demonstrated between the two data 
sources. Secondly, the strategic texts have demonstrated that Polish regions can draw 
little legitimacy from historically formed identities. Strikingly, only two regions 
(Wielkopolskie and Malopolskie) use the discoursive "ewe" in their rhetoric. In addition, 
despite relatively great efforts and attention in the strategies devoted to describing 
intraregional policy zones, only in the Wielkopolskie strategy does the differentiation 
translate into intraregional spatially selective policy instruments for rural areas. Finally, 
the preferences demonstrate little selectivity: with no opportunity cost indication, they 
signal policy "wants" rather than effective demands and choices. We have concluded 
that the strategies of Polish regions in 2000 are best understood as examples of 
"communicative governance" (Healey, 1993) rather than as a manifestation of collective 
choice practices. On balance, the second proposition of genuinely heterogenous 
preferences for policy action between regions has also been rejected. 
2.3: Budget regionalisation as a measure to ensure territorial fairness and 
contribution to regional cohesion objectives (proposition 3) 
The third specific research proposition has examined whether budget regionalisation 
assists in ensuring territorial fairness and contribution to regional cohesion objectives 
relative to horizontal funding arrangements. 
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This proposition has been examined based on the empirical data of setting the regional 
allocations for the SAPARD programme in comparison to the regional distribution of a 
horizontal national scheme. 
The search for a theoretical framework to interpret the questions of territorial 
distributions raised questions of territorial cohesion and fairness. It has been recognized 
that EU concept of cohesion is ambiguous in both its reference (to the member state 
level or to regions) (Rynck, McAleavey, 2001) and its measurements of cohesion deficits 
(e. g. Scott, 1995). Indeed, there are arguments that the regional targeting of the 
cohesion policy appears to concern only the ERDF, since the rural development 
programmes are applicable horizontally across the EU rural areas with no specific 
regional targeting (Saraceno, 2002). Although the concept is trapped in an uneasy 
positioning in the neo-liberal models of EU capitalism (Hooghe, 1998; Fainstein, 2001), it 
does nonetheless raise the issue of territorial fairness. However, the distribution of rural 
development (investment) policies is likely to exhibit biases, as noted in the fiscal 
federalism literature on the distribution of conditional matching grants and economics of 
rural credits. Seen primarily as a compensatory mechanism for larger intergovernmental 
deals (Leonardi, 1995), the concept of cohesion has been realistically defined as political 
tolerance for disparities (Begg, 1995) rather than as a specific tangible target. 
The empirical focus has been divided into two parts. The first part examines the 
"fairness" of regional funding allocations for rural policies, exemplified by the politically 
legitimized SAPARD allocations. It identifies how these have been defined and asks 
whether they are in line with the EU cohesion objectives measured at the regional level, 
namely if regions with cohesion deficit tend to have a relatively higher allocation. The 
second part explores the question of whether patterns of rural development policy 
absorption are regionally biased, compared with those programmes where regional 
funding allocations are absent. 
It has been shown that the regional "fairness" envelope (as defined by the SAPARD 
programme) displays mixed compliance with the regional cohesion objectives. Funding 
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allocations for territorial measures (such as infrastructure and rural diversification) are 
broadly in line with the EU cohesion objectives, whilst funding benchmarks for a sectoral 
measure (investment in agricultural holdings) are inconsistent with the regional cohesion 
targets. 
However, if SAPARD envelopes are treated as a benchmark for "fairness", their absence 
need not necessarily lead to biased absorption imbalances at the regional level. Limited 
data from a single past national rural scheme (which did not have any regional ring- 
fenced allocation) indicates that the patterns of regional distribution of agricultural 
investment support broadly matches the SAPARD regional allocation; patterns of 
absorption for infrastructure grants have favoured poorer regions (relative to the 
benchmarks). However, the absorption of rural diversification funding has been biased 
towards more wealthy regions, according to this comparison. 
Whether the "fair" regional budgetary arrangements serve as an effective equity 
mechanism depends on policy demand. The equalization mechanism is only triggered 
when the applications exceed the available budget. Even then, territorial "fairness" at a 
higher level does not nnecessarilyeed result in improved equity at lower levels. 
Intraregional variation of the resource base among Polish voivodships might suggest 
that this lack of correspondence is generally the case. 
Based on the mobilized empirical data and theoretical considerations, the third 
proposition has been rejected. 
2.4. Feasibility of regionalisation in policy process (proposition 4) 
The fourth proposition has explored whether the political process of setting Polish EU 
rural development policy permits (even encourages) its regionalisation. 
The analysis has drawn upon participant observation in setting up the SAPARD 
programme in Poland, supplemented by a series of semi-structured interviews held with 
selected major EU, central and regional policy actors in 2002. 
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Seeking a working theoretical framework to fit the specific policy account, a review of 
major Western policy frameworks has identified that the key models of: public choice; 
policy networks; specific EU polity frameworks, such as the notion of europeanisation, as 
best suited to the participant experience and Polish policy context. An eclectic analysis 
framework based on Moyer and Josling (1990) has been applied as a storyline for the 
policy account. The framework assumes that the policy outputs depend on policy inputs 
and the bargaining process. The key policy inputs include past policy precedents, 
particular interests and motivations of key policy actors, and cohesiveness of the policy 
network. On the bargaining side, emphasis is placed on the issues of power and access 
of network members to the policy process. 
The analysis has argued that the room for policy regionalisation is very limited, both for 
policy inputs and bargaining rules. The centralist network, consisting of the key policy 
actors (the Polish Ministry of Agriculture - MARD, and the Directorate Agriculture of the 
EU Commission - DG AGRI) and secondary network members (such as the Polish central 
agencies for agricultural and rural policies, namely ARMA and FAPA) appear more 
cohesive than the corresponding and loosely connected regionalist framework, which 
mostly consists of the secondary network actors (the Polish Ministry of Economy and the 
Directorate for Regional Development of the EU Commission), working closely with the 
regions (Marshall Offices), albeit for regional, not rural matters. 
Members of the centralist networks, notably MARD and DG AGRI, exhibit a clear 
technocratic and central logic, with little demand for territorial participation or 
legitimization. DG AGRI, a major partner in the centralistic network, has a primary 
interest in simplicity, financial accountability and the compliance of the programme with 
the acquis, especially with the views of the Member States. Although, strictly speaking 
regionally-neutral, the Commission's emphasis on "simplicity", financial accountability 
and transparency of procedures tends to favour central solutions. MARD clearly talks 
about vague localist sentiments (that can be traced back to the ideology of Polish 
regionalisation reform), but also clearly demonstrates practical concerns to keep its 
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power linkages with the central agencies, and ensure inter-organisational coordination 
for a smooth feedback to Brussels. ARMA has strongly protected its bureaucratic powers 
in the SAPARD programme. It has only belatedly admitted of a possibility for delegating 
limited functions to regions, for implementation of the evolving common agricultural 
policy, though has done so unwillingly. However, to date the rural divisions of regional 
authorities have exhibited virtually no efforts to establish contacts with the MARD. 
The regional network appears much looser. Headed by the Ministry of Economy, in 
conjunction with the DG REGIO, the interaction relates mainly to the regional policy, 
with only loose contacts with rural measures, perceived as speical and technically 
complex. Though the working relations between regions and the center appear strongly 
established, they are underpinned by a lack of trust (especially on political as opposed to 
bureaucratic levels). The regions, in particular the Marshall Offices, are active in the new 
policy setting, in particular in the development of the national development plan and the 
regional plans, but their role in rural planning and policy development is insignificant. 
Willing to accept risk-free templates, the rural divisions do not seek to input their unique 
preferences (if any) into the policy process. 
The bargaining takes place primarily on a technocratic rather than political level, and is 
strongly conditioned by the past policy precedents, especially from the centralized 
SAPARD programme. In line with Europeanisation framework, Poland is correctly 
portrayed as a policy taker, rather than a setter. The Polish policy-making reflects the 
primarily central sectoral logic in the EU rural policy making (Saraceno, 2002; Grabbe, 
2000; Depoele, 2000). Issues of intra-organisational cooperation, aggregated by the 
imperfect information flow and slow policy learning, make access to rural regional offices 
for policy making even more difficult. Under these circumstances, the actual policy 
outcome is essentially centralistic, although some policies are delegated to the regions 
as "a training field". 
The analysis of empirical data based on the theoretical insights has concluded that there 
is a limited scope for regionalisation of Polish EU rural development policies from a 
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political feasibility point of view. 
3. Towards an integrated framework for rural policy (incl. its regionalisation) 
These specific findings remain somewhat disconnected. To remedy this, an integrated 
policy analysis framework has been elaborated (cf. Figure 7.1. ). The model recognizes 
that the policy-making has a multiple rationality, namely actors perform a multiplicity of 
actions and roles when setting and implementing policy, both embedded in and feeding 
back to fundamental resource capacities. The principal dimensions in which policy is 
agreed and implemented are indentified as being: economic; political; cognitive. Each 
dimension of policy making can be researched, based on the data and techniques 
associated with it. The linkages between policy paradigms are as important for 
understanding these complex systems as are the processes and mechanisms within each 
paradigm. Each paradigm is subject to endogenous and exogenous pressures for 
change. The change in each paradigm takes time and effort, and is mutually inter- 
dependent. 
The application of the integrated framework to the rural policy regionalisation is 
illustrated in Table 7.3. (Chapter 7). 
4. Policy recommendations 
4.1. General 
1. Policy making needs to be seen as an art of complexity with multiple rationalities 
happening in the economic, political and cognitive paradigms, based upon and 
feeding back to the fundamental underlying resource capacities. Thus, a single 
minded managerial perspective with associated exclusively economic policy 
prescriptions does not suffice, or else is unlikely to meet the test of legitimacy. In 
fact, at present social science is unable to provide optimum policy prescriptions 
to contribute to the development process. In a most fundamental sense, the 
policy process through which policies are selected, appraised and revised are 
more important than the policy outputs. 
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2. Regionalisation in Poland is a strongly value-laden term associated with the 
processes of regaining democracy and with europeanisation. 
However, rural policy regionalisation can be more adequately conceptualized as a 
process, not as a policy desideratum. The forces driving policy regionalisation in 
Poland are weakly developed at present, but are predicted to gain in force in 
longer term. At present, the major forces demanding policy regionalisation 
feature in a cognitive dimension, a common belief that regionalisation enhances 
democracy and eauropeanisation. Nonetheless, the regional logic is only weakly 
legitimized by questionable regional identities in Poland. In the political 
paradigm, the regional actors appear still weak due to patriarchal traditions and 
lack of authority, clearly a legacy of central planning traditions. Early accession 
programming is also constrained by institutional capacities, encouraging use of 
existing bureaucratic templates, strict coordination and risk avoidance. In the 
economic zone, the horizontal differences between rural and urban areas are 
larger than regional differences, suggesting that a horizontal approach is more 
appropriate at present. 
In the longer run, the demands for rural policy regionalisation (or at least 
territorialisation) are likely to be reinforced in all of the economic, political and 
cognitive spheres. On the political level, more demands for more participative 
governance, as opposed to government, are expected, following a trend already 
apparent in Western Europe. Also a slow transition of EU rural policies is 
expected towards territorial levels. On the economic level, specific and distinctive 
spatial capital is expected to become more important and valuable as the 
economy develops, bringing demands for "village as a product" with natural, 
cultural and social added-value. Non-agricultural rural development is also linked 
to broader regional development, especially small towns. On the cognitive level, 
globalisation is said to facilitate the emergence of "defensive" identities and 
spatial affinities. 
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4.2. Specific policy recommendations 
1. No clear pattern of differentiated rural resource endowment can be linked to the 
current administrative boundaries. Indeed, Polish rural areas exhibit patterns of 
homogeneity around bigger meta-regions. Internal differentiation of resources 
within voivodships also remains significant. Variation in resource endowments is 
likely to translate into territorially differentiated policy absorption patterns. 
Indeed, the five types of ruralities identified here can constitute a useful 
benchmark for future evaluations and case studies. 
In a nutshell, the top-down map of rural resources is not sufficiently detailed to 
identify patterns of specificity, especially of cultural, natural and social capitals. 
No doubt, area based policy packages are useful as complementary measures, 
but they are best defined in a bottom up way at a level lower than NUTS 2. 
2. No clear regional pattern of preferences for rural development has been found in 
this analysis. Indeed, the preferences for major policy instruments appear 
horizontal and univocal, whilst those that do appear to be regionally selective are 
also inconsistent. Polish regional governance processes are also only weakly 
legitimized by regional identities, using the participative and consultative modes 
instead. 
Indeed, regional policy differentiation is more likely to include differentiated 
funding allocations between measures (reflecting their differentiated importance) 
rather than the choice of measures per se. 
3. The regionalisation of the budget for rural policies has been found to be of a 
different order to regional cohesion. The allocation of sectoral measures (such as 
investments in agricultural holdings) follows the principle of assessing effective 
demands for grants. In contrast, the allocation of funding for territorial measures 
(such as infrastructure or rural diversification) is in line with the regional 
cohesion objectives. It is concluded that, whilst regional budgetary envelopes (as 
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per SAPARD) have a limited usefulness as territorial equity mechanisms, they can 
be a useful territorial benchmark for policy evaluation. 
4. Finally, the analysis of Polish-EU rural policy arena has concluded that Poland is 
presently merely a taker (responder or copier) of EU centralized rural policies, 
and Polish regions have limited capacities or incentives for active participation in 
the process. 
Indeed, though a territorial angle in rural development policy appears uncontestable, 
there is little evidence to support the relevance of the regional scale for rural policy 
making in Poland. Indeed, the menu approach adopted at the central level appears 
adequate to provide the local policy clients with the choices to cater for their needs and 
integrate them with local strategies at present. 
However, there is also a need to encourage and facilitate the development of local 
participation and involvement in the policy process, which implies that building regional 
and local capacity to develop and evolve future policies is an important element in the 
design and implimentation of present policies. 
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Research rationale, context, 
questions, and methodology 
1.1. Objectives and outline 
This thesis is about regional dimensions of Polish EU rural development policy, notably 
FEOGA-Guidance programmes. The original motivation for undertaking this study comes 
from my participant experience in setting up the pre-accession SAPARD programme2, a 
direct predecessor of FEOGA rural programme, and in particular from coordinating 
regional consultations. This research has been conducted since 2000, largely in parallel 
to the policy process of preparing Polish FEOGA programme, with a view to highlighting 
the potential contribution of social science to real policy decisions. 
Chapter 1 explains the context, questions and basic methodology for this thesis as well 
as providing a roadmap of the whole study. It is organized as follows. Section 1.2. 
clarifies the research rationale in the context of Polish enlargement process, and leads to 
Section 1.3. which explains the policy context, and then to Section 1.4. which lists the 
main research questions. Section 1.5. contains a brief discussion of the regionalisation 
and decentralization debate, on the basis of which specific research propositions are 
defined. These specific propositions constitute the core ordering logic for the whole 
thesis. Section 1.6. deals with the methodological approach. Section 1.7. outlines the 
key contextual situation of Polish regionalisation reform. For reasons of clarity, a new 
more specific classification of policy regionalisation is also proposed in this section. The 
final Section 1.8. provides a map of the thesis as a whole. 
2 SAPARD (special accession assistance programme for agricultural and rural development) is a fund of 520 
million EUR per year over the period 2000-2006 among the ten applicant countries. The Programme is 
intended to facilitate the implementation of the EU acquis relating to the Common Agricultural Policy and 
associated policies, and to solve priority and specific problems for the sustainable adjustment and 
development of the agricultural sector and rural areas in the applicant countries. The programme, intended 
to start in January 2000, was only finally launched in Poland on 3 July 2002. 
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1.2. Research motivation: rooted in policy practice 
The origin of this work lies in my experience as a policy practitioner in Poland, which 
generated a need for a more informed basis for policy decisions for EU co-financed 
structural policies in agriculture and rural development in Poland. This experience also 
provided invaluable insights and knowledge of the actual policy process, through 
genuine participant observation and practice. Since 1996 I have been involved in Polish 
EU accession preparations, linked with the Ministry of Agriculture in Warsaw, particularly 
with the structural policies. In 1998-2001 I worked as the coordinating expert for the 
Polish SAPARD Programme: a model for future EC structural programmes in agriculture 
and rural development. In 1999, concurrently with the Polish decentralization reforms, 
the dilemma of how to regionalize the SAPARD programme demanded resolution. 
Despite "localist sentiments" (Keating, 1998) amongst the majority of Polish policy 
actors, however, the policy process (driven primarily by the EU actors) produced a 
heavily centralized programme (Lisztwan and Harvey: 2002). This outcome encountered 
much criticism in political and academic circles as well as the media in Poland, of which 
voices the following is representative: 
Regretfully once again an idea that the center knows better" and can 
coordinate various policies, has won. This is a wrong idea... We shall all 
pay high price: the regional authorities will learn responsible regional 
policy slower and the overall ability to face global and integration 
pressures, as well as reduced national competitiveness will weaken. This 
is a shame as our country is poor, and needs to catch up with the more 
developed states. We should have chosen the most efficient governance 
structure. . J. Szomburg, President of Institute for Market Economy Research (2001) 
As Poland is progressing to implementing the full Structural Funds, the question of policy 
regionalisation demands reappraisal. What can social science offer to help us answer 
this question? 
1.3. EU rural policy in Poland and policy regionalisation choices 
As agreed in Copenhagen in December 2002, upon EU accession in 2004, Poland will 
proceed to implement a set of EU agricultural and rural policies. The main points of the 
Copenhagen deal include a provision for immediate market opening, reduced direct 
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payments', modest production quotas (30% below the requested level), immediate 
entry to market intervention policy as well as participation in the 2"d Pillar of the CAP 
and in the Structural Funds, Incl. FEOGA-Guidance. The details of the financial deal are 
presented Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1. EU expenditure for Polish agriculture and rural areas in 2004-2006 
! f`nnonhanon anroaniantl 
Expenditure from the EU budget for Polish agriculture and 
rural areas (million EUR) 
2004 2005 2006 2004-2006 
Direct payments 620 765 920 2,305 
Supplement to direct payments* 215 192 157 564 
Market intervention 135 350 377 862 
2"d Pillar of CAP 647 769 887 2,302 
FEOGA-Guidance** 166 462 568 1,196 
(Ind. Polish co-financing) 207 577 711 1,495 
Total EU 1,783 2,538 2,908 7,229 
*Reallocation from 2'" Pillar or CAP. 
** Assuming that 16.9% of the Structural Funds Is allocated for FEOGA-Guidance. Note that hereafter 
FEOGA-Guidance programmes are used Interchangeably with rural development policy. 
*** For comparative reasons note that in 2002 the total Polish agricultural budget (excl. farmers' pension 
scheme) amounted to 1,271 million EUR. 
Source: SAEPR (2003) 
Measures under the 2"d Pillar of the CAP, financed from the FEOGA Guarantee Section 
Include conventional accompanying measures (early retirements, agri-environment and 
afforest ration), and support to Less Favoured Areas (LFA) complemented by special 
measures such as support to semi-subsistence farms which plan to develop marketable 
production4, and compensation for farmers for investments in hygiene standards, food 
safety and animal welfare5. Rural development measures which could be financed under 
the FEOGA-Guidance programme include: Investments in agricultural holdings, young 
farmers schemes, training, forestry, improvement in processing and marketing, as well 
as measures for the adaptation and development of rural areas such as melioration, re- 
3 Progressive payments are foreseen 25% in 2004,30% In 2005 and 35% In 2006. These payments can be 
topped up by funding reallocated from the 2"d pillar of the CAP (albeit, cofinanced from Poland) and from 
the national funding to, respectively, 55%, 60% and 65%. 4 At 1250 EUR per annum (for 3-5 years). 
5 Degressive from 200 EUR per hectare in 2004. 
21 
Chapter 1: Research rationale, context, questions, and methodology 
parcelling land, services for farming businesses, marketing of high quality agricultural 
produce, basic services for rural population, village renewal and protection of rural 
heritage, diversification of economic activities providing for alternative income, rural 
water management, infrastructure connected with agriculture, encouraging tourism and 
crafts, improvement of environment connected with agriculture, forestry and landscape, 
recovering production potential destroyed as a result of natural disasters and financial 
engineering. This list provides a total of 27 measures from which to construct a 
structural rural development policy in Poland. 
FEOGA-Guidance policy operates according to the common major principles of the 
Structural Funds. Consequently, a multi-annual programme is required in Poland as the 
basis for fund disbursement. In addition, the EU funds need to be co-financed by the 
Polish public budget as well as by private funding. On-going monitoring as well as 
periodic evaluation will be required. The additionality rule does not permit simple 
replacement of national expenditure with Community funding. Programme design and 
implementation is to be done in partnership between the Commission and Member 
State, with involvement of local, regional, economic and social partners as appropriate. 
Within the framework of EC legislation, Poland needs to take choices, both as regards 
programming and implementation. On the programming side, the decisions involve the 
selection of measures6, allocation of funds and targeted beneficiaries. Each of these 
choices has a potential regional dimension: what regionally specific elements to 
incorporate and how to take such a decision (by the center, by the center with regional 
consultation or by the regional authority)? 
The EC legislation does not define the geographical level for regional involvement. 
According to Ch. 2, Art. 41 of Rural Development Regulation7: 
"Rural development plans will be drafted at the most appropriate 
geographical level. The plans will be prepared by the designated 
authorities in the Member States, and presented to the European 
6 The choice of measures is within the competences of the member states, with notable exception of agri- 
environment (which is obligatory). 
Council Regulation (EC), 1257/1999 Support to Rural Development by the European Agricultural Guidance 
and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), (0J 26.6.1999) 
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Commission, upon consultation with competent authorities and bodies at 
the appropriate geographical level". 
However, by raising the issue of "appropriate geographical level", the legislation puts 
this question directly on the agenda, rather than leaving it implicit. After all, even 
without it being explicitly mentioned, the national states have both a prerogative and an 
obligation to provide for geographical diversity, notwithstanding that the obligation 
might be avoided by declaring any geographical division inappropriate, in which case the 
obligation would shift to a requirement that this declaration be substantiated and 
defended. 
This encouragement, if not requirement, for consultation promotes the emergence and 
activity of local and regional actors. Hooghe (1998) points out that partnership has 
become a source of political contention as regional and local actors have used EU 
partnership to challenge their national governments. No precise definition is however 
given what actually constitutes consultation. The actual involvement of regional and 
other partners is still a reflection of political balance and habits. The geographical 
partners can either be consulted or directly involved as active participants in the decision 
making process. 
On the implementation side, similar decisions need to be taken. However, some clear 
guidelines are to be found in the Commission's proposals already, which seem to put 
restrictions on the geographical structures: 
'"Given the short programming periods of three years (2004-2006) ... it would seem logical to try and build to the maximum on the experience 
gained with and the implementing bodies set up under SAPARD" 
(CEC 2002: 12) 
In addition, clearly measures implemented from the Guarantee Section (such as 
afforestation, agri-environment, LFA, setting up producer groups) are to be centralized: 
The implementing bodies for the rural development programmes co- 
financed from the Guarantee instrument should be the programme 
management authorities in conjunction with the monitoring committees 
and the paying agencies set under SAPARD". 
(CEC 2002: 15) 
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1.4. Research questions: initial ambitions, early disappointments and 
forced amendments 
The original normative question: how should policy be regionalized so as to ensure its 
maximum contribution to economic and social cohesion8 in Polish rural areas, arose as 
much from a rational managerial standpoint9 as from the ignorance of the boundaries of 
social science. 
Begun at the start of 2000, this research had an ambition of developing models of rural 
cohesion, in particular of establishing a link between modes of rural policy 
regionalisation and their impact on regional economic and social cohesion. Admittedly, 
the original research objectives were conditional upon availability of policy data and 
conceptual frameworks. It was hoped that data from centralised SAPARD 
implementation would give an important basis for evaluating cohesion effects, compared 
with regionalised programmes such as those implemented under the Rural Development 
Project financed from the World Bank1°. However, despite its planned launch in the 
beginning of 2000, SAPARD only started in mid-2002, offering hardly any policy 
implementation data. But perhaps more importantly, at present, social science has only 
limited capacity to comprehensively evaluate policy optimality (Minogue, 1983), and 
offers scarce predictive power (Shapiro, 2002). The system is complex and there are 
simply too many variables, both on the economic, social, and institutional levels: 
"There does not exist an optimal level of decentralization: there exist 
specific levels, which will be one for every country calculated to hold 
appropriately in that context. Decentralisation as privatisation will 
improve economic efficiency to the extent that it seeks truer 
understanding of political and economic values". 
Bird and Vaiilancourt: 1998: 361 
8 As enshrined in the Single European Act, Art. 130 (a) providing for "reducing disparities between various 
regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions". 
9 New Public Management has been criticized especially for its unattainable goals (see e. g. Minogue, 2000), 
conflicts between the individual and collective interests, excessive managers' entrepreneurial spirits and 
costly mistakes, fragmentation leading to eroded accountability, and deficits of social values underlying the 
managerial public services. 
10 Rural Development Project (circa 297 million EUR) is an integrated rural development programme 
implemented in Poland in 2000-2004 with an objective of assisting In rural job creation, mostly outside 
agriculture. The main components of the programme are microcredits, labour redployment, education, 
institution building and rural infrastructure. The programme is Implemented In a decentralized way (for 
more details see: http: //www. fapa. com. pl/jkp/context/english/index_en. html). 
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As the ideal situation is clearly neither available nor commonly acceptable, for lack of 
both directly suitable methodology and data, life forces the researcher to use the second 
best strategy. Two broad, intertwined practical and theoretical research questions 
underpin this thesis: 
" What (if any) policy regionalisation is desirable for practical Polish EU rural 
development policies? 
" How can rural development processes and policy be conceptualised, to include 
regional dimensions? 
These main research questions are too general to be examined directly or confronted 
with the empirical data. Thus, they are examined in an inductive mode, based upon four 
specific research propositions derived from a theoretical debate on regionalisation and 
decentralization. 
1.5. In search for specific research propositions: the regionalisation 
and decentralization debates 
A mesh of theoretical debates intersects at policy regionalisation questions. Numerous 
multidisciplinary research agendas are located on the continuum between the normative 
and descriptive positions. Admittedly, regionalism (or broader decentralization 
concepts") cover diverse and complex issues, raising doubts about the analytical value 
of the notion (Keating, 1997). Three broad schools of thought engaged in the 
regionalisation debate are considered here, each with a different point of emphasis: new 
public management, economics (especially fiscal federalism) and new regionalism (with 
recent regulation theories and new institutionalism). 
1.5.1. New public management 
On the normative end of the theoretical spectrum lies new public management, with its 
emphasis on institutional aspects. It views decentralization as a policy imperative leading 
to more effective participatory management (Osborne, Gaebler, 1992). Accordingly, 
decentralised institutions are depicted as more flexible than centralised ones, since they 
li The use of terms regionalisation and decentralization are not always coherent. Regionalisation is 
commonly presented as a decentralizing phenomenon "downwards", often in conjunction with the 
globalisation pressures, weakening the central state "upwards". For the sake of this thesis, we use the term 
"regionalisation" as a specific case of decentralization, relating to empowerment of the regional (rather than 
local) actors (cf. Section 1.6.1. for more details on types of regionalisation). 
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can respond quickly to changing circumstances and customers' needs (Osborne, 
Gaebler, 1992; Bardham, 1997). Decentralisation is seen as encouraging a greater 
diversity in the construction and delivery of policies, thus helping policy makers to 
discover which policies are likely to be most effective. Decentralised policy management 
is claimed to generate higher morale, more commitment and greater productivity 
(Osborne, Gaebler, 1992: 253). Such a good performance is believed to be the result of 
the close proximity to the citizens (echoing the subsidiarity principle espoused by the 
European Commission, if not the European Union, at least in its rhetoric if not yet 
convincingly in its practice): 
"The closer government is to its citizens, the more accountable its 
officials tend to be... Unless there is an important reason to do otherwise, 
responsibility for addressing problems should lie with the lowest level of 
government possible" 
Osborne, Gaebler, 1992: 277 
Furthermore, Bardham (1997) suggests that costs of provision of public services tend to 
be lower if delivered and implemented at a lower level, since a uniform approach may 
not solve problems that, by their very nature, differ from one region to another. 
Moreover, decentralised policy delivery mechanisms are believed to allow for the 
emergence of local leaders for investment projects and innovative management, and 
might mobilise a higher contribution from the intended beneficiaries, particularly if they 
are involved at an early project formulation stage. Bardham argues that at the project 
selection stage, centralised hierarchies tend to reject too many good projects as not 
matching central criteria (a type I error). Hence, this approach seems to echo the 
criticism of SAPARD (cf. Section 1.2. above). 
However, the critics of new public theory argue that regions lack political accountability 
even if they have managerial accountability. Proponents of supra-local control stress the 
need for policy coordination. This is important, especially if the benefits of a policy spill 
across jurisdictions. They also claim that competence of central level bureaucrats is 
likely to be higher, as it is easier to attract qualified people to central bureaucracies than 
to local levels. Essential asymmetry in information occurs, since central government may 
not know what needs doing, while local government may not know how to do it 
effectively (Prudhomme, 1995). In general, decentralised decision makers are expected 
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to have an inherent bias towards accepting too many poor projects (a type II error), and 
of contesting the initial distribution of funds and resources, leading to more corruption 
(Azfar et al, 2001). Finally, smaller jurisdictions are more in danger of being captured by 
elites or single party monopolies (Azfar et al, 2001; Keating, 1997). 
1.5.2. Economic approaches (incl. fiscal federalism literature) 
From a purely economic perspective, a whole body of literature has grown up around 
intergovernmental relations, in particular finance (for a review see: Begg, 1998). A 
classic book on public finance (Musgrave, Musgrave, 1965) argues that public goods of 
national importance should be provided centrally, due to supra-regional benefits or 
spillover effects between lower level jurisdictions in a federation, whereas all other 
goods should be provided by the lower levels of the government as decentralization is 
believed to promote allocative efficiency by allowing greater differentiation of resource 
allocation. In the same fashion, Oates (1972) has listed three major reasons for 
decentralization as: heterogeneity of preferences across jurisdiction; information costs, 
which make it prohibitively costly to provide public goods centrally; and cost 
effectiveness of local provision due to electoral accountability. To that listing Tiebout 
(1956) has added the insight that competition between jurisdictions allows people to 
reveal their preferences better, as they simply can vote with their feet, adding exit to 
voice among their strategic options. 
However, recent economic analysis (Rodriguez-Pose, Gill, 2002) attempts to find a 
relationship between the degree of decentralization and economic efficiency, and 
concludes that the expectation that devolution leads to greater efficiency, and facilitates 
choice can be questioned due to harmful competition and lack of economies of scale, 
generating not only higher lobbying costs and more clientelism12, but also potentially 
more corruption. 
12 Roniger (2002) defines clientelism as asymetrical, yet mutually beneficial transactions based on 
differential control by groups or Individuals over the access to resources. Patrons may provide selective 
access to resources they control. In exchange the so-called clients are supposed to provide material or 
immaterial resources, Including their gratitude and loyalty. 
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1.5.3. New regionalism 
In contrast to normative ambitions characterizing new public management and 
economic approaches, new regionalism holds a view that the decentralized, regionalized 
governance results not so much from its superiority as from the evolution of economic 
regimes, which weaken the nation state (Keating, 1997). But the apparent death of the 
nation state is highly contested. Critiques of new regionalism call for a reappraisal of 
"new regional ideology" or "local sentiments" (McLeod, 2001; Lovering, 1999, Amin, 
1999), in order to clarify its vagueness, and remove the ignorance of macro-economic 
conditions and lack of academic rigour (Lovering, 1999, Amin, 1999). Nevertheless, with 
the rise of post-fordist13 modes of production, accompanied by increased mobility of 
capital and labour, as observed by Keating (1998), the functional imperatives of 
economic restructuring at the global level are said to be breaking down nation-states in 
favour of trading regional entities: 
"we are an interpenetration of territorial policy spaces, as Europe is 
increasingly regionalized, regions are europeanised, and the state is both 
regionalized and europeanised" 
Keating (1998: 183) 
New regulation theory assumes that the regional and local modes of government are a 
consequence of change in production patterns, linked to the forms of geographic and 
political governance and regulation. As Goldwin, Painter (1996) put it in a nutshell: 
"What we are witnessing with the demise of Fordism is the emergence 
of greater geographical unevenness in the system of regulation. The 
abandonment of national redistributive strategies has led to a parallel 
mosaic of differentiated spaces of regulation. These are constituted from 
a mixture of regulatory and anti-regulatory processes operating at 
different geographical scales. While the new local governance is part of 
that mixture, there is little evidence so far that it is capable of helping to 
sustain economic development and social cohesion in the medium term". 
If the region is subject to globalisation pressures, new institutionalists argue that it is 
the institutional networks that matter most for its responsive capacities. New 
institutionalists beliefs in participatory decision-making and associative structures as 
conducive to business, and learning and adjustment (Amin, 1999; Dimaggio and Powell, 
13 "Post-Fordism (sometimes called "neo-Fordism, " "flexible specialization" and "Toyotism") refers to a 
serious of changes in the production regime and a broader way of life from the late 70s and especially in 
90s, such as just-in-time manufacturing, use of computer aided specialization, flexibility, global capital 
fleeting the national regulation, niche markets and culture of consumption (Amin, 1994). 
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1991) have resulted in the rapid increase in quasi-public bodies (Lovering, 1999). 
Regional governance is perceived as essentially a means of regulating conflicts by 
reinforcing territorial regulation so as to establish "something collective" in increasingly 
atomized societies, for instance by shared collective memories or more naturally by 
distance proximity (Les Galles, 1998), which is seen as important for trust building, risk 
sharing and, ultimately, enterprise encouragement. In contrast, Rhodes (1986) stresses 
the interdependence and exchange of authority (or legal resources, financial, political 
legitimacy, informational, and organizational resources) between different levels of 
governance as the basis for associative structures and networks. 
1.5.4. Regionalisation issues in rural development policy and research 
agendas 
In the rural development context, the debate on regionalisation has been noticeably and 
surprisingly absent. The idea of subsidiarity is emphasised in the Cork Declaration, point 
5 (CEC: 1996), though the Declaration has failed to substantially colour the reform of 
rural development policies. 
"Given the diversity of the Union's rural areas, rural development policy 
must follow the principle of subsidiarity. It must be as decentralised as 
possible and based on partnership and co-operation between all levels 
concerned (local, regional, national and European). The emphasis must 
be on participation and a 'bottom up' approach, which harnesses the 
creativity and solidarity of rural communities. Rural development must be 
local and community-driven within a coherent European framework". 
The rural development research agenda thus features a debate around the local - 
central scale, with the regional level appearing striking by its absence. Although 
decentralization of policy administration and, within limits, design has been one of the 
key shifts in governance structures in OECD countries (Pezzini, 2001), little attention has 
been specifically devoted to the role of regional level in rural governance, 
notwithstanding an abundant research agenda on local and bottom-up approaches. 
Parker (1995), dealing with the World Bank decentralization programme, has been an 
exception. Based on the review of institutional practices, mostly in the developing 
countries, Parker has developed "a souffle theory of decentralization", claiming that 
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decentralization of agricultural and rural development policies need not be appropriate 
per se, rather it requires the appropriate combination of political, institutional, and fiscal 
factors to suit specific circumstances and contexts. Hard and fast rules, general 
propositions or universal recipes are impossible to discern or derive. 
1.5.5. Specific research propositions 
Despite the abundance of both normative and descriptive decentralization arguments, 
their application to academically rigorous research remains problematic. A number of 
propositions from the new public management perspective, such as "more flexible, more 
democratic, more efficient" decentralized governance suffer from imprecision and 
difficulties in measurability (Parker, 1995). A key methodological problem for those 
wishing to provide clear prescriptive propositions is the lack of an appropriate 
comparator. Genuinely comparable centralist and decentralized policies are simply hard 
to find. On the other hand, more descriptive new regionalism propositions often fail to 
be testable, regarded by some critics as mere conjectures, "stories that might be true" 
(Lovering, 1999). 
In the light of this general background, the following four research propositions are 
suggested, on the bases of: rigour (in particular, requirements for testing); data 
availability and practical policy relevance. 
1. The structure of rural resources and structures is heterogeneous across rural 
regions in Poland, which necessitate policy differentiation between regions. 
2. The preferences of regions' constituents and/or elected representatives for 
development measures are heterogeneous, so that policy demands are different 
between regions. 
3. Cohesion deficits between regions are sufficient to require regional financial 
differentiation to achieve more equal distribution of policy benefits across 
regions, and thus over constituents. 
4. The political process of preparing Polish EU rural programmes permits and 
facilitates regional differentiation, without which no regional policy can be 
successful, regardless of justification on other grounds. 
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Examination of each of these specific research propositions should then provide a sound 
and reasonable basis for synthesizing an answer to the principle and guiding issue 
addressed in this thesis: the appropriate level and form of regionalisation of agricultural 
and rural development policies for Poland. 
1.6. Research methodology 
Firstly, this thesis is fundamentally problem driven. The search for an appropriate 
methodology is part and parcel of this thesis. Though such an approach involves a 
substantial risk, it is nonetheless trying to avoid a trap of using self-serving construction 
of problems (as postulated for example by Shapiro, 2002). 
Secondly, this thesis is rooted in and has grown from an extended and active 
participatory experience. For this reason, a grounded approach (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967) seems particularly appropriate. It has involved a sequence of experiencing the 
social interactions, suspending awareness, seeking patterns of understanding, or what 
Weber called the "interpretive paradigm", by searching the relevant theories and 
validating them both by reference to participant observation as well as by mutual 
contrast. This research process has used the grounded theory in an atypical way. Whilst 
genuinely starting from a theory-free observation, it does in its first stage refer to 
highlighting a set of relevant theories against which further data is re-judged and an 
integrated framework developed. In contrast to the original approach advocated by 
Glaser and Strauss (1967), theories are not dismantled at the beginning of the process 
only to arrive at the final product, but are used in an intermingled way. The research 
process, illustrated in Figure 1.1 below, combines qualitative and quantitative methods 
and can be broadly described as theory triangulation (Denzin 1970, Burgess, 1982). The 
triangulation with multiple complementary theories and propositions is aimed to provide 
a general picture and to enhance the validity of the findings (Bryman, 1992). 
Thirdly, this thesis has necessarily adopted a multidisciplinary approach. The literature 
recognizes that the choice of methodology is inevitably a function of the researcher's 
preferences, ambitions and background (Branner: 1992). My generalist background, 
with some academic training in humanities, linguistics, management and advertising, 
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clearly favours an eclectic and multidisciplinary approach. The multidisciplinary nature of 
the policy problem as seen from the practioner's point of view (Shapiro, 2002) has also 
led to the critical appraisal of specific single-disciplined methodologies and theories in 
economics (Lee, 2002), human geography (Yeung, 1997) and political science (Shapiro, 
2002). 
Figure 1.1. Grounded theory method applied in this thesis 
Pre-existing ideas, concepts, values 
collected with constant comparisons 
Conceptual categories identified from the data and literature 
Core propositions identified 
Core propositions examined and triangulated 
Core question addressed 
conjecture developed or formal theory postulated 
Source: adapted from Lee (2002: 793) 
Obviously, the position of a researcher in a participant observation context is especially 
problematic. Whilst some methodologists claim that "all observation is theory laden" 
(Shapiro: 2002), my observation has been more "value laden", as I was immersed in the 
predominant policy narratives and sentiments, especially "localist ideologies". So the 
research process has involved the gradual replacement of the value-laden observation 
with theory-laden inputs. 
The principal question about the epistemological14 commitment underlining this thesis is 
not straightforward. Indeed, a three-tiered view of the world, following Lee (2002) is 
adopted: the economic world does not consist just of our experiences and events, but 
also of underlying structures and causal mechanisms. In the view of critical realism, 
theoretical constructions are not obtained by selectivity of data use, but by a constant 
14 Epistemology, a branch of philosophy, studies the nature of Knowledge. For the sake of this research two 
contradictory epistemological positions need to be distinguished. On one hand, knowledge can be viewed as 
essentialist, universal, and generating laws. The other view on knowledge assumes the construction of 
knowledge in time, dynamic, socially and context dependent. 
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search for fully explanatory propositions. In this sense, tentative answers to theoretical 
and practical regionalisation questions are theoretical conjecture, rather than a formal 
explanatory theory. But, as Shapiro (2002) has cogently argued, conjectures, while hard 
to evidence, might nonetheless be true. Other limitations of this research are related to 
the grounded theory approach. Yeung (1997) points to the practical constraints this 
approach might suffer. Prone to being lost in categories, the researcher is at risk of 
failing to see a broad picture or a theoretical perspective. Quite so. However, the final 
goal of this thesis - to synthesise - is well-suited as a guard against such dangers. 
The epistemological commitments for the specific research propositions follow the utility 
function. When possible, a positivist approach is used; where deemed more appropriate 
or relevant, interpretivist frameworks are employed, with an attempt to strike a balance 
and be conscious of the associated limitations, attempting what May (1997) terms as 
"building a bridge". 
Specific methodological guidelines, frameworks and data thus accompany each specific 
research proposition. For analysis of rural resources across Poland (Chapter 3), and 
budget regionalisation issues (Chapter 5), economic, geographic and statistical methods 
are employed to establish objective patterns, usually quantitative in nature, as positivist 
truths. The approach to examining regional preferences (Chapter 4) is more complex. 
Firstly, an eclectic approach is demanded by the nature of the available data. 
Documentary data, in conjunction with the fluid nature of preferences, are best tackled 
through a combination of para-quantitative and linguistic analysis. The discourse of 
regional development strategies is supposed to reveal the strength of regional loyalties 
and identity. Supplementary insider's observation, as well as a regional questionnaire 
exercise, are used in a more interpretavist mode, in contrast to the treatment of the 
documentary evidence. The analysis of political processes (Chapter 6) involves a few 
assumptions. First, although the approach is context specific and confined to Polish-EU 
policy (requiring a more interpretivist approach), positivist propositions are made on 
generalizations of process replication and behaviour, primarily on the basis of 
subsequent interviews with the policy actors. 
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Finally, it is worth noting that a search for a broad and practical result, rather than a 
more narrowly focused and academically rigorous study, can be considered as an 
attempt to go beyond what Kuhn (1970) has called a scientific paradigm. In this case, 
the conventional paradigm for higher degree research is that of a highly specialized, 
narrowly focused Ph. D. thesis. However, there is no commonly accepted formula or 
approach to the problem of desirable and effective development processes or associated 
policies. The search for a sustainable development policy for Polish rural regions is 
therefore fundamentally risky, an unambiguous characteristic of genuine research. 
Clearly, in the essential trade-off between breadth and depth, this study necessarily 
eschews rigour and academic excellence in favour of policy realism and relevance, yet 
also necessarily poses a risk of superficiality and unreliability. But by identifying the 
important assumptions and shortcomings, the study's ultimate methodological objective 
is a search for what Harvey (2000a) terms as "reconciliation between academic 
excellence and policy relevance". Meanwhile, as with all policy research, but especially 
with this - focused on accession policies in the context of an increasingly contested and 
potentially changing EU policy - the generic problem of transience has to be coped with: 
the policies under review and analysis are changing form and shape while they are 
being studied. Results and conclusions are thus bound to be essentially ephemeral, 
conditional and provisional, ultimately relative to the specific context and circumstance. 
The usual problem of the policies changing as they are researched has been 
encountered. The core research data comes from the participant observation (of 1999- 
2001), updated in the first half of 2002 with the FEOGA-Guidance developments 
following the launch of official EU proposals for an accession packages. This information 
was last updated for political events in January 2003 during a short series of interviews 
in Warsaw. The analysis is valid as of April 2003. FEOGA-Guidance programmes are still 
at the drafting stage (their first stage in summer 2002). The results of the Copenhagen 
Summit are treated as binding (though in practice the text was finalized before the 
official signing of the Accession Treaty). At the time of final drafting, in April 2003 only 
preliminary policy outputs are available. 
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On this basis, we now move to the specific policy context for this thesis. 
1.7. Polish regionalisation reform 
Polish regionalisation reform took place in 199915 as a second stage of the state 
administrative reforms in transition from the central planning system. The first stage 
was the creation of local self-governing communities (gmina) in 1990. 
The decentralisation process, originating from ideas of the opposition activities and 
Round Table16 discussions in the 80s (Regulski, 1999; Kerlin, 2001, Ostoja-Ostaszewska, 
2002), has been depicted as a fight of pro-reform forces linked to the post-Solidarity 
movement and status-quo holders of local power (such as the Peasant Party (PSL) and 
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD). The theoretical benefits of the reforms were strongly 
believed, as revealed passionately by M. Kulesza, Government Plenipotentiary for 
Administrative reform: 
"Putting off the reform again would not only carry measurable losses 
for civilization, but also for the economic development of the country and 
direct financial damage" (Kulesza quoted in Kerlin 2002: 5). 
Compliance with the EU standards (as an improvement of regional level administration) 
was seen as an appropriate adjustment to structural funds, and was popularly used in 
the reform discourse (Brusis, 2002; Ostoja-0staszewska, 2002), fuelled by the 
Commission's apparent, if not always explicit preferences for elected regional authorities 
(Brusis, 2002). In addition, the debate was underlined by an ideological traditionalist 
sentiment of restoring the pre-communist order (Kerlin, 2001). The results of the reform 
have been seen as "doing the main job of overhauling the soviet type of sub-national 
government. " (Ilner, 2002). 
As a result of the reform17,16 (new) self-governing voivodships, amalgamating the old 
and small 49 administrative voivodships, have been created. Despite numerous scientific 
is Law on the regional self-government of 5 June 1998 (0] 91,18 July 1998) 
16 Round Table discussions were held In 1988 between the official communist authorities (under the chair of 
President Jaruzelski) and the banned trade union and other opposition groups. The talks, taken amid 
widespread predictions of a social explosion, marked an important step in the peaceful Polish transition to 
democracy. 
17 Law on the regional self-government of 5 June 1998 (0191,18 July 1998) 
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studies carried out to ensure that these regional boundaries reflect historic and 
economic traditions (Regulski, 1999), the number and definition have, of course, been 
highly contested (Gorzelak, 1999), especially by those who have lost voivodship status. 
Pressures for a larger number of regions were relatively successfully opposed (Regulski, 
1999), contrary to the demands for more counties (poviats), as an intermediate self- 
governing level, where all local demands could be satisfied, with a number of counties 
totaling 372. 
The "new" regions are governed by regional assemblies (sejmik wojewodzki) headed by 
a board chaired by the marshall (marsza/ek). Central government is represented in the 
region by the governor (wojewoda, voivod)18, who is primarily responsible for enforcing 
central laws in the region. The scope of responsibilities of the regional authorities 
(marshals) have been broadly defined to include public education, health care, 
protection of cultural heritage, social supports, family-oriented policies, modernization of 
rural areas, spatial development, environmental protection, transport and roads, 
consumer protection, public security and counteracting unemployment. Funding is 
transferred from the central government to the regional authorities19 according to a 
regional contract identifying specific investment projects. However, the budgetary 
prerogatives fall well behind such a wide array of obligations (Gilewska, 2000) as plans 
for decentralization of public finance have not progressed as originally intended 
(Gorzelak, 2001; Zaleski, Dzedzyk, 2001). In particular, competences in regional 
development are not matched by budgetary authority, which is retained by the central 
administration. Presently, own revenues only account for 15% of total regional revenues 
(or, on average, 95 PLN per inhabitant) and the resultant reliance on central grants, 
especially special purpose subventions, leads to clientelism (Gilowska, 2000). Opaque 
divisions of competences, initially a transition tool helping to win popular support for the 
reforms (Kerlin, 2001), have led to tensions between voivods, marshals and central 
ministries (Zaleski, Dzedzyk, 2001). 
Zaleski, Dzedzyk (2001) argue that the competence of agriculture and rural development 
is a particularly misfortunate example of the competence "mess". The regional 
18 Law on the governmental administration of 5 June 1998 (OJ 91,18 July 1998) 
19 Law on supporting regional development of 12 May 2000 (OJ 14 June 2000) 
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governments have obtained the necessary legal competences, yet financial capacities 
have been almost totally retained by the center (cf. Table 1.2. ), so in practice the 
regions have little scope for regional policy-making. In addition, they have no 
competence in land policies, or even in the (recently re-centralised) advisory systems. 
Such a highly centralized non-transparent financial system has led Gilowska (2001) to 
claim that public agricultural expenditure is unlikely to be Integrated with regional 
policies. 
Moreover, Zalewski, Dzedzyk (2001) claim that mismatches between competence and 
financial authority lead to conflicts, not merely on the grounds of ambitions but also of 
competence between marshals and voivods. Most conflicts originate from the voivod's 
role in controlling the transfer of central funding to regional self-governments. As the 
scale of such transfers is huge, in practice voivods have the role of supervising the 
marshals, a tension reflected also in the structural funds preparation. 
Table 1.2. Polish public development expenditure on agriculture in 2000 
at central and regional level (million PLN) 
Grants and 
subsidies in 
agriculture 
Expenditure on 
assets in 
agriculture 
Other 
development 
funding in 
agriculture 
Central government, of which: 2,600.766 14.967 1.348 
State budget 2,589.606 14.209 0 
State targeted funds 11.106 0.767 1.348 
Self- government sector, of which: 89.092 880.443 0 
Communes 0 578.607 0 
Districts 0 192.426 0 
Towns with district status 0 8.797 0 
Voivodships 0 291.227 0 
Regional government targeted funds 89.092 0 0 
Both sectors 2 689.858 895.410 1.348 
Source: Gilowska (2001) 
It is In this context that Poland needs to make a choice on policy regionalisation for the 
structural programmes for agriculture and rural development on EU accession. 
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1.7.1. Definitions: policy regionalisation 
A variety of terms are used rather inconsistently in the decentralization debate, and 
have been ordered by Rondinelli (1981). He has identified four points on the 
decentralization continuum: de-concentration, delegation, devolution and privatization. 
In his classification, de-concentration implies the transfer of competence to local 
administrative offices of the central government. Delegation means the transmission of 
competence to sub-national governments. Devolution implies transfer of competence to 
sub-national political entities, and finally, privatization means transfer of functions to 
private agents. However, Parker (1995) makes a horizontal distinction between political, 
fiscal and institutional dimensions of decentralization, pointing at the imprecision of 
Rondinelli's classification, but failing to propose an alternative. 
Indeed, Rondinelli's (1981) typology of decentralization is confined to transfer of 
competences underlined by political and institutional contexts and is far from precise. It 
is argued here that the definition (and hence, classification) of policy regionalisation 
needs to go beyond transfer of competences. Following Parker's (1995) call for a more 
precise typology, a three dimensional categorization of policy regionalisation is proposed 
here for rural development policy. It is argued that policy regionalisation refers to 
encompassing regional aspects not only in institutional implementation set-up (exclusive 
to Rondinelli's typology) but also in policy design (programming) and budget allocation. 
Each of these dimensions constitute axes for classification. In addition, types of 
arrangements need to encompass not merely binary distinction of central versus 
regional competence, but also more cooperative, consultative arrangements applicable 
in the Structural Funds policy-making. Such a classification also allows more precision 
and coherence in the use of terms, which is badly needed, as both in Warsaw and 
Brussels (if nowhere else) their use is confusing (Interview: Nowicka, 2002; Juetta, 
2002). 
The resultant classification along three major dimensions is shown in Table 1.3. below: 
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Table 1.3. Three dimensional definition of policy regionalisation 
The case of EU rural and structural policies 
Programming 
axis2° 
Budgetary 
axis"l 
Institutional 
implementation 
axis22 
0. Horizontal, centrally 0. Horizontal allocation, 0. Central agency 
decided central co-financing headquarters 
1. Horizontal, 1. Regional allocation J. Regional administrative 
centrally decided, centrally decided; offices of central agency 
regionally consulted central co-financing 
2. Horizontal, centrally 2. Regional allocation 2. Regional administrative 
decided measures with centrally decided; offices of central agency 
regionally differentiated regionally consulted; In conjunction with regional 
policy details central co-financing authorities/committee 
3. Regionally differentiated 3. Regional allocation; 3. Regional administrative 
measures, regional co-financing bodies (voivod) 
centrally decided 
4. Regionally differentiated 4. Regional administrative 
measures, bodies (voivod) In 
centrally decided, conjunction with regional 
regionally consulted (elected) authorities 
(marshal)23 
5. Regionally differentiated 
measures, S. Regional (elected) 
regionally decided authorities (marshal) 
6. Regional programme, 
Regionally decided 
Source: own compilation 
A specific regionalisation category is a function of scores on the three continua. This can 
be better illustrated in Figure 1.2. below: 
20 The rural development programme consists of multiple measures (instruments) associated with specific 
objectives, eligibility conditions and criteria and rates of aid (termed policy details). 21 EU legislation requires that a funding allocation per measure Is specified In the rural development 
! 
programme. 
Z Implementation covers the following key functions: receipt of applications for aid (projects), processing of 
applications to determine their eligibility, ranking of applications, decisions to grant aid, contracts with 
beneficiaries, inspections and control and provision of information. The payment side involves authorization 
of payments, execution of payments to beneficiaries, and accounting procedures. 23 For details of competences of marshall and voivods, see Section 1.6. 
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Figure 1.2: Three dimensional classification of policy regionalisation 
institutional 
51 regional 
036 
central regiona 
design 
3 '`regional 
budgetary 
Source: own 
1.8. Roadmap for this thesis 
The research processes are shown in Figure 1.3. This research, essentially rooted in a 
grounded perspective, has consisted of processes of search (both for data and for 
theoretical frameworks), validation and, finally synthesis. 
The Key Policy Questions (Q), specified at the beginning of this Chapter (Section 1.4) 
are: 
9 Q. 1. What (if any) policy regionalisation is desirable for practical Polish EU rural 
development policies? 
" Q. 2. How can rural development processes and policy be conceptualised, to 
include regional dimensions? 
The Research Propositions (P), specified in section 1.5. above are: 
0 P1. The structure of rural resources is heterogeneous across rural regions in 
Poland, which necessitate policy differentiation between regions. 
" P. 2. The preferences of regions' constituents and/or elected representatives for 
development goals are heterogeneous, so that policy demands are different 
between regions. 
" P. 3. Resource and income disparities between regions are sufficient to require 
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regional financial differentiation to achieve more equal distribution of policy 
benefits across regions, and thus over constituents. 
" P. 4. The political process of preparing Polish EU rural programmes, permits, 
encourages and facilitates regional differentiation, without which no regional 
policy can be successful, regardless of justification on other grounds. 
Figure 1.3. Scheme of main research structure and process 
Complex system approaches 
Research Key questions Questions Q1 Policy/theory Q2 
Economic geography, Regional studies 
Development economics 
Heterogeneity Heterogeneity P1 
of resources of preferences 
Research Participant 
Propositions observation Grounded 
....:,. theory 
Budgetary Feasibility of 
P3 envelopes as political process P4 
equity measure 
Policy evaluation Political science 
Synthesis 
P2 
Analysis 
Main research processes 
. ",...:....... ............ : search analysis and cross-validation 
synthesis 
Chapter 1 
This chapter has outlined and discussed the research justification and context, leading to 
the main (theoretical and policy) questions of the thesis. These are tackled indirectly by 
exploring a series of specific research propositions formulated on the basis of a critical 
appraisal of decentralization and regionalisation debate. In the background, Polish 
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regionalisation reform is briefly discussed, as well as the choices related to Polish EU 
structural and rural development policies, as presented at the end of the accession 
negotiation. 
Chapter 2 
Chapter 2, a desk study of development literature and economic geography, seeks to 
establish a methodology for analyzing and interpreting Polish rural circumstances in a 
spatial sense. A brief account of current debates on development and its geography, 
both in developing and developed countries, leads to a specific discussion of rural 
circumstances, embodied by a classic endogenous versus exogenous development 
debate. This Chapter draws primarily upon development economics and economic 
geography. In conclusion, a framework for spatial interpretation of rural heterogeneity is 
presented. 
Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 explores the first specific proposition related to policy regionalisation, namely 
that of the spatial heterogeneity of problems and resources in Polish rural areas. Clearly 
in the positivist epistemology, the statistical techniques of Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA) and Cluster Analysis (CA) of secondary statistical data are used to examine the 
heterogeneity patterns of rural resources at both rurality (commune) and regional 
(voivodship) levels. Set against the broader historical and macroeconomic contexts, 
spatial rural analysis seeks to determine to what extent Polish regions are internally 
homogenous while being heterogeneous relative to each other. 
Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 examines a proposition of policy regionalisation as underpinned by 
heterogeneous policy preferences in Poland across regions. Data triangulation, based on 
the SAPARD regional consultation exercise and documented regional development 
strategies, is carried out to reveal regional differentiation of rural development policy 
preferences. Underneath the patterns of preferences, their legitimacy is examined as a 
basis for bottom-up regionalism, underpinned by territorial identities within Polish 
regions. New regionalism literature, in particularly work on regional identities and 
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legitimacy, is referred to in the analysis. The analysis itself combines mixed methods, 
including discourse analysis. 
Chapter 5 
Chapter 5 analyses the proposition that regional budget allocations for rural 
development policy are an important equity measure to ensure "fair" policy distribution 
between regions. Based on literature of fiscal federalism as well as rural credits, the 
theoretical basis for potential policy biases is identified. The Chapter also discusses the 
issue of cohesion and regional fairness for policy distribution as presented in literature. 
For its analytical parts, the policy absorption patterns of the financially regionalized 
SAPARD programme, as well as centralized horizontal aids in Poland, have been 
examined to assess the relevance of budgetary regionalisation. 
Chapter 6 
Chapter 6 examines the proposition of regionalisation feasibility in the Polish EU 
structural rural development policy programming. Based on a review of political science 
literature related both to the policy process itself, as well as specifically to the EU policy- 
making, an eclectic analytical framework is outlined for the short-term analysis. The 
analysis is carried out from participant observation data as well as a series of semi- 
structured interviews carried out with main policy actors. In conclusion, a speculative 
conjecture is made on the long term prospects for policy regionalisation and the key 
forces shaping it. 
Chapter 7 
Chapter 7 constitutes an attempt to synthesize the specific research propositions and 
multidisciplinary frameworks used in the analytical part of this work, to address both a 
theoretical and practical policy main research questions. A complex system approach 
with a multiple rationality policy model is proposed as an integrated framework for rural 
policy analysis. The policy implications are outlined. In conclusion, the new research 
questions and key limitations of the adopted approach are given. 
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Nature and Geography of Rural Development: 
towards a theoretical framework for analyzing spatial dimensions of 
rural development in Poland 
2.1. Outline and objectives of Chapter 2 
Based on the premise that spatial heterogeneity of rural circumstances potentially 
underpins policy regionalisation, this chapter develops a methodology for territorial 
analysis of rural development in Poland. Any interpretation of spatial characteristics in 
rural areas, though by no means straightforward (Weesp, 1999), is inherently 
underpinned by the concepts of development, including agricultural development. For 
this reason, emphasis has been placed on the discussion of development process. 
This Chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2. reports on the main concepts of 
development process as discussed in literature. Section 2.3. highlights the development 
processes in agricultural and rural contexts, concentrating on the locus of development 
impulses as endogenous or exogenous. The rest of the chapter concerns the location of 
those processes in space. Section 2.4. discusses the main forces behind economic 
convergence and divergence. Section 2.5. attempts to outline how the location of 
development processes and their dynamics are reflected in spatial categories of rural 
and urban, and in particular how rural typologies relate to the locus of economic 
development. In conclusion an analytical framework for evaluating the spatial 
dimension of rural development in Poland is proposed, especially on assessing the 
validity of the voivodship in describing the geography of Polish rural development. 
2.2. Concepts of development process and its main mechanisms 
Discussion of the development process, in which agricultural and rural development is 
embedded, is wide-ranging with far from univocal results (Mosse et al, 1998; Meyer and 
Stiglitz (ed), 2000). Development concepts, as well as ideology and explanatory 
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discourses, have evolved over time, generating different comparative measurements, 
and leading to different policy recommendations. The evolution of social and scientific 
approaches is partly attributable to intellectual efforts, and partly responsive to parallel 
historic developments and experience on the ground (for overviews see for example: 
Meyer, Stiglitz, 2000; Ruffan, 1998; Sachs, 1992; Thirwall, 1994). 
The traditional school of growth economics, pioneered in the 50s (Solow, 1957; Rostov, 
1960; Lewis 1955; Nurkse, 1957) was enthusiastic about grand theories and normative 
policy planning. As growth was seen mainly as an outcome of capital (especially physical 
capital) accumulation, governments were charged with engineering their policies and 
planning so as to maximize savings and encourage such desired accumulation. However, 
recently Podrecca, Carmeci (2001) question the causality of capital formation and 
growth, indicating a feedback relationship. To break low-level equilibria of poverty, 
recommendations were for a "minimum critical effort" (Leibenstein, 1957), or a "big 
push" (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943). Development was primarily conceptualized as simply 
economic growth, which good government was expected to plan and make happen. 
Enthusiasm about the planning powers of state actors, generated in the spirit of falling 
colonialism, ended rather abruptly in the 70s with clear evidence for deficiencies in 
planning. If development did not happen as expected, it was public mismanagement to 
be blamed, and efforts to learn and "get prices right" were encouraged. The 60s also 
brought a concept of "entrepreneurship" as a source of growth, and a collection of 
interdisciplinary socio-psychological approaches emerged (Hagen, 1962). 
Marked disillusionment with planning capacities led to abandonment of faith in state 
intervention and the re-emergence of "leaving it all" to the market, or in particular, to 
the forces of international trade. Both tangible and non-tangible (especially, access to 
information and diffusion of innovation) gains from trade were given as a recipe for 
accelerating development in the 80 and 90s (Krugman, 1991). There is now little doubt 
that open economies perform better than closed economies (Falvey, 1997) as people 
capitalize on their comparative and competitive advantages (Porter, 1990; Kay 1993). 
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With the inequality resulting from capital accumulation and labour displacement, 
economic growth itself was seen as insufficient to enhance the standards of living, or to 
reduce poverty24, and search for quality growth, rather than mere growth has been 
advocated. New definitions and measures of "quality growth" have come into vogue, 
with emphasis on poverty reduction (measured as income and growth of the bottom 
quintile), overall living standards (measured through the Human Development Index 
HD125 ), entitlements and freedom (Sen, 1987), and the more recent concept of 
"sustainable development". An example is the DiFD sustainable livelihood approach, 
stressing people's means of living and the need to decrease vulnerability, while not 
undermining the natural resource base. However simple the sustainability approach of 
maintaining the natural resource base may sound, it is plagued with difficulties in 
environmental valuation, units of measurement and geographical scales (Midmore, 
Whittaker, 2000). 
The search for universal sources of growth has now moved far beyond physical capital 
accumulation. Whilst, already in 80s, the residual in the growth functions relating 
income growth to capital accumulation and trade, was explained as arising from a 
mixture of education, economies of scale and improved efficiency, the new growth 
economics put innovation and knowledge into a new focus (Romer, 1986). Meanwhile 
(e. g. Gereffi, Fonda, 1992) more skeptical theories of economic growth were also 
advanced, emphasizing dependency theories (for example, imperial linkages) and 
Marxism. New market failures connected with information and risk-sharing, highlighted 
by the new institutional economy as well as by numerous comparative inter-country 
studies of differentiated economic performance (Barro, Sala-i-Martin, 1992) moved 
institutions into the center of attention of new generation of development economists 
24 Scott (1995) notes that in the EC higher income growth per capita may not necessarily improve 
development levels. Despite high GDP levels, the stringent budgetary discipline needed for meeting 
convergence criteria for EMU, combined with lower tax revenues resultant from fierce competition for 
inward investment, results in reduced public expenditure. A reduction in public spending might well be 
supposed to hit the poor disproportionately as they are less likely to be able to afford to pay privately for 
education, health, transport, environment or other "entitlements". Higher private incomes in the absence of, 
or difficult access to public entitlements might reduce, rather than improve life's quality. 
25 The Human Development Index (HDI), developed by the United Nations Organisation (first used in 1990), 
combines three factors of equal weight: opportunity for long and healthy life (life expectancy), educational 
attainment (adult literacy rate and school enrollment), and standard of living (GDP per capita). 
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(Stiglitz, 1989). Institutions, defined as "rules of the game in a society" (North, 1990), 
underpinned by conventional trust and willingness to cooperate, began to be seen as 
"social capital" (Abramovitz, 1993; Fukuyama, 2002), leading to decreased transaction 
costs and risk-encouraging innovative attitudes (Putnam, 1993; Williamson, 2000; 
Ruffan, 1998) and acceptance of complementarities between the state and the market. 
In the light of current pre-occupations with seeking explanations of past growth or pre- 
conditions for future growth, Ruttan's (1998) comment seems vital: 
"any attempt to analyze economic development with a model in which there is 
no mechanism to generate structural transformation can hardly be regarded as 
serious. It resembles an attempt to perform Hamlet with no role for the Prince of 
Denmark. " 
Such structural options are often missing in literature. The debate about the nature of 
development process teaches us that development is complex, multifaceted, non-linear 
and non-replicable (Adelman, 2000; Mosse et al, 1998). The World Bank report (2000) 
highlights a few of the important development components for policy guidance: 
"Development is about improving the quality of people's lives: higher per 
capita income, more equitable distribution of education and job opportunities, 
greater gender equality, better health and nutrition, a cleaner, more sustainable 
environment, a more impartial judicial system, broader civil and political 
freedoms, a richer cultural life". 
World Bank, 2000: 126 
The story of development studies demonstrates that their ex-ante predictive capacities 
are limited, and hence, their ability to provide a solid framework for beneficial policy 
intervention is also rather limited. Development economics, with its recent and 
important branch of transition economics, follows its own principles: it develops its 
learning by doing, and offers no ready-made recipes of how to make development 
happen, only a general way of reflecting on past performance and learning from it. 
26 Other features of growth, or what the World Bank (2000) terms as "quality of growth" Include its 
sustainability and equity. The World Bank study (2000) suggests that economic growth (as measured by 
GDP per capita) has a positive correlation with some health indicators, however, the study points out that 
growth in GDP per capita can be achieved in numerous ways, with different volatilities, as for example, 
incentives to exploit natural capital below its real costs might bring unsustainable growth. Similarly, 
openness to trade and the volatility of capital flows are (can be) associated with increased volatility of 
growth. To offset potential risks, a strong financial sector along with effective regulatory and legal 
frameworks are needed. Also high per capita rates can be reached simply by the labour (or the 
unemployed) moving out of the disadvantaged region, which may not contribute to cohesion (more on 
cohesion in Chapter 5). 
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Recent studies, influenced by Foucault's work, have taken a new and critical view of 
"development narratives" and the historically specific interactions between knowledge 
and power, especially with particular types of scientific knowledge to the exclusion of 
others (Mosse, 1998). 
2.3. The process of agricultural and rural development and its primary 
determinants 
Likewise, debates on mechanisms of agricultural and rural development remain 
inconclusive, both in the context of developed post-industrial economies (Ploeg et al, 
2000; Terluin, 2000) as well as in developing countries. 
2.3.1. Definitions and core conceptualisations 
Within a whole spectrum of definitions of rural development, the holistic nature of 
development seems uncontestable, at least in its meaning beyond agricultural or purely 
economic terms, (Shepherd, 1998; Knickel, Renting, 2000; Saraceno, 2002; Bryden, 
2000). The following definition (Shepherd, 1998: 3) is sufficiently representative for 
present purposes: 
"Rural development is the set of activities and actions of diverse actors - 
individuals, organizations, groups - which taken together lead to progress in 
rural areas. Progress is defined differently by different people: historically, 
material progress - growth of incomes and wealth, (reduction in) poverty - has 
been the main consideration in development theory and practice. Today other 
indicators of progress - cultural, spiritual, ethical - are increasingly taking their 
place beside the material in a reformulated, more holistic concept of 
development. " 
Questions remain as to whether rural areas are capable of non-dependent growth 
(echoing the role of agriculture debates above). For Hodge (1986), rural areas are 
capable of sustained growth as he claims that their growth results in "an overall 
improvement in welfare of rural residents and in the contribution which the rural 
resource base makes more generally to the welfare of the population as a whole". On 
the other hand, for some post-industrial researchers in the developed economies (such 
as Saraceno, 1994a; Lowe et al, 1995) rural development need not to be a positive 
category at all. They claim that rural development merely constitutes a residual 
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category, closely linked with developments elsewhere in the economy (in urban sectors), 
and they argue plausibly and forcefully that ruralities in Western Europe are increasingly 
becoming places of consumption rather than production. 
However, there is no doubt that the relative decline of the conventional (commodity) 
agricultural sector is necessary as the development proceeds, simply because income 
growth itself both generates and is generated by non-agricultural (food production) 
activities. This forces rural economies to seek alternatives elsewhere. But those 
opportunities, at least in the light of present geographical theories, are seen as limited 
indeed. Physical dispersion, lack of agglomeration economies, looser networks of 
information and higher transport costs are claimed to put rural areas at a structural 
disadvantage (Leon, 1999). However, empirical research carried out in Europe has 
evidenced a variety of rural adjustment strategies. A wide body of research carried out 
in Europe notes a variety of adjustment strategies, such as the provision of 
environmental and recreation services, culture, networking, cost-reduction and value- 
added differentiated products (Ploeg et al, 2000); or rural specialization oriented 
respectively around mass food markets, quality food production, agricultural 
development and non-agricultural developments (Marsden, 1998). Indeed recent 
research (Saraceno, 2002; Terluin, 2000; OECD, 1994) shows that a traditionally 
conceptualized spatial rural hindrance in developed countries has not materialized, at 
least not in terms of employment losses. Emerging theoretical models are indicating an 
increasing role of cultural and environmental capital for rural development (Ray, 2002), 
replacing traditional land based agricultural production as the richer (largely urban) 
society is willing to pay for the provision of landscape and amenity based productions 
(Moss, Chilton, 1997). However, the transformation paradigm underpinning such post 
(agricultural) modernization is still conceptually deficient (Ploeg, 2000; Ray, 2002). 
On the other hand, the conceptualization of agricultural development in developing 
economies is based on the assumption of higher marginal returns of labour outside 
agriculture and, hence the need to provide encouragement to move resources out of 
agriculture (Hunter, Knowles, 1998). In this model, the agricultural surplus is extracted 
49 
Chapter 2: Nature and Geography of Development Process 
to finance industrial development (Winters et al, 1998) whereby price serves as a 
primary mechanism for extraction. As coined in a classic Kuznets (1964) model, one of 
the crucial problems of modern economic growth is how to extract from the product of 
agriculture a surplus for the financing of capital formation necessary for industrial 
growth without at the same time blighting the growth of agriculture. 
The literature disagrees about whether agricultural and rural development processes 
follow a repetitive paradigm, or happen merely as a set of their own non-replicable 
incidents. In the context of developing countries, Shepherd (1998) argues succinctly 
about the failure of a modernization paradigm, supporting the need for people to define 
their own course of development. This view is supported by a whole array of research 
(and policy approaches) on community-based bottom-up development (LEADER 
Observatory, 2001) maintaining that in post-industrial globalized economies, competitive 
advantage built on unique resource mixes (Harvey, 1996; Saraceno, 1994a) defines a 
unique development trajectory. However, some researchers, in particular in Italy, 
believe in a sequential logic of rural development (Esposti, Sotte, 2002; Storti, 2000) on 
the continuum between agrarian and post-industrial modes of rural organization as 
indicated by employment in primary, secondary and tertiary sectors. Storti's (2000) 
classification by employment clusters in relation to the national averages, identifies 
manufacturing systems, tourism based systems, agricultural systems, mixed hinge 
systems, agricultural systems in transitions, and finally, Integrated systems. 
This discussion brings us to a question of the origin of rural development processes, the 
main bone of contention in current rural development studies: if development impulses 
lie inside or outside the control of rural dwellers. 
2.3.2. Determinants of rural development process: endogenous/exogenous 
debate 
Proponents of exogenous theories (in vogue till 70s) base their view on an assumption 
that modernization results in a division of economic activities between urban and rural: 
urban areas become the domain of industries and services and rural areas that of 
agriculture. Since urban areas are the primary determinants of agricultural demand, the 
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process is exogenously determined (Slee, 1994), neglecting local impulses or values. 
The endogenous development approach is conceptualized primarily as grounded on local 
resources, in which local values are respected and able to sustain control of the 
development trajectory. In this model, networks of small and medium firms can 
constitute a rural competitive advantage with local locus of control, based on 
agglomeration economies of exchange and durability of local networks, leading to the 
decline of information costs and trust-building relations decreasing transaction costs. 
Ideas of an endogenously determined potential have led to concepts of "bottom-up", 
"community development" (LEADER Observatory, 2001). Bryden (1998) has elaborated 
the endogenous theories by arguing that in global economies with mobile capital and 
human resources, the competitive advantage can be ensured based on a unique mix of 
immobile local resources as social, environmental and cultural capital. 
A mixed endogenous-exogenous approach, advocated by Lowe et a/ (1995), for 
example, claims that the control of rural development process lies at the interplay 
between internal and external actors. According to this view, analysis should cover 
economic resources in conjunction with political components of internal and external 
power networks. 
The debate suggests that the importance of endogenous capital increases with 
abundance of capital and labour. In Poland, with limited consumer demand, and limited 
capital stocks, the main impulses for rural development processes are likely to come 
from external, urban economies, with location being an important rural asset. However, 
following Lowe's mixed approach, the spatial location, or broader connectivity, in 
relation to growth centers can be endogenised. Given the restructuring processes in 
urban economies and high unemployment, the practicability of monitoring rural 
dynamics in employment trends seems to be limited. Notwithstanding that the 
development process features fundamental complexity and, hence, dynamic 
unpredictability (e. g. Capra, 1996; Prigogine Stengers, 1984), we conclude that the 
development prospects of a given rural area are a function of all its assets, including 
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location, as endogenous factors, as well as the development of the broader regional 
economy (exogenous factors). 
2.4. Geography of economic dynamics 
Given the concept of development and its primarily determinants, we now move on to a 
static question of "where", and dynamic question of forces behind rural change. The 
unequal patterns of development are an obvious fact, yet the task of explaining those 
patterns by contemporary theories still remains "ambitious" (Marsden, 1995; Henderson 
et al, no date) with explanatory but contradictory convergence - divergence theories 
being offered. 
2.4.1. Convergence-divergence debate 
Under the neo-classical economic model, the economic dynamic between territories is 
perceived as a balance between forces of convergence and those of divergence. 
The convergence theory (see, e. g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992) proposes that 
economic convergence happens automatically, at least in the long run, independent of 
initial conditions, as long as technology transfer is not seriously restrained, as growth is 
assumed as mainly exogenous, driven by a knowledge progress. Capital flows from 
richer regions to poorer ones, where it is assumed to generate higher marginal returns, 
stemming from relative scarcities. Similarly, with time, labour (if assumed a mobile 
resource) will tend to move to more prosperous regions, thus equalizing capital/labour 
ratios and returns. However, this theory depends rather heavily on the simplifying 
assumptions that capital returns are determined independently of the history and 
context of investment, and that these returns are not closely co-determined by the 
quantity and quality of labour (human capital), and other capitals, and that both labour 
and capital are malleable into different forms and activities over time, as well as being 
mobile over space. Weaker versions of convergence theory hold that convergence is not 
automatic, depending on the set of policies, with conditionalities on mobility of factors, 
and on the nature of competition in both factor and product markets. 
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The divergence approach highlights a number of forces, such as economies of scale, 
scope and agglomeration. Economies of scale tend to encourage concentration, 
specialization and regional divergence. Already developed regions appear to be better in 
transforming knowledge into improved human capital than lagging regions. Growth in 
one sectoral or product dimension tends to generate growth in supporting and 
complementary sectors in the same or adjacent localities. At least temporary monopolies 
are often generated by innovation, which happens in specific locations. Labour market 
efficiency is enhanced due to search-and-match effects27, which are stronger in more 
developed regions. The weak non-convergence hypothesis argues that some minimum 
absolute level of externality-inducing factors must be obtained, or a critical threshold 
attained in the endowment of the strategic inputs: human capital, public infrastructure, 
R&D, financial. Krugman (1991) notes that regional economies tend to be more 
specialised than national economies of the same size. This is a direct prediction of the 
theory of trade, where open (trading) economies take advantage of and specialise 
according to their comparative advantages to capture the gains from trade. In addition, 
movements of capital and especially labour often give rise to cumulative processes of 
uneven developments (Myrdal's "cumulative causation"), where particular enabling and 
supporting factors tend to reinforce each other over time. However, the development of 
footloose industries (which do not rely on transportation of raw materials or final 
products) as well as general reduction in logistical costs (associated with improved 
transport and communication systems) can, in principle at least, overcome some of 
these disadvantages in modern circumstances, notwithstanding the apparent importance 
of these factors (economies of scale, scope and agglomeration) in explaining historic 
development patterns. 
The literature discussed above indicates that the forces for convergence and divergence 
are not exclusive. An actual outcome appears the function of their strengths 
characteristic to a particular area, making any generalization highly risky. The debate 
offers scarce predictive powers, but it can be helpful in explaining the observed 
dynamics of development. 
27 Search-and-match facilities, such as job counseling and agencies tend to be better organized in better-off 
regions where the fluctuation on the labour markets are higher. 
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Having briefly discussed the notions of development process, its sources and 
geographical dynamics, we finally move to summarize the critical spatial categories such 
as rural typology, region and locality (rurality), against which we set the Polish spatial 
analysis. 
2.5. Main spatial categories 
2.5.1. Rural 
The following three main approaches to categorisation of "rural" have been identified by 
Blanc (1997), reviewed by Terluin, 2000; Terluin, 2001: spatial, territorial and 
constructivist. A spatial approach attempts to define the distinctiveness of rural areas 
from other (urban) territories. The use of space however, is seen not as a purely 
descriptive category, but more as an outcome of agents' search for optimum location in 
relation to the centre. Activities further away from the center are likely to bring lower 
rents, require less economics of scale and scope (such as basic services) and feature 
lower levels of employment. The rural thus corresponds to the peripheral and is defined 
by a set of socio-economic indicators, such as population density, share of agricultural 
sector or land use. Examples of such categories include OECD (199428) definition by 
population density. The second approach, termed "territorial", based on a model of 
competing discrete territorial economies with close rural-urban linkages (Douglass, not 
dated), claims that the added value of the rural as an analytical category is limited. 
Instead, the concept of "local" economy is deemed more appropriate (Saraceno, 
1994b)29. Indeed, a diversity of ruralities makes Murdoch and Pratt (1993) call for "an 
end to the use of universal or global concepts such as 'rural' (or the 'urban') and for a 
concern with the way places are ' made"'. The third stream of rural conceptualizations 
holds that spatial categories are merely mental constructs, emerging through social 
habits and language use, which function as a reference frame in the complex world. 
Linked with such an approach is a group of rural studies on image and cognitive studies 
of how the term "rural" functions in public discourses (Richardson, 2000), and the 
"cultural turn" in rural geographical studies (Little, 1999). Such a non-essentialist 
28 OECD (1994) defines rural areas as municipalities (NUTS V) with a population density below 150 
Inhabitants per square kilometre. Further sub-categories are distinguished between predominantly, 
significantly and rural regions (at NUTS II) based the share of rural population in the total regional 
population. 28 29 Indeed, an official Polish definition of rural areas is constructed based on non-urban delimitation. 
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approach to rurality also appears to be in line with some sociological approaches, which 
increasingly question the fit between horizontal spatial patterns and complex, mostly 
vertical social structures (Bradley, Lowe, 1984). 
2.5.2. Rural typologies 
A widely acknowledged rural diversity invites a whole array of rural typologies. They are 
relatively easy to fabricate in descriptive terms, but their explanatory value is not so 
easily discerned. Weesp (1999) notes that the explanation shaping development of 
ruralities defeats any attempts for a simple classification: as "seen as entities, rural 
areas are as diverse as any other region, and are subjects to a range of conflicting 
developments" (Weesp 1999: 249). Current typologies of rural areas are a function of 
objectives as well as of underlying concepts of rural dynamics. Three groups of rural 
typologies (evolutionary (dynamic); policy; resource), are recognized in current literature 
and are discussed briefly below. 
Evolutionary typologies are underlined by an ordering process (Esposti and Sotte, 2002, 
Storti, 2000; Ceccato, Persson, 2002). Esposti and Sotte's (2002), based on a belief that 
ruralities undergo an evolution along the path from "agrarian rurality", "industrial 
rurality" to "post-industrial rurality", which leads to a clustering of ruralities by 
employment share in major sectors. A similar analysis is presented by Storti (2000)30. In 
Sweden, Ceccato and Persson (2002) suggest that key drives for rural change come 
from specialization and creation of inter-firm networks: their resultant typology is based 
upon defining units with geographical employment clusters in specific sectors. In France, 
Henry et a/ (2001) present econometric models of the rural development dynamic by 
modeling rural population and employment changes related to urban proximity. In the 
UK, Marsden (1995) argues that the main dynamic paradigms differentiating rural 
spaces are orientated around: mass food markets, quality food markets, agriculturally 
related development and rural restructuring (non-agricultural development), with a 
classification of ruralities generated accordingly. 
'o Storti (2000) uses cluster analysis to define rural trajectories based on the following indicators: 
employment share of primary sector; employment share of tertiary sector; manufacturing employees per 
thousand inhabitants; wholesale and retail trade employees per thousand inhabitants; hotels employees per 
thousand inhabitants; and bank establishments per thousand inhabitants. 
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A Hungarian rural typology (Bauko; Gurzo 2001) exemplifies a resource-based 
classification, with emphasis on the type of agricultural systems and resources and 
natural amenities. 90 rural Hungarian microregions are divided into the following 
categories: predominantly intensive agricultural area; predominantly extensive 
agricultural area; predominantly protected area; mixed extensive and intensive 
agricultural area; mixed extensive agricultural/protected area and balanced areas 
(Bauko; Gurzo 2001). Classification is based on complex indexes characterizing 
agricultural potential and environmental sensitivity. 
Finally, policy classifications of ruralities (at least in the EU) seek to assess rural 
disadvantage measured by low population density and/or high share of agricultural 
employment. Selected rural areas eligible for assistance under EU Objective 2 of the 
Structural Funds are defined as local systems with a population density below 100 
inhabitants per square kilometre and/or with a percentage share of agricultural 
employment in total employment which is equal or higher than twice the Community 
average in any year from 1985 on (Regulation (CE) 1260/99). Further EU classifications 
seek to evaluate locational advantages in relation to urban economies (integrated, 
intermediate and peripheral zones: European Commission, 1997). EC definitions are 
more descriptive as follows: a) integrated rural areas, with a growing population, an 
employment basis in the secondary and tertiary sectors, but with farming still being a 
key use of land. Facing potential threats to their environmental, social and cultural 
heritage, some of these areas, relatively close to big cities, risk becoming dwelling areas 
only and not working areas ("urbanization"); others are developing in their own right; b) 
intermediate rural areas, relatively distant from urban centres, with a varying mix of 
primary and secondary sectors; in many countries, larger scale farming operations are 
found in these areas; c) remote rural areas, with the lowest population densities, often 
the lowest incomes, and an older population which depends heavily on agricultural 
employment. These areas generally provide the least adequate basic services; isolating 
features are often topographic characteristics, like mountains, or their remoteness from 
transport networks. Clearly, these classifications imply a policy focus on non-agricultural 
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growth in rural areas. Indeed, the agrarian decline, which is not offset by growth in 
other sectors, leads to reduced incomes and lack of development. 
2.5.3. Spatial units: region, locality and local labour unit 
The final point of theoretical background is that of a basic unit for exploring rural 
diversity. In this respect a tension arises between achieving high spatial sensitivity 
(Bradley, Lowe, 1984), and the need to avoid burdensome analysis of numerous 
variables on a lower level (Marsden, 1998). In addition, the application of existing 
administrative boundaries is argued most appropriate for policy relevance (Montresor, 
2002). Generally, four types of geographical units can be considered as potential 
candidates for spatial rural readings: a region, a microregion, a local labour unit and a 
locality. Before looking at the functional meaning of geographical unit, one important 
point should be emphasised. Though conceptually defined as discreet categories, some 
approaches (notably, Murdoch, 1997) stress networked dependencies with uneasy 
boundaries between them. The logic of this approach indicates that any geographical 
distinction will be necessarily artificial and arbitrary. 
The basic unit of spatial structure is conceptualized in human geography as a locality, 
defined as follows: 
"a locality can be delineated according to the distance over which effects of the 
decisions characterize these activities are felt and cause reactions. A large 
number of decisions, generally concerning the daily needs of people, such as 
retailing, private organization such as the parish and local government make 
their effects felt in areas encompassed by not much more than fifteen minutes to 
half an hour of traveling time" (Hilhorst, 1990: 10). 
The locality constitutes the seat of the most primary human zone. For higher rank 
activities, a concept of a slightly bigger functional microregion has been established and 
defined as "a set of villages and nearest town" (Hilhorst, 1990: 9). Microregions are used 
for Hungarian rural classification (Bauko; Gurzo 2001). An alternative unit of 
measurement for rural geographic analysis (usually equivalent in size) is based on 
functionally defined areas called Local Labour Systems (LLSs)31. LLSs are obtained as 
31 In an LLS, workers who live and work within the area are the highest number, while both residents with a 
job outside the area and non residents working in the area represent the lowest figure. LLSs make it 
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aggregations of municipalities identified on the basis of daily labour flows between 
residential areas (which are mainly rural) and urban and industrial centres. LLSs are the 
basis for Italian (Storti, 2000) and Swedish rural classifications (Ceccato, Persson, 2002) 
2.6. Proposed methodology 
Based on the literature above, constrained by data availability and driven by research 
objectives, the following methodology is proposed for spatial analysis of the relevance of 
regional ("voivodship'ý level to Polish rural development policies. 
2.6.1. Geographical units 
Firstly, the policy relevance of this research dictates references to current administrative 
boundaries (Montresor, 2002) rather than unbounded territories. Notwithstanding that 
the EU does permit dynamic geographical associations with no rigid administrative 
boundaries for some of its policies (notably the Community LEADER Initiative), in this 
thesis references to current administrative structures will be maintained. The assumption 
that different rural contexts require a specifically tailored policy mix, explored in much 
rural policy related research (inter alia, McDonnagh, et al, 2001; OECD: 1994) leads this 
analysis to concentrate on identifying patterns of commonality and heterogeneity in the 
Polish rural world. 
In particular, we seek to validate the notion of "voivodships" (NUTS II) as functional 
rural "planning" regions (Blair, 1995), legitimized by internal homogeneity and external 
heterogeneity. To substantiate internal homogeneity, smaller units of analysis, namely 
rural communes (NUTS V- equivalent to "localities") will be referred to. All geographical 
units are assumed to be discreet units and of equal status, largely in line with 
Saraceno's local economy approach (Saraceno, 1994a). Leakages and multipliers 
between territorial economies (Leon, 1999) as well as hierarchical network dependencies 
(Murdoch, 1997) are neglected for reasons of simplification and data availability. 
possible to take the functional division of space into account by considering the labour market linkages 
between rural and non rural communities. LLS is defined based on community information on commuting. 
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2.6.2. Differentiated rural characteristics and their underpinning 
The choice of defining characteristics and their dynamic must reflect an underlying 
model for rural development if the comparative exercise is to be meaningfully 
interpreted. 
The approach advocated below draws upon the endogenous/exogenous debate (van der 
Ploeg, 1995) as well as on the livelihoods perspective (DfiD, 2002). The main 
assumption is that the development trajectory of a given area is driven by its 
competitive advantage underpinned by a relative resource endowment (Leamer, 1987; 
Anderson, 1995) (quoted in Harvey, 1998) - Figure 2.1. Areas with fewer resources do 
less well. The second assumption is the development process consists in capital building 
(or in other words, expanding resource base)32. 
Figure 2.1. Area based rural resource pentagon 
TOTAL 
FACTOR 
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Note that the labels attached to each form of capital indicate the potential approximate measures 
or indicators of each stock. 
Source: own, inspired on DfiD (2002), Learner (1987) and Anderson (1995) 
32 The alternative theories claim that the development process has to do with improving efficiency (Temple, 
1999). Please note that the difference between the two approaches arises for terminology only. If 
resources are broadly defined, innovation can be endogenised. 
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Of course, this is a major simplification. Firstly, Berkum, Meijl (2000) note that the 
rewards to factors of production change with trade and technological change. Secondly, 
the link between rural resource mix and rural dynamics needs to be better explored. 
Thus, the concept of total factor endowment (Figure 2.1), represented on a resource 
pentagon" does not attempt to provide a representation of reality, it merely serves as a 
mental construct for comparative analysis: 
Notions of some types of capital are already strongly established in literature. In 
particular, physical capital, perhaps most clearly defined, relates to physical 
infrastructure, as well as plant and machinery, as well as financial assets. In DFID 
(2002) conceptualization of livelihoods framework, the financial capital is seen as a 
distinct category. However, in territorial context such a distinction does not seem to 
bring any conceptual benefit. Furthermore, it can be strongly argued that financial 
capital is the (often primary) means through which the various resource capitals are 
exchanged and transformed. To separately identify financial capital as one of the five 
primary dimensions of the resource base seems to confuse means with ends, and 
structures with processes, and furthermore obscures one of the critical linkages between 
the locality and its wider world. 
The notion of human capital (linked to development prospects, as emphasised by 
Abramowitz (1993), and new growth theorists) reflects the character of the rural labour 
force, its skills, abilities, entrepreneurship, and innovativeness as well as health. Natural 
capital encompasses land and natural resources, as well as, increasingly important, 
environmental and landscape qualities. Social capital (as analyzed by: Robinson, 2000; 
Ritzen et al, no date; Fukuyama, 2002) incorporates social norms and standards for 
cooperative behaviour, trust, and collective cultures including image, identities and 
networks, and is thus close to the notion of institutions (North, 1990). Unlike Bryden 
(1998) and Ray (2002), no special conceptual distinction is made here for cultural 
capital. This concept is strongly associated with both natural and social capitals 
(institutions), as well as with the relationships between these local capitals and their 
33 Inspired on DfiD livelihoods pentagon (DFID, 2002). 
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counterparts in the wider socio-economy with which this region or locality interacts. As 
a consequence, it is not separately identified as a distinct resource base here, though 
this does not deny that further elaborations of this framework could not include separate 
identification of cultural aspects of both natural and social capital. 
Finally, a new notion of spatial capital is proposed here to encompass features of 
connectivity (and hence, agglomeration economies) as well as access to markets (and, 
hence, gains from trade) and to seats of political power. The idea of spatial capital is in 
line with spatial theories, which treat space as a scarce resource (Leon, 1999). 
Additional spatial features in the broad category of spatial capital reflect urban linkages. 
This concept echoes the fundamental notion of geography, where development has 
historically happened round trade routes and transport and communication nodes (and 
hence around political power nexus) as well as round concentrations of natural 
resources. 
The rural resource pentagon by no means implies that rural development happens 
exclusively endogenously. Quite the opposite, following the Lowe et a/ (1995) argument, 
it is assumed that rural development takes place as an interplay between internal and 
external forces and associated resources. Yet, it is argued here that the internal and 
external resources mobilized for rural development are neither independent variables (as 
conceptualized by Lowe), nor exclusively dependent on the networks of social capital (as 
elaborated by Terluin, 2000). Instead it is argued that access to external resources, 
mostly to urban linkages and financial capital inflows, is determined not only by social 
capital, but also by location conceptualized here as part of spatial capital. Spatial and 
social capital endowments (partly independent variables explaining the exogenous factor 
mobilization) are area specific. In short, it is the value, and hence attraction, of these 
internal, local resources to external trading and political partners (or would-be 
governors) which determine the development potential of a locality, in conjunction with 
the coherence between local institutions and cultures with those of the locality's 
economic and political partners or competitors. Thus, the rural resource pentagon 
implies partial endogenisation of external factors of development, through the 
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fundamental economic, social and political transactions between the locality and the 
wider world within which it exists. 
Moreover, some exogenous factors, such as macro-economic policies and the overall 
rate and character of growth in the economy, can be assumed to operate horizontally 
across space, and cannot therefore be separately identified in a territorial analysis of 
heterogeneity, yet these common exogenous factors are clearly important in explaining 
patterns of commonality. 
Although the area-based rural pentagon is a useful theoretical concept for thinking 
about territorial rural heterogeneity, making it operational poses practical difficulties. 
The key problem is that of identification and measurability. Whilst some types of capital 
(especially physical, but also environmental) can be identified and measured in 
quantitative terms, social and spatial resources pose substantially more difficulty, not 
least due to sample size (more than 2000 ruralities). While a combination of qualitative 
and quantitative techniques is obviously feasible, qualitative analysis is more appropriate 
for a small number of cases. For high number of cases, statistical techniques require 
more numerical data. For this reason, the resource pentagon can mostly be used for 
interpretation and conceptualisation, yet for the analysis itself a variety of indicators 
other than resource indicators is needed34. Altogether all types of indicators are required 
for interpretation. The basic logic for interpretation of rural heterogeneity is explained in 
Figure 2.2, below. 
For heterogeneity analysis, statistical techniques such as Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA) and Cluster Analysis (CA) are employed. Principal Component Factor analysis (FA) 
is used as a data reduction technique, useful in dealing with large sets of strongly 
correlated metric data employed in spatial analysis. The technique allows the reduction 
of original criteria (attributes or indicators) to a smaller number of dimensions 
(underlying factors). Factor analysis allows the establishment of key aggregate variables 
(components) differentiating a data set. PCA will be applied to Polish voivodships to 
establish the key differences in terms of rural resource structure. For analyzing internal 
34 A list of indicators is in Appendix 4. 
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homogeneity within regions, cluster analysis of ruralities will be performed. Ruralities will 
be clustered into classes and then cross-tabulated with their regional membership. As a 
result, regional rural profiles will be produced, with indication of predominant type of 
rurality and its differentiation. 
Figure 2.2. A conceptual model for analyzing spatial rural heterogeneity 
Level of development of a given rural area 
(Performance indicators: income, employment, access to services, etc) 
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Source: own conceptualization inspired primarily on: DiFD (2002), Lowe et al (1995), Terluin 
(2000) 
2.6.3. Advantages and limitations of the proposed framework 
This method has a number of advantages and inevitably, some disadvantages. Perhaps 
its main asset is its clarity and systematic, if not rigid classification order. A large size of 
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sample coupled with qualitative methods makes it credible for those policy audiences 
who are wary of qualitative approaches. 
The main problem with rural resource comparative methods (as advocated here) is their 
failure to capture processes of rural change. Indeed, process indicators (for example 
agricultural specialization, market orientation, or rural industrial development clusters) 
could shed some specific light on rural adjustment strategies. However, lack of statistical 
data dooms this attempt to failure. Also, rural change (seen as a change in basic rural 
structures) fails to be recognized by an essentially static resource-based approach. While 
this might be overcome using time-series of resource-based measures, the statistical 
fatigue involved with such large data sets makes it virtually unfeasible, while lack of 
time-series data makes it completely impractical in this study. However, the essentially 
static comparative resource framework and exercise can constitute a useful benchmark 
for future case studies. 
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t 
Spatial analysis of agricultural and rural development 
in Poland 
3.1. Objectives and content of Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 provides a basic spatial analysis of agricultural and rural development in 
Poland, the interpretation of which is based upon the theoretical framework developed 
in Chapter 2 (cf. Section 2.6. ). The main research question is whether the voivodship is 
a sensible unit of rural diversity in Poland and, thus, whether rural policy might sensibly 
focus on the voivodship level (NUTS 2). Spatial variation is relative. A differentiation 
between rural areas at NUTS 2 level in Poland is thus depicted in comparison with the 
horizontal rural-urban divide, regional differences, as well as a diversity of ruralities 
within regions. 
The Chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 outlines the main natural and 
geographical characteristics of Poland, with a special emphasis on rural conditions. 
Section 3.3. sketches the geographical dimension of Polish history. Section 3.4. outlines 
the present macro-economic conditions. Section 3.5. presents the regional aspects of 
Polish economic development. Section 3.6. reports on the relative position of the 
agricultural and rural sector in the economy in the context of transition, with special 
emphasis on urban-rural divide in Poland. Section 3.7. briefly reports on the previous 
studies of territorial variations in rural Poland and examines the main differences 
between Polish rural regions with the application of factor analysis. Section 3.8. 
examines the variation of rural conditions within regions using a cluster analysis of 
ruralities. Section 3.9. draws conclusions on the importance of spatial dimension in 
explaining the patterns of development of Polish rural areas, specifically on the 
relevance of voivodship as a spatial rural category in Poland. 
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3.2. Poland: location and natural conditions 
Poland is a relatively big country (of 312 thousands sq km) inhabited by 38 million 
people, located outside the main economic core of the European development triangle 
yet on the major trade routes between Europe and Asia, especially between Germany 
and Russia. Less important trade routes, at least in modern times, lead from north to 
the south, linking Central Europe with the Baltic Sea. For administrative purposes, 
Poland is now divided into 16 voivodships, 373 districts and 2489 communes (Map 3.2. ). 
Map 3.1. Location of Poland Map 3.2. Administrative division of Poland 
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Poland is mostly flat and has a range of mountains in the south. The coastline in the 
north is 491 km long. Its climate is temperate with cold winters and frequent showers 
during summer. The vegetative growing period is shorter than in most of the EU. 
3.3. Poland: spatial heritage of history 
The present state of economic and social resource endowment in Polish regions comes 
from the endowments of nature combined with at least 1000 stormy years of history. 
With a short interval of feudal fragmentation in the middle ages - Poland has been a 
unitary state with no federalist traditions. However, as parts of the country followed 
different historical and economic trajectories, Poland features substantial spatial 
differences. 
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The differences emerged very early. Already in 15th century, Eastern Prussia was the 
most developed part of Poland and Mazovia was lagging behind. In 17th century "the 
differences between more developed and urbanised western areas (Wielkopolska, 
Silesia, Eastern Pomerania) and less developed regions in Eastern Poland were already 
very explicit" (Maczak et al 1999: 79). Although gaps in development levels between 
Polish regions are most commonly attributed to the last two centuries, Jalowiecki (1996) 
notes that: 
"The strength of settlement patterns and agrarian structures indicates 
clearly that the spatial differentiation of economic structures has very old 
roots and dates back to very old times, well before the partitions (in end 
18th c. ). However, the crucial factor for Polish economic spatial 
relationships was industrialisation of 19th century. Most Polish industrial 
districts emerged in those times. Neither the industrialisation of the pre- 
war period nor socialist" industrialisation" fundamentally changed the industrial geography of Poland, though both introduced important 
modifications". 
In the 19th century, during the industrial revolution in Western Europe, Poland was 
partitioned between three countries: Prussia, Russia and the Austrian-Hungarian 
Kingdom, each of which brought different traditions, cultures and indeed levels of 
development (Topolski: 1975). The Prussians, who occupied the already better- 
developed Wielkopolska, Pomerania and Kujawy, facilitated work ethics, education, 
management and organisation, and what is important for rural areas, an early land 
reform. Areas under the Austrian rule (Malopolska), though relatively poor, could 
nonetheless enjoy cultural freedom and rural education (Peasant Universities 
Movement35). Finally, areas under the Russian rule (Mazovia, eastern Poland), were 
under highly hierarchical (Russian) and significantly corrupt government structure, cut 
off from the mainstream European developments and poorly educated. On the other 
hand, the Western past of Russian territory capitalised on strategic trade location with 
the East. 
The 20`h century reinforced earlier patterns. New areas taken from Germany in 1945 
(Dolnoslaskie, Zachodniopomorskie, Lubuskie), though relatively well provided with 
infrastructure, were populated with new inflow of people, mostly from the former 
35 Peasant universities developed in 19th and the beginning of 20th century, transferred from Danish 
traditions. The tradition continues to date. 
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Malopolska and eastern areas (now, taken over by the Soviet Union) who, however, were 
only slowly adapting to the new environment or creating viable social networks 
(Gorzelak, Jalowiecki, 1998). 
Figure 3.1. Geographical Inheritance of Polish history: "God's Playground" 
Major Shifts in Polish territorial boundaries in 18th-20th century 
Map 3.5. Central Europe in 1920 
ý. 
Berlin 
" 
UNION 
Map 3.4. Central Europe in 1795 
(after the partitions) 
I fýRip 
aa1äc Sea Vilnius 
Gdnsk Minsk 
Pozoa 
s 
w Waaw 
f racow 
r 1ý Lviv 
" ev 
Map 3.6. Central Europe in 2000 
6 
Gd: dsk 
. Po®afi 
w Warsaw 4" Kiev 
ragas 
C"RCXYW 
_. 
ý`r1r Lviv 
Colours on historic maps above: 
Poland is marked in white; Russia - in green, Austria - in yellow and Prussia (Germany) - in blue. 
Present-day political boundaries are shown as red lines. Present names of cities are also given 
Source: Internet resources at www. Dolishroots. or4 
The post-war history of Poland was marked by a series of administrative reforms. In 
1950,17 regions were created with 300 districts (cf. Map 3.7), significantly resembling 
the present regional division (Map 3.2. ). Gorzelak (2000) dates the functional 
boundaries of districts back 400 years, which "structured the Polish settlement system of 
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small and medium-sized towns which were the centres of the local economic, labour, 
service and in several cases also cultural and even ethnic systems" (Gorzelak, 2000: 3). 
In 1975 another reform dismantled the district level and only kept a regional tier with 49 
units ("small voivodships"), though with insufficient autonomy or size to perform 
genuinely decentralized functions (Gorzelak, 2000). 
Map 3.7: Administrative division of Poland 
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The current regional structure (Map 3.2. ) of 16 voivodships (regions) was introduced in 
1999, and was intended to make good these deficiencies, and also to prepare Poland for 
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accession to the EU, which was perceived as encouraging regional participation in 
development and policy processes. It was also a result of strong Polish post-transition 
pressures for a more decentralized government structure, seen as a clear break with the 
central command strc utures of the communist era (cf. Section 1.7. ). 
3.4. Macroeconomic performance of Poland in the transition period 
The recent decade has seen a major transition process in the economy and society of 
Poland from the centrally planned system towards market economy. 
The transformation brought a dynamic fluctuation of GDP levels and structure. Following 
a sharp decline of -15.5% in 1990, Polish GDP was recovering at a rapid rate of 
approximately 5 per cent a year to reach 8269 EUR in 1999 (39% of the EU average in 
PPS, Eurostat: 2002), followed by a visible slow-down since 2000 to 1.3% in 2002. 
Throughout the decade, Poland had a negative trade balance, rising from -0.8 to -18.5 
billion dollars between 1991 and 2001, although total trade flows increased during this 
period on both sides of the balance sheet. Poland exports mostly machines, metal and 
metal products, vehicles and ships, textiles, and mineral products, whilst the main 
imports are mineral products, chemicals, plastics, cars and machines. 
The transition shock triggered a very high inflation of 585% in 1990, which took a long 
time to return to the more stable values of 10% in 2000 and 1.2% in 2002. 
In the last decade the unemployment rate showed high fluctuations, starting from 
politically justified non existence in the communist era, the initial level of 6.5% in 1990 
went up to 16% in 1993 when it gradually started to decline as a result of increased 
demand for labour generated by rapid economic growth, to reach 10.3% in 1997. Since 
then, unemployment has started to rise again, both due to slower growth and a 
substantial number of entrants to the labour market (640 thousands in 1998-2000) to 
reach 16.7 in 2001 and 18.2% in the end of 2002 (more than double the average EU 
rate at 8.6). Substantial increases in population of working age, projected at 1.154 
million by 2005, and 643.000 in 2006-2010, are likely to put the labour market under 
pressure. Most significantly, half of this increase is projected to occur in rural areas 
(GUS, 2000). 
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The composition of the national gross value added has evolved, showing a relative 
decline of agricultural sector from 7.2% in 1992 to 3.3 % In 2000 and of industry (from 
42.8% to 36.1%) to accommodate the growth in services from 50% to 60.6%. (Ministry 
of Economy: 2001) yet there are still significant mismatches between labour and added 
value compared to the EU (Table 3.1), especially in the agricultural sector. 
Table 3.1: Match between labour and value added in Polish and EU economy 
(%)* 
Services and Industry Agriculture, 
Construction forestry and fisheries 
added* value EU 61.2 31.9 6.9 
labour 66.4 29.2 4.4 
added value Poland 72.3 25.4 2.3 
labour 49.7 22.9 27.4 
*Labour 1999 data, value added 1996 
Source: GUS, Eurostat 
Consumers' Incomes are low. Today Polish consumer income only reaches about 38% of 
the purchasing power of the EU average (CEC: 2002) 
3.5. Regional differentiation in Poland 
The economic development in Poland during the transition has been spatially unequal 
(Petrakos, 2000; Gbocki and Rogacki, 2002; CEC: 1999; Gorzelak, 2000). The levels of 
GDP per capita in Poland (presented in Figure 3.2) exhibit disparities along the West- 
East axis with an island of highest growth around the capital city. 
Figure 3.2. Levels of GDP per capita in Polish regions in 1999* (PPS, EUR) 
GDP per capita in Polish regions in 1999 (EUR, PPS) 
16538 
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*Poland average = 8,269 EUR 
Source: Eurostat (2002) 
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For comparative purposes, the coefficient of regional variation (636) is calculated at 0.2, 
a level of disparity comparable to that of Spain or the UK (Table 3.2. ). 
Table 3.2. Disparities in regional GDP per capita in Poland and selected EU 
member states (at NUTS 2 level) 
Disparities in GDP in Poland (EUR, PPS) (1999) UK (2000) Germany (2000) Spain (2000) 
Maximum 12,345 33,223 41,025 24,855 
Minimum 5774 17.499 15,455 14,076 
Standard deviation 1566 4113 6953 3731 
Mean 7669 21,597 23,123 18,582 
Max/min 2.13 1.89 2.65 1.76 
a- coefficient 0.204 0.19 0.30 0.20 
Source: own calculation based on Eurostat data 
Indeed, as indicated at Figure 3.3. Polish economic growth in the 90s was spatially 
unequal. Figure 3.3. illustrates the dynamic of regional GDP per capita relative to the 
national average in 1995-1999. 
Figure 3.3. Relative GDP per capita growth in Polish regions in 1995-1999* 
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*All figures represent growth of GRP/capita, relative to the average national growth rate. 
National average growth rate = 1. 
Source: own calculation based on GUS (2002b) 
36 a- coefficient equals the standard deviation of a variable divided by its mean. 
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Figure 3.3. suggests that there is a growing divergence between the GDP levels in Polish 
regions in 1995-1999.7 lagging and mid-regions (Lubelskie, Podlaskie, Podkarpackie, 
Warminsko-Mazurskie, Swietokrzyskie, Opolskie and Kujawsko-Pomorskie) grew more 
slowly than the national average (orange column below 1) in the period 1995-1999, 
though their annual performance was more mixed. Amongst the richest regions, only 
Mazowieckie and Wielkopolskie grew visibly above the national average, but only 
Mazowieckie's performance was consistently above the average in the time series 
examined. Other regions with overall good performance are Pomorskie, Lodzkie and 
Malopolskie (albeit mid-ranking for the level of GDP), all of which have big metropolitan 
cities, apparently an engine for growth in the transition period in Poland (Gawlikowska- 
Huckel, Uminski, 2000). However, the very poorest regions did relatively better than the 
mid-range regions. Petrakos (2001) attributes divergent trends in the transition 
economies to a set of complex factors, such as structural change and spatially selective 
participation in trade as well as agglomeration economies derived from the service 
sector developing in urban economies (also: Gawlikowska-Huckel and Uminski, 2000). 
The crudest explanation of the varying levels of GDP per capita in Polish regions lies in 
their economic structures, in particularly the match between labour and value 
distribution, as illustrated in Figures 3.4. and 3.5. below. Although in all regions the 
share of agricultural labour exceeds the contribution of value added, in peripheral 
agrarian regions of Lubelskie, Podkarpackie, Podlaskie, and Swietokrzyskie the 
imbalances are particularly striking. 
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Figure 3.4: Structure of regional gross value added by sectors (1999) 
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Figure 3.5: Structure of regional employment by sectors (1999) 
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In fact, there is a positive correlation between GDP per capita and the share of urban 
population, estimated in Figure 3.6. below: 
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Figure 3.6: Level and urbanisation and GDP per capita in Polish regions (1999) 
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A high share of industries, especially declining sectors, explains relatively low levels of 
growth in Slaskie (mining and heavy industry), Swietokrzyskie (old heavy industry 
works), and Lodzkie (textile industry). Indeed, a heavy reliance on industry with the 
resultant limited provision of services, including business services, is often associated 
with environmental damage, which undermines regional competitiveness. A synthetic 
research on regional competitiveness, understood as the ability to attract investment37, 
conducted by Gawlikowska-Hueckel and Uminski (2000) produced the following 
classification of Polish regions (Table 3.3. ). 
37 The ability to attract investment is seen as one of the definitions of competitiveness. The 
measures were based on questionnaires sent to 700 FDI companies as well as regional 
authorities carried out by Institute of Research on Market Economy. The ranking is based on 
several desirable criteria, such as transport accessibility, market size, business infrastructure, 
industrial base, economic transformation, tourism attractions and natural environment. 
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Table 3.3. Synthetic measurements of attractiveness of Polish regions for 
investors 
Region Attractiveness for investors* 
Mazowieckie A- very high 
Slaskie 
Wielkopolskie 
Pomorskie B- high 
Dolnoslaskie 
Zachodniopomorskie 
Malopolskie 
Lubuskie 
Lodzkie C- medium 
Kujawsko-Pomorskie 
Opoiskie 
Warminsko-Mazurskie 
Podkarpackie 
Podlaskie D- low 
Lubelskie 
Swietokrzvskie 
*A-best, B-good, C-fair, D-moderate 
Source: Gawlikowska-Hueckel and Uminski (2000: 60) 
The brief analysis above has shown that the development dynamics of Polish regions 
has been divergent in the transition period in favour of urban, (or more precisely 
metropolitan) areas, and Western regions bordering the EU. This result is in line with 
Petrakos (2001) evidence in the CEECs in general. Depressed agrarian regions of 
Eastern and Southern Poland demonstrate processes of cumulative causation: they rank 
low in investment prospects and current economic structures alike, yet their relative 
growth (albeit as a percentage of a lower benchmark) has exceeded mid-ranging Polish 
regions. 
We now turn to the principal focus of the spatial pattern of Polish development, as far as 
rural and agricultural development is concerned: urban/rural differentiation. 
3.6. Agricultural and rural sector in Polish economy 
3.6.1. Rural resource base relative to urban resources in Poland 
A comparison between the levels of rural and urban resource endowments in Poland 
reveals a considerable gap, underpinning disparities in economic structures, and levels 
of development between rural and urban populations, partly attributable to the spatial 
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patterns left by Polish socio-economic history, and partly reflecting the transition from 
the centrally planned to the market economy. 
Rural areas in Poland38 account for 93.4% of the total land area and are inhabited by 
14.8 million people (38% of the total population), which makes Poland a relatively 
agrarian country compared to the EU average of 26% (1993). The average population 
density in Poland is 123 persons per sq km, close to the EU average of 116 (1998). 
Dispersed settlement patterns and small villages (on average 260 persons) mitigate 
against spatial connectivity and the creation of social bonds, and increase the cost of 
provision of technical infrastructure (Heffner: 2000). 
Poland has abundant agricultural land, which should give the country a comparative 
advantage in farming (e. g., Harvey, 2000). The area of agricultural land per capita is 0.5 
ha. (i. e. at the level close to that of France, Denmark and Greece, however 28% higher 
than the EU average). The area of arable land per capita amounts to 0.37 ha (the EU 
average is 0.21 ha). 
However, the soils are relatively poor: only 30% arable land is on good or very good 
soils whilst 23% of arable land is poor or very poor. The Institute of Cultivation and Soil 
Fertilisation (IUNG) estimates that Polish soils are 25% worse than those in France, 
Holland, Belgium or West Germany (ME: 2002). In addition Polish agriculture is strongly 
dependent on weather due to lack of melioration systems (Siekierski: 2000), while it also 
suffers a more continental (extreme) climate than most of Western Europe. 
The levels of human capital in rural areas are considerably lower than in urban areas, as 
illustrated in Table 3.4. below: 
Table 3.4. Educational attainment of Polish rural and urban population 
(aged 15 and more) (1995) 
Educational attainment Rural Urban 
primary 43.8 27.6 
vocational 28.0 24.7 
secondary 15.5 34.2 
tertiary 1.9 9.8 
others (unfinished) 10.8 3.7 
Source: Rosner, Frenkiel, 2000: 107 
38 In accordance to Polish law, rural areas are defined as situated outside the administrative boundaries of 
the urban zones. 
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Farmers have on average an even worse level of training than rural population not 
connected with farming (Table 3.5). 
Table 3.5. Educational attainment of rural population: connected with farms and 
working outside own farm (1996) 
Educational attainment Working on own farms (%) Working outside own farms (%) 
primary 50.4 15.8 
vocational 26.1 41.8 
secondary 14.4 34.5 
tertiary 1.1 7.3 
other (unfinished) 8.4 0.5 
Source: GUS (1997) 
This is consistent with professional mobility outside agriculture being facilitated by better 
training, and the proposition that people with better education often choose better 
opportunities outside farms. 
The rural population also has a higher share of people pre- and post- productive age, 
relative to urban dwellers in Poland (Table 3.6). In particular, the farming population is 
visibly older than the profile of Polish society. This is consistent with the status of 
agriculture as a declining sector in the Polish economy, and with the transition from a 
predominantly agrarian society towards a modern mixed economy. 
Table 3.6. Age distribution of rural and urban population (1997) 
Category Urbana Rural') Farm DoDulation'°` 
Total population 100 100 100 
Population pre-productive age (% of total) 24.7 28.8 27.3 
Population productive age (% of total) 61.9 55.7 56.0 
Population post-productive aae (% of total) 13.4 15.5 16.7 
x) SYB: state on the 31.12.1997 
"`) according to GUS: National Agricultural Census, 1996 
Productive age for women 18-59, for men: 18-64 
The literature suggests that the levels of social capital In rural areas were seriously 
depleted in the communist period, producing an atomistic social structure, underlined by 
lack of solidaristic bonds and feelings of helplessness and pessimism (FDPA: 2001, 
Kolarska-Bobinska, (et al), 2001), however other sources (such as Swain, 2000) argue 
also that the peasants developed resourcefulness and ingenuity. On the other hand, the 
collectivization of agriculture under communist rule also provided considerable social 
amenities and services (education, health etc. ) for the collective labour force. Since the 
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collapse of the socialist systems, these services have suffered, especially in those areas 
dominated by collective and state farms. 
There is still a considerable, though diminishing gap in the endowment of physical 
infrastructure (Piecek, 2002). The number of telephone subscribers per 1000 of rural 
population is only half of the urban rate (139 compared with the urban ratio of 260 in 
1999), but the gap has decreased from fourfold in 1990 (respectively 27 and 86) (GUS: 
2000). Also, the disparity in the provision of water systems to households in rural and 
urban areas declined from, respectively, 67% and 95% in 1990 to 82% and 97% in 
1999. On the other hand, housing conditions are better (or at least larger) in rural 
areas: rural dwellings are bigger than urban ones (notably 56 sq. m versus 72 sq. m in 
1999). 
Rural financial provision is also likely to be less than in urban areas. The rural banking 
system has 2.200 outlets (circa 20% of the total banking network in Poland). Some 
literature argues that rural finance is under-provided (Siekierski, 2000; Swinnen, Gow, 
1998) because of institutional failure due to information costs, and considerable rigidities 
of rural land and property markets, underpinning problems with collateral and 
associated transaction costs (Swinnen, Gow, 1998). On the other hand, where capital is 
scarce, it naturally flows to more competitive and remunerative urban uses. However, 
the final outcome is uncontested in literature: that investment is poor - the plant and 
equipment resources of numerous rural businesses are run down (Majewski, Dalton, 
2000). 
When compared to the EU, Polish rural areas have considerable natural resources, in 
particular biodiversity and cultural heritage. However, with a limited demand from both 
urban and rural consumers', their market valuation is low, at least in the short-term. 
Some of these resources are capitalized in the agri-tourism activities, yet MAFE (2001b) 
estimates that in 2000 there were only 11,260 agri-tourism farms in Poland, giving only 
15,000 direct jobs. Also, rural tourism lags behind urban developments in terms of its 
base. 
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3.6.2. Structure of rural economy in Poland 
Few data on rural economy are available. Data is simply collected on sectoral or regional 
bases, and separate specifically rural statistics for value added or rural employment 
patterns (by sectors) do not exist39. Below, drawing upon the resource base and some 
structural rural data, we attempt to sketch the economics of Polish rural areas. We 
assume here that 'rura'l is a discrete economic category, separable from the regional 
entity according to its spatial categorization (cf. Section 2.5.1. ). 
Firstly, rural incomes are on average 50% lower than those of urban population. In 
1999, the monthly disposable income of urban dwellers (per capita) amounted to 639 
PLN compared to 441 PLN per capita in rural zones. 
Secondly, the role of agriculture in rural economy, at least in purely economic terms, is 
less important than many stylized facts, and is constantly declining. As indicated in Table 
3.7., less than half of Polish rural population is now employed in agriculture. In fact, 
almost a half of rural people in Poland do not have any land. 
Table 3.7. Structure of employment of rural population 40(1992 1 1998) 
1992 1998 
Total employment of rural population 6,200,000 5,943,000 
(%) 100% 100% 
Outside agriculture 44.3 53.7 
Public sector 29.1 23.5 
Private sector 15.2 30.2 
Aariculture41 55.7 46.3 
Source: Frenklel and Rosner (2001) based on GUS (1999) 
The relative importance of sectors for rural economy can be roughly estimated based on 
rural households income presented in Table 3.8. Net of social payments, the income 
from non-agricultural activities amongst the rural population amounts to 60% of the 
39 Analysis based on rural employment patterns by sectors is exemplified by the European Rural 
Employment Project where, in short, successful regions are those with a growth of non-agricultural rural 
employment, however clear and useful, cannot be extended or updated because of the lack of statistical 
data. 
40 Representative Survey of Economic Activity of Population (BAEL) defines employment on the basis of 
current economic activity, namely based on activity in the previous week (at least one hour). 
41 As an exclusive or main source of activity. BAEL definition includes persons of 15 years+, who worked on 
farm at least 1 hour in the week following the survey as a farm user, an assisting family member or as hired 
labour. 
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total rural income, income from agriculture consists of 34% and that from self- 
employment (otherwise defined) contributes about 6%. 
Table 3.8. Sources of incomes of rural population in Poland 
Total From non From social From work From self- Others 
agricultural payments on own employment 
paid farm 
employment 
Number of rural 4,106 1,152 1,501 1,062 148 208 
households with main 
source of income (000, 
1995) 
Share in total rural 100% 36.1 34.3 20.9 4.7 4.0 
Incomes (1998) 
Source: GUS, 1995; GUS, 1999 
Furthermore, a substantial number of jobs for rural people are located outside rural 
areas. According to a non representative survey by IERGZ, rural people commute to 
work in towns (53%: Frenklel, Rosner, 2001), so we assume that at least42 50% of the 
income earned by rural households with non-agricultural jobs is generated in the urban 
(regional) economy. The other half could be earned locally as estimated In Table 3.9. 
below: 
Table 3.9. Income and emolovment of rural population in Poland 
Total rural Sources of main Total rural 
household income for employment in 
income employed sectors 
estimated share population 1998 (3) 
in % (1998) (1) 1995 (2) (5,943,000=100) 
(6.882.000=100) 
1. Generated external to rural economy: 
Social payments 34.3 21.8 - 
Non agricultural jobs in urban economy43 18.0 18.6 26.8 
2. Generated in rural economy: 
Non-agricultural jobs 18.0 18.6 26.8 
Work on own farm 20.9 41.0 46.3 
Self-employment 4.7 n/a 5.5 
3. Others 4.0 n/a n/a 
Note different definitions of employment in GUS, Microcensus (2) and GUS, BAEL (3) 
Source: own estimates and compilation based on: 
(1) GUS (1999) 
(2) GUS (1995) and Frenkiel, Rosner (2001: 124) 
(3) GUS (1999) and Frenkiel, Rosner (2001: 124) 
42 At least 50%, since urban incomes and wages tend to be higher than rural ones. 43 Based on assumption that half of rural employees outside agriculture commute to towns. M Definition of employment in Microcensus covers both current activity (in the week prior to enquiry) as well 
as permanent activity of at least 3 months per year. 
81 
Chapter 3: Spatial analysis of Polish agriculture and rural development 
These rough estimates suggest that more than half of income of rural population is 
either transferred from the state budget in the form of pensions and benefits, or 
generated in urban economy by commuters. About 40% of rural incomes may be 
actually generated in rural areas, slightly more outside agriculture than in farming. Also, 
the role of farming as the rural households income provider (20.9%) Is much less 
Important than as employment provider (circa 41%). Vital linkages with urban 
economies revealed in Table 3.8 Include commuting, augmenting the more obvious 
demand linkages for rural companies and farms. 
Rural unemployment in Poland is high, though the official figures are slightly higher for 
urban than rural areas. However, the rate for the landless rural population is more than 
double the average rate for rural population as a whole. In reality, the gap between the 
rural farming population and the rural landless is more attributable to Polish law than to 
economic reality. Persons (and their family members) who own or rent a farm of above 
2 ha do not have the right to register as unemployed, and hence are not counted as 
unemployed. 
Table 3.10. Professional activity of rural population (aged 15 and more) (2001) 
Total (000) Employment rate* Unemployment rate 
Connected with farm 6,328 58% 11% 
Not connected with farm (landless) 5,120 46% 27% 
*Total population (aged 15 and more); both full-time and part-time employment 
Source: GUS, BAEL (2002c) 
The transformation of the economy in the beginning of 90s laid 600,000 rural workers 
off from their industrial works. Only some of those jobs were replaced by local rural 
based services, with the rest of the redundant labour contributing to hidden or 
registered unemployment 45. "Hidden" agricultural unemployment is estimated at 
between 500,000 (Orlowski, 2002) and 900.000 (according to farmers declaration in 
Agricultural Census46 In 1996) and up to 1.8 m. (Rowiski, Wigier, 2001), depending on 
the extent to which the available farm activities can be counted as providing 
employment. 
45 Two types of Polish statistics on unemployment are used. Labour Offices report on registered unemployed 
(which, legally, exclude farmers); central statistical office (GUS) undertakes regular survey of population's 
economic activity (BAEL), which defines unemployment as lack of working activity in the week prior to the 
survey. 
46 Hidden unemployment defined for Agricultural Census by farmers' own judgement as persons who could 
leave the farming occupation for other gainful activity without any disturbance in farm performance. 
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No data are available on the value of non-agricultural economic activities in rural areas. 
However, data on business development indicate that business density (as the number 
of companies per 1000 population) registered (in Polish REGON system) In rural areas is 
half that of urban centers (respectively 47 and 98) (GUS: 2001) with most only serving 
local markets, primarily in the retail sector (Sikorska: 2001)47, where capital needs are 
relatively low, as are opportunities for growth. 
Table 3.11. Rural and urban businesses by selected sectors (31.12.1999 
Total Manufac 
turing 
Construc 
tion 
Retail 
and repair 
Hotels and 
restaurant 
Transport 
Storage 
Services 
to firms 
Other 
services 
Urban 
510,000 12.1 7.7 33.0 2.6 3.1 17.8 12.4 
Companies =100 
Physical 1,854,000 10.0 10.7 37.8 27.5 9.2 13.2 4.1 
persons =100 
Rural 
109,000 15.3 4.9 20.9 2.8 2.9 5.4 13.9 
Companies 
= 100 
Physical 563,000 15.6 14.5 35.1 3.7 9.5 5.3 2.4 
persons 
=100 
Source: based on GUS (2001) 
Weaker rural economies, relative to urban centers, translate into generally weaker tax 
bases of rural communes (Table 3.12), in principle an indicator of communes' 
Investment potential (Dzierzoniowski: 2001). 
Table 3.12. Index of rural and urban communes' own revenue (G Index) In 2000 
Commune type Mean G index N Std. Deviation 
Urban 274.31 317 89.44 
Rural 174.39 1586 87.58 
Rural-urban 212.15 568 77.12 
Total 195.89 2471 91.96 
Commune types defined as administrative categories. 
Source: own calculation based on data kindly received from FAPA 
47 In 2000 Institute of Agricultural and Food Economics (IAFE) carried out a survey of 8643 rural households 
(both with and without farms) in 76 villages with soclo-economic characteristics (in particular farm 
structure) representative to Polish conditions in all macroregions. In formal statistical terms the sample, 
however, is not statistically representative. 
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Given the difference in the living standards (or at least in incomes) between rural and 
urban areas, and structural difficulties in the rural economy, surprisingly migration as a 
adjustment method has declined in 80s and 90s from 25.8 to 15.0 (per 1000 population) 
to reach the positive net balance for the rural areas, unprecedented in the whole post- 
war period. The explanations include high relocation costs, especially expensive and/or 
poor quality housing in urban areas, and also limited job opportunities in towns, with 
greater opportunities to survive in rural areas without gainful employment. 
Table 3.13. Rural and urban migrations in 2000 
Urban Rural 
Rural-urban migrations 
Inflow 99,000 103,200 
Outflow 103,000 99,000 
Balance -4,200 +4,200 
Source: GUS (2001) 
3.6.3. Agri-food sector in Polish economy and society 
The Polish agricultural sector is worth 24 billion PLN (1998), 4% of the GDP, double the 
average of 2% In the EU (1998). As shown in the Table 3.8., the agricultural sector 
provides 20% of rural household incomes and around 40% of employment for rural 
population in Poland. Though its economic importance has been declining, it still lies at 
the backbone of rural economy. 
Polish farms tend to have mostly mixed production patterns of plant and animal 
production: 77% of all farms represent a traditional mixed production pattern 
(CEC: 2002). 
Table 3.14. Production patterns of Polish agriculture in 2000 (%) 
Total production Marketed 
production 
Animal 46.7 62.6 
Plant 53.3 37.4 
Source: MAFE (2001) 
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Official Polish statistics record over 2 million farms48, most of them very small with an 
average size of 8.5 ha in 2000 (compared to 18.4 ha in the EU in 1999) (cf. Table 3.15. ) 
with only slow structural adjustment. The current farm structure has emerged as a 
consequence of historic patterns (Szemberg 1999; Glebocki and Rogacki, 2002), notably 
of Land Reform (of 1944) and settlements on lands taken from Germany (after 1945). 
Land reform consisted of dismantling big farms and transfers of land to peasants or 
workers: the new farms were typically of 5 ha, though larger In the "regained territories" 
(7-15 ha) where more land was available for disbursement. Also the Western and 
Northern territories had a higher share of collective state farming under the socialist 
system. 
Table 3.15. Holdings and the Land Area in Poland, (1996) 
Total Farm Sizes (ha) 
1-2 2-5 5-10 10-15 over 15 
No of holdings 
1996 2,041,400 462,200 667,600 520,800 217,200 173,600 
Land area (ha) 
1996 14,259,500 650,600 2,199,100 3,713,300 2,631,500 5,065,000 
Source: GUS (2000) 
Official statistics record 4 million farmers, 27% of the total labour force (compared to 
the EU average of 4.4 % (1999). However, "farmer" in Poland is defined as anybody 
who declares themselves being a member of the family owning or using at least 0.1 ha 
of land, with no reference to income. More realistic estimates, such as in full-time job 
equivalents, bring the number down to 1.8 million, or, to 2.5 million farmers (10 per 
cent of labour force) under an economic approach49 (Orlowski: 2002). 
Large parts of Polish agriculture have no or very loose linkages with the market. 
Orlowski (2002: 8) has produced a useful classification of Polish farms depending on 
their market linkages. Market-oriented farms occupy 56% of land but only employ 22% 
of labour, while producing 60% of the total output. The share of market-oriented farms 
grows with size of farm (Table 3.16). 
48 GUS defines a farm as a unit with at least 1 hectare of agricultural land, either owned or leased, or as an 
agricultural plot with less than 1 ha of agriculturally utilized area. 49 Total number minus 0.9 mil. pensioners, 0.5 mil. hidden unemployment, and 0.6 mil. working mainly 
outside of agriculture. 
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Table 3.16. Linkages of Polish farming with the market 
Economic type total land total employment total output marketed output 
Social 18 42 12 4 
Non-market oriented 26 35 28 19 
Market oriented 10 8 18 23 
Hiahlv market oriented 46 14 42 53 
Social farms declared production only or mainly for own consumption 
Non-market oriented farms declared sales of below 15,000 PLN 
Market oriented farms declared sales of 15,000-25,000 PLN 
Highly market-oriented farms declared sales above 25,000 PLN. 
All data based on 1996 census. 
Source: Orlowski (2002: 8) 
As a result of limited specialization, fragmentation, poor qualifications of farmers and 
labour surpluses, the sector's profitability is low. Zawalinska (2002) demonstrates that if 
Polish farmers are assessed in terms of paid and unpaid (or opportunity) costs (i. e. 
including a notional return to their own labour and land), 91 per cent cannot cover their 
full costs and are loss-making. Even if only the costs of paid factors are taken Into 
account, 40 per cent cannot cover their costs with their revenues. Nonetheless, parts of 
the sector are profit making. According to the Zawalinska (2002) analysis, profitable 
farms are significantly larger than those that are not profitable. These conditions are 
not, of course, unique to Poland. Similar analysis of almost any farm sector In the world 
will reveal similar (though possibly not so extreme) patterns. They are typical of a 
declining sector, in which those with the least accessible and attractive alternatives will 
remain the sector at a level little above subsistence. 
The transfer of activity into non-farm use depends critically on the accessibility of 
alternatives. MARD (2001a) notes that non-farm investment is related to closeness to 
market, mostly to urban centres. According to the 1996 agricultural census, non 
agricultural economic activities are run by 6.7% of farms located in rural communes, 
8.8% of those in urban-rural communes and 15.2% of farms in urban communes. 
Empirical evidence suggests that higher capital endowments will be associated with 
stronger labour demand in non-farm sectors and that the marginal returns of capital 
investment are likely to be higher in non-farm than in most farming activities 
(Breitschopf, Schrieder, 1999). However, the key impediment to farm diversification in 
Poland is high regional unemployment (Chaplin, et al, 2002), which limits local demand 
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and reflects limited availability of alternatives, whilst also indicating an oversupply of 
ender-employed resources. 
Foreign trade in agri-food products accounts for roughly 7% of the total imports and 
exports, yet the share in exports has declined in recent years. The trade balance in agri- 
food products is negative (at about 10% of the total trade). The main export products 
are: fruits and processed fruits, milk and meat products. On the import side, key 
products are exotic fruit and crop and tea and coffee, and cereals. Most of Polish agri- 
food products are exported to the UE and former Soviet Union. The informal trade 
economy is said to be important for rural areas, but (of course) no data are available for 
these activities. 
The interpretation of Polish rural systems in transition is disputed both in academic 
analyses and political discourses. Some studies (Piskorz, 2001; Lerman, Schrenemacher, 
2002; Kotlarska-Bobinska et at, 2001) present rural, and in particular agriculture as a 
"buffer" of change, absorbing the redundant labour released from restructuring sectors 
of the economy, and hence bound to show relative decline. On the other hand, as 
pointed out by Majewski and Dalton (2000), though the rural economy in Poland may 
not have grown in relative terms, it has shared in the benefits of urban zones, for 
example as a result of increased demand for food and of subsidized programmes of rural 
infrastructure development. Clearly, the political pressures from rural, and specifically 
agricultural communities, spring from the relative decline in their financial status: 
compared to national average the level of wages declined from 110 in 1994 to only 60 
per cent in 1994 (Domanski 1994: 58). Research by Kostova, Johnson (2000) confirms 
the relative decline of welfare in farmers' households in the period 1987-1992. There are 
still a lot of people in the rural areas, and they are not well-off by the standards of their 
urban counterparts. In a democracy, one should expect that their voices will be heard. 
But does this mean that rural development policies should be regionalized? 
We now turn to the central question for this Chapter: an examination of how the 
regional development patterns in conjunction with urban/rural divide translate into the 
regional patterns of rural development in Poland. 
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3.7. Territorial variations in rural and agricultural sector in Poland 
A growing interest in the regional and territorial dimensions in Poland (discussed in 
Chapter 1) has generated a series of studies in the area of agricultural and rural 
development policies (Szemberg, 1999; Heller, 2000; Heijman et al, 1999; Michna, 
2001; Rosner (ed), 1999) (see Appendix and maps in Figure 3.7. ). 
Figure 3.7. Previous geographical studies of Polish rural areas 
Map 3.9. Division by Rosner (ed) (1999) 
.Rýý 
Classes of communes by level of economic development 
1 (black) best developed 
2 (dark blue) developed 
3 (blue) fairly developed 
4: (red) poorly developed 
5: (yellow) underdeveloped 
Map 3.11. Division for rural policy 
(MARD: 1999) 
Map 3.10. Division by Michna 
(2001) 
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All analyses conclude that there is a territorial variation in the patterns of Polish rural 
development. However, the logic and evidence underlying these several different but 
similar regional demarcations is typically rather thin. With the notable exception of the 
Rosner (ed) (1999) study, which is based on commune levels, these studies make 
limited reference to existing territorial units. Instead, they typically seek to identify 
macroregions. In most cases, the explicit methodology is missing, both in terms of data 
aggregation and the underlying development model. Thus, there is a need to reassess 
the spatial dynamics of rural areas in reference to the current administrative boundaries, 
with the use of a formal and replicable methodology, and underlined by an explicit rural 
development model. As seen from Section 3.6.2. and Chapter 2, such a model needs to 
take a broader territorial (rather than purely agriculturally based) view and to include 
exogenous factors relating to the regional economy. 
The framework employed here is based on the discussion in Chapter 2 above. It includes 
an outline of the theoretical linkages as well as the relationships between indicators that 
would be expected. The framework is illustrated in Figure 3.8 below. The main 
characteristics of Polish rural regions, as specified in this figure, are given in Appendix 3 
and Appendix 9. 
Factor analysis is used to identify the major dimensions underlying differences in rural 
resources and the resulting economic structures of Polish rural regions in order to arrive 
at a synthetic rural resource index for each Polish rural region. The variation between 
the values of the index for each region then provides an indication of differentiation 
between the regions. 
However, we need to start with what we measure. The indicators used for the analysis 
reflect both a theoretical model chosen (cf. Chapter 2) and the availability of statistics. 
The statistical sources offer a multitude of agricultural indicators but, similar to the 
national level, are sparse in rural non-agricultural data. Although, as demonstrated in 
Section 3.6.2., the agricultural and non-agricultural businesses carry equal importance, 
the indicators used in the analysis for Polish rural areas have an agricultural bias. No 
statistics on the value added produced in the rural areas outside farming is actually 
available (cf. main missing indicators (? ) in Figure 3.8. ). 
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The second point is the separation between rural and regional indicators. Despite strong 
linkages between urban and rural economies (highlighted in Section 3.6.2. as well as in 
Chapter 2), the distinction needs to be retained for a comparison of the regional 
variation of rural resources and structures with a horizontal rural-urban divide (Section 
3.6.1. ). Thus, this analysis takes a traditional view on the rural category, albeit 
recognizing linkages with wider regional economy. Indicators related to the wider 
regional economy are, however, treated as exogenous. 
The third point is that some indicators reflect more than one type of capital. For 
example rural business density indicates not only physical but also human capital (if not 
also linked to spatial and social types). 
The fourth constraint is lack of quantitative data on human and social capital. Proxies 
also have to be used for spatial capital (e. g. rural population density). 
Finally, more detailed comments are due. The indicator for sewage provision is not 
applied, since it exhibits very high and largely uncorrelated variations in conjunction with 
the very low general average level. Farm size is used as a (very approximate) proxy for 
farm profitability. 
A list of indicators used for the territorial analysis and their linkages to the overall 
conceptual model is presented in Figure 3.8 (with detailed explanation of indicators in 
Appendix 4). It is clear that the analysis is general in nature, suitable to our general 
research questions. For detailed territorial analysis, case studies supplemented by the 
quantitative angle or GIS methods would be more appropriate, as and when appropriate 
data and resources for their analysis become available. 
From the regional settlement pattern point of view, defined as a share of rural 
population in total regional population, Polish regions are all intermediate (15% - 50% 
of population classed as rural) with an exception of three predominantly rural regions of 
Lubelskie, Podkarpackie and Swietokrzyskie (above 50%). 
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Figure 3.8. Main indicators for analysing diversity of Polish rural conditions and 
their relevance to development frameworkso 
Level of rural development ? RUR_GDP 
(Development indicators) 
UNEMPL 
AGF. VA_LAND 
AGRI_EMP 
AGfýVA E 
HUMAN 
ENDOGENOUS 
SOCIAL RURAL RESOURCE PHYSICAL 
PENTAGON ROAD_DEN 
7 TEL_DEN 
(Resource BUS-DEN 
%M SERV %N_ )tSERV indicators) WATER 
Exogenous (urban- ARP-CAP COM_REV 
regional) resources SPATIAL 
and dependencies %_RUR_POP POP_DEN LOC-BORDMET 
Descriptive statistics for Polish rural regions are given in Table 3.17. 
50 Abbreviations: ? RUR_GRP 
GRP_CAP 
AGR VA EMP 
BUS DENS 
UNEMPL 
AGR_EMPL 
AGRI_COND 
FARM_SIZE 
PROT_NAT 
ROAD DEN 
TEL DEN 
WATER 
SEW DEN 
POP_DEN 
COM_REV 
%_RUR PO 
%_M_SER 
% N_M_SER 
LOC-BORD_METRO 
gross rural regional product 
gross regional product per capita 
value added per person employed in agriculture 
density of rural economic units registered (per popul) 
registered rural unemployment 
agricultural labour per 100 ha of agricultural land 
index for the quality of natural conditions for agriculture 
average farm size (ha of agricultural land) 
legally protected nature conservation zones as % of total area 
Commune paved roads 
Telephone subscribers per 100 rural households 
access to water systems 
provision of sewage system (to farms, in %) 
rural population density 
index of own tax revenue of rural communes (G Indicators) 
share of rural population in total regional population 
% of regional employment in market services 
% of regional employment in non-market services (public sector) 
presence of Western border/metropolitan town 
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Table 3.17. Variables characterising Polish rural regions: descrip tive statistics 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Endogenous resource variables 
Agricultural labour per 100 ha 7 54 24 14 
Average farm size 3 27 11 7 
% of environmentally protected areas 16 58 33 13 
Telephone subscribers per 100 rural population 10 15 13 2 
% of rural dwellings connected to water system 64 100 85 14 
Density of local paved roads . 170 . 500 . 31 0.09 Rural population density 32 137 66 27 
Value added per agricultural employee/worker 4 23 11 6 
Rural businesses per 1000 population 33 58 45 8 
Registered rural unemployment 7 30 16 6 
Rural commune own revenue (G index) 143 305 207 40 
Exogenous(regional) variables 
Share of rural population (%) in regional population 21 59 40 10 
GRP/capita 11112 23760 14760 3113 
Share of market services in regional added value 53 75 60 4 
Share of agriculture in regional employment 11 50 28 13 
Share of non market services in regional emolovment 36 62 49 9 
Source: own calculation based on GUS data 
We begin with an examination of the inequality in the rural resource base and economic 
structures between Polish voivodships. 
In order to arrive at a single index of rural development resources and potential in 
regions, we adapt a method developed by Heijman et al. (1999) for welfare. They have 
conducted a multivariate technique of factor analysis, arriving at an index based on the 
major factor. 
We choose a basic set of correlated endogenous indicators with one partly exogenous 
Indicator (share of rural population in total regional population). Other slightly different 
combinations of indicators have been tested (see Appendix 8). They yield a similar 
result, but they are less well correlated than the chosen combination. 
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Table 3.18: Indicators of rural resources and their influence of the overall rural 
development index 
Indicator Influence on rural 
develo p ment index 
Agricultural employment per land unit Negative 
Farm size Positive 
Registered rural unemployment Negative 
Agricultural value added per employed Positive 
Share of rural population in total Negative 
Road density Positive 
Rural commune own revenue Positive 
Water provision Positive 
Population density Positive* 
Density of rural businesses Positive 
Rural telephone subscribers Positive 
% of environmentally protected land Positive** 
*Assuming the congestion effects are not present in Polish rural development context as yet. 
**Although the argument of the contribution of natural amenities for rural development seems to be valid only In 
presence of valuation of those resources. In absence of the right (market or non market) valuation of resources, the rural 
population simply covers costs of maintaining the otherwise productive land. 
The correlations between variables are presented in Appendix 3. Interestingly, strong 
correlations between rural business density and GDP/capita (0.72) and the share of rural 
population in regional population (-0.79) indicate that rural business development might 
be exogenously driven - originating in the urban rather than rural economies. 
With the aid of SPSS software, we apply factor analysis to identify a smaller set of 
underlying dimensions to explain interrelationships with a minimum loss of information. 
All variables have been standardized (Nijkamp, 1979) to values 0-1 in order to ensure 
comparability and to include the direction of influence. In the course of standardization 
for positive variables, the highest score has been given a value of 1; for the negative 
variable a value of 0 has been attributed. The other scores have been given, 
respectively, the indexes of the actual score divided by the maximum. Two tests have 
been applied to assess the validity of factor analysis. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkim measure 
of sampling adequacy is used in order to determine whether the data matrix has 
sufficient correlation to justify the application of factor analysis. Bartlett's test of 
sphericity is used to determine the significance of the correlation matrix in order to test 
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the hypothesis that the correlation matrix is the identity matrix. The results show that 
the factor analysis can be applied in a meaningful way. 
Table 3.19. KMO and Bartlett's Test for Factor Analysis of Polish Rural Regions 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. . 482 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 159.496 
dtf 66 
Sia. . 000 
Source: own calculation 
The three-factor solution has been generated (Table 3.20) based on the standardized 
variables. 
Table 3.20. Key factors differentiating Polish rural regions 
fmrinrhi I rmmnnnnnd nniIuciel 
Variables 
(standardized) 
Factors 
Commonality 
1 2 3 
Agricultural employment per ha . 887 -. 182 -. 375 . 
960 
Farm size . 886 -. 299 -3.872E-02 . 
875 
Registered rural unemployment -. 806 9.365E-02 -. 402 . 820 
Agricultural value added per 
employed 
. 775 . 252 . 201 . 705 
Share of rural population . 757 3.666E-02 . 117 . 587 
Local road density -. 739 . 529 . 123 . 
841 
Commune own revenue . 676 . 613 -7.367E-02 . 839 
Water provision . 620 . 419 . 401 . 
721 
Population density -. 562 . 620 . 496 . 
946 
Density of rural businesses . 469 . 763 -1.398E-02 . 
803 
Telephone subscribers -. 325 . 434 -. 634 . 695 
% of env'IIy protected land -. 308 -. 409 . 749 . 822 
Eigenvalue 5.518 2.349 1.747 
Variance 45.98 19.57 14.56 
Cumulative 45.98 65.55 80.12 
Source: own calculation. 
Note: these loadings and contributions to total variance are robust with changes in the number of factors considered. 
The regional factor scores for first factor are shown below (Table 3.21). The scores 
reflect the measured rural structures and resource base across Polish regions in a 
synthetic manner. In fact, the differences between single voivodships do not appear 
significant. The voivodships visibly cluster into four categories (the macro-regions, 
identified in the previous Polish studies, illustrated in the maps (3.9; 3.10; 3.11; 3.12) 
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above, and detailed in Appendix 1). 
Table 3.21. Rural resource index of Polish regions based on multivariate analysis 
(First factor score) 
Rural resource Rural resource and Meta region 
index structure type 
Zachodniopomorskie 1.55 1 
Warm! nsko-Mazurskie 1.48 1 North-Western 
Lubuskie 1.17 1 meta region 
Dolnoslaskle . 99 1 
Pomorskie . 86 1 
Opolskie . 21 2 
Wielkopolskie . 11 2 
Central-Western 
Slaskie . 08 2 meta region 
Kujawsko-Pomorskie . 04 2 
Mazowieckie -. 38 3 Central-Eastern 
Lodzkle -. 45 3 Meta region 
Podlaskie -. 61 3 
Lubelskie -1.07 4 
Podkarpackle -1.17 4 South-Eastern 
Swietokrzyskie -1.21 4 meta region 
Malopolskie -1.60 4 
Source: own calculation 
Indeed, the classification in Table 3.21. Is clearly agriculturally based. As seen from the 
composition of the first factor (Table 3.20) and confirmed by the ANOVA (Appendix 5) 
the regional clusters (meta regions) are significantly different only in terms of 
agricultural employment per land (F=16.0), farm size (F=10.7), value added per 
agricultural labour (F=7.2), rural registered unemployment (F=11), share of rural 
population (F=7.5) and water provision (F=9.9). Clearly the differences between regions 
will necessarily exhibit agricultural bias, since they are based on underlying variables 
with this same bias. 
Our initial measurements were underrepresented for non-agricultural business 
development and employment. Therefore, we look separately at the only available 
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indicator, namely rural business density. We have already indicated that it might be 
driven exogenously. This variable is closely associated with factor 2 In Table 3.20, which 
indicates that there is an alternative distinguishing factor to the predominantly 
agricultural factor (1) between Polish regions. The third factor Is heavily Influenced by 
the environmentally protected land variable, suggesting that this is also a distinguishing 
factor between regions. However, this Is not pursued in any detail here, since it does 
not materially affect the major point of this analysis - to Identify the correspondence of 
of administrative regions with regional diversity (section 3.8 below). 
A classification of rural regions in Poland is shown in Table 3.22, based purely on 
business development, as a proxy for non-agricultural rural development in the absence 
of data of rural employment on the regional level. Regions are again clustered into four 
categories on this basis. 
Table 3.22. Rural business profile across Polish rural regions 
Registered rural 
businesses 
per 1000 
population 
Cluster Level Locational 
advantage - 
disadvantage 
Slaskle 58 1 Very high Metropolitan 
Zachodniopomorskle 56 1 Very high Western border 
Dolnoslaskie 53 1 Very high Western border 
Lubuskie 51 2 High Western border 
Wielkopolskle 50 2 High Metropolitan 
Mazowieckie 50 2 High Metropolitan 
Pomorskie 49 2 High Metropolitan 
Malopolskie 46 3 Medium Metropolitan 
Lodzkle 46 3 Medium Metropolitan 
Kujawsko-Pomor 45 3 Medium Not 
Opolskie 40 3 Medium *Special case 
Podkarpackle 37 4 Low Peripheral 
Podlaskie 36 4 Low Peripheral 
Swietokrzyskie 36 4 Low Peripheral 
Warminsko-Mazur 35 4 Low Peripheral 
Lubelskie 33 4 Low Peripheral 
*Special case: Opole region has a substantial share of population with dual citizenship (Polish-German) who 
work abroad. 
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The ANOVA analysis has been performed to identify the differentiating factors between 
regions with four different levels of business development (Appendix 6). The results 
indicate that the meta-regions representing classes of rural business development differ 
significantly only in terms of one exogenous factor, namely GDP per capita. Factors such 
as the levels of agricultural development, urbanisation or infrastructure provision do not 
appear significantly different between groups. 
A closer look at the regional ranking in terms of the rural business development (Table 
3.22. ) suggests that the leading regions have locational advantages (different levels of 
spatial capital), a pattern already Identified in the logic of regional development in 
Poland (cf. Section 3.5). The two rankings of rural conditions In Polish regions, one 
mostly in terms of agricultural development, and the other one, in terms of non- 
agricultural development do not correspond closely, as would be expected, since the 
latter emphasizes a single measure while the former includes a number of different 
(even if predominantly agricultural) measures. The most striking difference Is 
exemplified by Warminsko-Mazurskie region with a very high rural resource Index and a 
low rural business index largely due to peripheral location. 
Table 3.23. Regional rural resource index and rural business development 
categories of Polish rural regions 
Rural resource category Rural business development 
(but agriculturally biased) category 
Zachodniopomorskie 11 
Warminsko-Mazurskie 14 
Lubuskie 
Dolnoslaskie 
12 
11 
Pomorskie 12 
Opolskie 23 
Wielkopolskie 
Slaskie 
22 
21 
Kujawsko-Pomorskie 23 
Mazowieckie 32 
Lodzkle 33 
Podlaskie 34 
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Lubelskie 44 
Podkarpackie 44 
Swietokrzyskie 44 
Malopolskie 43 
Source: own 
Notably, the Eastern regions of Lubelskie, Podkarpackie and Swietokrzyskie appear to be 
disadvantaged both in terms of rural index and rural business development. This 
comparison strongly suggests that a better measure of spatial capital (the linkages 
between the territory and its surrounding socio-economic environment) would Improve 
the regional identification and characterization. However, it does not suggest, especially 
in conjunction with other spatial analyses in the literature, that the basic meta-regional 
character of Poland is spurious. Whether or not the administrative regions provide a 
useful mirror of this meta-regional pattern remains to be seen. 
3.8. Polish rural localities across regions 
The analysis of spatial variation undertaken above so far has taken for granted the 
validity of regional grouping - the voivodship. Now we proceed to test if Polish 
voivodship designation is appropriate for rural planning regions characterized by internal 
homogeneity (Blair, 1995). To substantiate the internal regional homogeneity, a smaller 
unit of analysis is needed, namely the communes (NUTS 5). Gasses of communes are 
defined by means of cluster analysis performed with SPSS software. 
The commune can be taken as the basic unit of rural space, in conceptual terms, an 
equivalent of a rural locality (cf. Section 2.5.3. ). Communes have a functional meaning 
beyond a purely administrative one, acting as a place for provision of local services and 
relatively well-established governance structures. The commune is also a locality in 
purely spatial terms. The area of Polish rural communes ranges from 11.3 sq km to a 
maximum of 624 sq km, with a mean of 137 sq km, within the functional boundaries "of 
not much more than fifteen minutes to half an hour of traveling time" (Hilhorst, 1990: 
10). Research (outside the boundary of this study) is needed to evaluate to what extent 
Internal Identities and bonds operate within communes to justify terming them as 
"communities" with local identities (Gorzelak, 2000): as local milieux with connections 
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via a myriad of formal and informal contacts and shared values and interests, for 
reducing information costs and transaction costs. Even then, the commune does not 
correspond to a functional microregion (Nilhorst, 1990: 9), defined as "a set of villages 
and nearest town" More than 70% of Polish rural or urban-rural communes do not 
contain towns at all51. Also, communes are too small to be an equivalent of Local 
Labour Systems (for definition see: Storti: 2000) delineated for commuting distances. 
Nevertheless, and despite these obvious drawbacks, the commune level data are the 
only ones available to examine the proposition that the regions (voivodships) are 
sufficiently internally homogeneous to be a useful focus for rural development 
programmes. 
The analysis covers 2085 communes (or parts of communes) defined as rural-based on 
OECD criteria52 and marked as such in the Bank Danych Lokalnych (BDL- Bank of Local 
Data) database maintained by the Polish statistical office (GUS). Selected data on 
agricultural conditions, commune revenues, and rural infrastructure provision has been 
gratefully received respectively from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, 
FAPA and the Institute of Rural Development (IRWiR). 
Allowing for the outliers and missing data53, the analysis is performed on the total group 
of 2009 communes. Unlike in the case of regions, the choice of indicators (cf. Table 
3.24) is not agriculturally biased but no exogenous categories have been included. The 
ANOVA table (3.24, below) indicates that there is an association between the commune 
variables and communes' location within a region, with the highest F indicators for 
registered unemployment rates, population density and farm size variables. The ANOVA 
analysis confirms a general regional pattern amongst ruralities in Polish regions. Among 
these variables, variance within regions is significantly smaller than between regions. 
However, this is not to say that the existing regions are necessarily a homogeneous 
clustering of communes. 
sl Three administrative types of communes are officially recognized: urban communes (municipality with a 
local council for one large or medium-sized city), rural (municipality composed exclusively of rural 
settlements) and rural-urban (municipality with a local council for one town and several nearby villages). 
Out of 2489 Polish communes, 316 are designated as urban, 567 are urban-rural and 1606 are rural. 
However, our analysis is based on OECD criteria of rurality, not Polish administrative categories. 52 OECD defines "rural" based on population density below 150 persons/sq km at local territorial units level. 53 The analysis covers all communes in Poland classified as "rural" according to OECD criteria. Due to 
occasional change in commune numbers/borders in some cases the data is missing (64, notably 3%), 
mostly for rural-urban communes. In addition, 16 outliers have been excluded from the analysis, leaving in 
total 2009 valid cases. 
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Table 3.24. ANOVA: Basic rural variables at commune level within regions and 
between regions (by F value) 
Sum of Squares df Mean F Sig. 
Square 
Unemployment rate in Between Regions 49724.794 15 3314.986 196.101 . 000 district 
Within Regions 33690.676 1993 16.905 
Total 83415.471 2008 
Farm size (ha) Between Regions 33833.405 15 2255.560 194.100 . 000 Within Regions 23159.922 1993 11.621 
Total 56993.328 2008 
Population density Between Regions 71.296 15 4.753 93.098 . 000 Within Regions 101.751 1993 5.105E-02 
Total 173.047 2008 
% of employed in Between Regions 6.051 15 . 403 34.912 . 000 agriculture 
Within Regions 23.019 1992 1.156E-02 
Total 29.070 2007 
% of employed in non Between Regions 12.182 15 . 812 30.204 . 000 market services 
Within Regions 53.561 1992 2.689E-02 
Total 65.743 2007 
Natural conditions for Between Regions 68139.772 15 4542.651 27.583 . 000 agri-production 
Within Regions 327897.218 1991 164.690 
Total 396036.991 2006 
Water provision Between Regions 180343.937 15 12022.929 21.088 . 000 Within Regions 1136252.433 1993 570.122 
Total 1316596.370 2008 
Index of own Between Regions 2777912.662 15 185194.177 19.088 . 000 commune tax base 
Within Regions 19335860.476 1993 9701.887 
Total 22113773.138 2008 
Companies per 1000 Between Regions 85669.703 15 5711.314 17.229 . 000 population 
Within Regions 660673.355 1993 331.497 
Total 746343.058 2008 
Telephone Between Regions 566182.702 15 37745.513 10.195 . 000 subscribers 
Within Regions 7378835.805 1993 3702.376 
Total 7945018.506 2008 
% of employed in Between Regions 5.412 15 . 361 9.125 . 000 manufacturing 
Within Regions 78.764 1992 3.954E-02 
Total 84.176 2007 
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To examine this proposition, the main dimensions of local variables are reduced by 
means of factor analysis to a smaller number of underlying dimensions. The initial tests 
(Table 3.25. ) indicate that the data are sufficiently correlated for the factor analysis to 
be meaningful. Again, to substantiate the factor and duster analysis, a slightly different 
combination of variables has been tried, which yields similar results (see Appendix 10). 
Table 3.25. KMO and Bartlett's test for variables at NUTS 5 level 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. . 702 Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 3626.671 
df 55 
Sig. . 000 
A three-factor solution has been identified to underline the major differences behind the 
measured variables amongst Polish communes (Table 3.26) 
Table 3.26. Major factors underlying differences behind Polish ruralities (PCA) 
Variables Factors 
Commona- 
1 2 3 lity 
Population density . 813 -4.950E-02 . 165 . 690 
Farm size (ha) -. 775 . 235 5.934E-02 . 659 
Local road density . 701 -5.976E-02 . 267 . 566 
Unemployment rate in district -. 656 . 176 . 307 . 556 
% of employed in non market 
services 
5.253E- 
02 
-. 710 -. 156 . 531 
Index of own commune tax base 1.824E- 
02 . 
706 . 278 . 577 
Companies per 1000 population . 174 . 687 -. 206 . 544 
Telephone subscribers . 313 . 556 -. 198 . 446 
Index of natural conditions for 
agricultural production 
. 201 -7.493E-03 . 749 . 601 
Water provision . 281 . 302 -. 103 . 181 
% of employment in market 
services . 
199 . 133 -. 472 . 280 
Eigenvalue 2.473 1.985 1.174 
Variance 22.481 18.043 10.669 
Cumulative 22.481 40.524 51.193 
Source: own 
The factors are similar to the factors identified at the regional level, but clearer due a 
larger population size (more communes than regions). Only those factors of elgenvalue 
above 1 have been chosen here, as Is common practice with this analysis. Once again, 
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however, inclusion of a larger number of factors does not alter the exhibition of these 
three major factors to any marked extent. 
The main factor underlying the variation between Polish rural conditions at the 
commune level can be termed settlement and farm pattern (22% of variance). It 
consists of population density negatively related to farm size and registered 
unemployment. The second factor, termed business development (18% of variance), 
consists of business density positively linked with commune own revenue index, and 
negatively linked with employment in public sector. The third factor is that of natural 
conditions for agricultural production (10% of variance). 
Noticeably, the farm and settlement pattern appears as a separate factor to business 
development, apparently driven by separate set of influences. In addition, infrastructure 
provision does not appear to be a distinguishing factor. Rather, it mirrors population 
patterns (for road provision) or business development (for telephone networks). This is 
in line with the latest research by Piecek (2002), concluding that the levels of rural 
infrastructure in Poland have been equalizing in recent years, with the traditional 
territorial inequality slowly disappearing. 
Cluster analysis has been performed to classify Polish ruralities. An hierarchical cluster 
technique has been used to identify the number of clusters to ensure the highest 
possible Internal homogeneity within a group with the highest possible distance between 
groups. Based on the hierarchical cluster, the K-cluster technique yields the following 
five clusters (Table 3.27). 
Table 3.27. Final cluster centres - typology of Polish ruralities 
Cluster - Rurality Type 
Rurality I Rurality 2 Rurality 3 Rurality 4 Rurality 5 
REGR factor score 1 1.01773 . 92613 -1.27951 -. 05086 . 31300 ++ ++ _ 0 + REGR factor score 2 2.65906 -. 81795 . 23745 -. 36792 . 75893 ++ -- + - + 
REGR factor score 3 -. 84375 . 64522 . 54374 -. 86053 . 56911 
- + + - + 
Source: own 
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Rurality 1 is best developed, primarily characterized by very high business development, 
where a large proportion of rural population is employed outside agriculture, especially 
in market services. This rurality has also the highest provision of telephones, but its 
conditions for agricultural production (e. g. farm size or natural conditions) are not better 
than average. Clearly this rurality capitalizes on locational advantages such as the 
vicinity of big cities, the national Western border, or major tourism attractions - the 
important spatial capital endowment already identified in Chapter 2. 
Rurality 2 is primarily characterized by its high population density and very small farm 
patterns. This rurality features the lowest levels of business development, and most 
employment (outside farms) is found in the public sector. Commune own revenues in 
Rurality 2 are low. Rurality 2 enjoys good natural conditions for agricultural production, 
but high labour redundancy in agriculture does not allow it to capitalize on natural 
advantages for agricultural profitability. 
The basic characteristics of Rurality 3 are a very low population density associated with 
relatively large farm size and very high structural unemployment (following the 
transformation of state farms, which predominate in this rurality). Rurality 3 has slightly 
higher rates of business development than rurality 2 and average levels of commune 
own revenues. 
Rurality 4 is close to Rurality 2, but differentiated by average settlement and bigger farm 
size, a low business density associated with low commune revenues, and relatively high 
employment in the public sector. 
Rurality 5 is relatively well developed with good level of business development, high 
commune revenues, and good provision of infrastructure. A large share of employment 
in rurality 5 is in industry. 
Detailed characteristics of five major types of Polish ruralities are given in ANOVA tables 
(3.28. ) below and in Appendix 7. 
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Chapter 3: Spatial analysis of Polish agricultural and rural development 
Figure 3.9. shows the share of rural population living in each type of rurality in Poland. 
Only 25% of the total rural population lives in the relatively well-developed ruralities 1 
and 5. 
Figure 3.9. Population in five types of Polish ruralities. 
Population in Polish ruralities (% total) 
I  rurality 1  rurality 20 rurality 3  rurality 4  rurality 5 
Source: own 
Figure 3.10. shows the location of ruralities in the Polish voivodships, indicating the 
number of ruralities of a given type in each region. Note that in Figure 3.10. the regions 
are ordered in accordance with their rural index (cf. Table 3.21. ). 
Figure 3.10. Rural regional profiles: 
Five types of ruralities in Polish regions (number of ruralities) 
c`°Q °J5 y\ýy 
QN tiý yý ýk yv \5p oo\ Q°ý5- oQ oQ 5' 
cl* 
Ip IQ 
  Cluster 1  Cluster 20 Cluster 3  Cluster 4  Cluster 5 
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Source: own calculation 
In principle, the patterns amongst ruralities substantiate the meta-regions identified by 
means of rural index, with more homogenous rurality patterns in meta-regions of North- 
West (left side of the graph) and South-East (right side of the graph) than the central 
ones (middle part of the graph). The mix in the rurality patterns in the center of Poland 
suggests that the boundaries between the meta-regions do not follow the boundaries of 
regions. 
However, in our assessment of the validity of present voivodship boundaries to describe 
patterns of ruralities, we note a considerable variety within voivodships. In fact, the 
regions of Zachodniopomorskie, Warminsko-Mazurskie and Lubuskie in the North-West 
and Podlaskie in Central-East remain homogenous (one major rurality type). 
Dolnoslaskie, Pomorskie, Wielkopolskie, Kujawsko-Pomorskie and Mazowieckie feature 
all five types of ruralities in their profile. The South-East meta region (Malopolskie, 
Swietokrzyskie, Podkarpackie, Lubelskie and Swietokrzyskie) appear bi-modal. Opoiskie 
and Slaskie contain four types of ruralities. 
3.9. Conclusions from Chapter 3 
This Chapter has examined the spatial dimension of Polish rural development patterns 
set against the context of historical trajectories and the macroeconomics of transition 
shocks. The key conclusion is that there is only limited evidence for the appropriateness 
of voivodship level as a unit to describe rural diversity in Poland in the context of other 
levels of spatial differentiation. 
Clearly, with the progress of the development, the relative importance of agriculture for 
both national and rural economy declines, with people taking up better opportunities 
outside farming. Already the share of labour in farming exceeds the share of income 
accruing to farming: whilst farming is estimated to provide employment to about 40 per 
cent of rural population, it merely provides 20% of rural household income in Poland 
(Section 3.6.2. ). The human capital still occupied with farming is on average less 
educated and older, compared with non-farming rural population and with the national 
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average. The relative decline of agriculture results from the growth in non-agricultural 
rural businesses; however, as yet only limited economic data on non-farming business 
development in rural areas is available in Poland. Nevertheless, assuming that half of 
rural population employed outside farming commutes to neighbouring urban locations, 
rural non agricultural businesses in Poland already now generate as much income and 
employment as the agricultural sector, notwithstanding the significant gaps in rural 
statistics. 
There is evidence to suggest that the levels of physical, human and social capital in rural 
areas in Poland lag behind the urban standards (Section 3.6.1. ). Indeed, the growth in 
the transition period has mostly concentrated in urban (if not mainly metropolitan) 
centers, but the gap between the urban and rural development levels has been historic. 
Rural areas have absorbed most of the redundant labour laid off during the restructuring 
of industrial sectors (contributing mostly to "hidden" agricultural unemployment or, at 
least, under-employment), as well as from the former state farms (constituting 
registered unemployment and areas of social exclusion). Non-agricultural business 
development is mainly driven by spatial capital, including, especially, location near the 
metropolitan areas or the Western borders. Location might become more especially 
important in the transition economies as a genuine market emerges for land. 
In the last decade the Polish economy has experienced a substantial, albeit regionally 
unequal growth (Section 3.5. ). The growth has been highly dynamic and concentrated in 
the metropolitan areas, in particular Warsaw: only the Mazowieckie region boasted the 
rates of growth continually higher than the national average in 1995-1999. Regions with 
highest GDP levels tended to grow quicker relative to lagging regions. However, the 
poorest regions exhibited higher levels of growth compared to the mid-regions. Yet, on 
the whole, the regional divergence in Poland, measured by the a-coefficient, is 
comparable to those shown in Spain and the UK. 
A rural resource and structure index (cf. Section 3.7, Table 3.21. ) calculated with a 
multivariate technique of the principal component analysis, indicates that there are 
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differences in the rural resource and structures between Polish regions. However, the 
pattern of difference, underlined primarily by the settlement and farm structure, appears 
more at the meta-regional level rather than at the voivodship level. Four major meta- 
regions can be differentiated with respect to rural resources based on the North-West 
versus South-East axis: North-Western region (Zachodniopomorskie, Warminsko- 
Mazurskie, Lubuskie, Dolnoslaskie and Pomorskie); Central-Western region (Opoiskie, 
Wielkopoiskie, Kujawsko-Pomorskie and Slaskie), Central-Eastern region (Mazowieckie, 
Lodzkie, Podlaskie) and South-Eastern region (Lubelskie, Podkarpackie, Swietokrzyskie 
and Malopolskie). 
These meta-regions reflect historic divisions between Russian, Prussian and Austrian 
empires in the 19th century and the territorial shifts after the World War 2. However, 
the availability of statistics (and thus, the choice of indicators) for the analysis has been 
implicitly biased towards agricultural structures and reflects an economy primarily driven 
by land capital. A complementary classification based on scarce data on non-agricultural 
development reveals a new spatial rural dynamic on the West-East axis, driven by the 
endowment of spatial capital, in particular the proximity of the Western border and 
metropolitan areas. The classification in terms of rural business potential does not seem 
to closely substantiate the homogeneity of the previous meta-regions. In each 
agriculturally defined meta-region there are voivodships with a varied level of non 
agricultural rural business development. On one end of the spectrum 
Zachodniopomorskie enjoys both the highest relative agricultural rural resource 
endowment and business development, on the other end the regions of Lubelskie, 
Podkarpackie and Swietokrzyskie appear to be lagging behind in both respects. That the 
factors driving agricultural development and business development are not the same is 
exemplified by the Warminsko-Mazurskie region, with a very high resource standing but 
a very low rural business development. 
The broad pattern of regional rural resource differences is confirmed on the level of 
ruralities in Poland, yet with a considerable internal variation. The cluster analysis of 
Polish ruralities has resulted in the typology of five major ruralities underpinned by three 
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major factors: population and farm patterns; business development; conditions for 
agricultural production (Table 3.28. ). The rural profiles of regions indicate that Polish 
voivodships tend to be differentiated in terms of their rurality structure. However, most 
regions have as many as all the five types of ruralities represented in their structure, 
thus making the relevance of vovoidships for rural policy design questionable. 
This analysis appears consistent with the major thrust of development theories (Chapter 
2). The standard theories of relative rural disadvantage from lack of agglomeration 
economies appear to be evidenced in the Polish case of transition, where scarce capital 
tends to favour economies of scale and scope associated with urban areas (or with the 
resources of spatial capital). Those left behind in primarily agrarian communities have 
less endowment in human, and physical capital, exhibiting clear cumulative causation 
patterns. On the other hand, in absolute terms, the rural economies are also growing as 
evidenced from the business development. The established categories of ruralities 
underpinned by agrarian economies are slowly losing their meaning, leading to rural 
businesses outside agriculture. Rural business development appears to be driven by 
partially exogenous factors (such as the dynamic of regional economies) as well as (and 
reflected by) the spatial capital endowment. With the clear linkages between rural and 
urban economies, a discreet division between the two appears contestable, albeit still 
more relevant than in Western Europe where the rural disadvantage has been 
outweighed by the diseconomies of congestion in urban areas. Unlike in Western 
Europe, the relevance of cultural capital and natural amenities appears hard to discern 
in the analysis, partly for lack of data, partly becuase presently low consumers' incomes 
do not support the development and exploitation of these potential advantages. 
3.9.1. Implications of spatial analysis for rural policy design in Poland 
A number of policy implications can be drawn from this spatial analysis in simple 
economic terms. 
Firstly, the analysis has confirmed the growing importance of the non-agricultural sector 
for Polish rural areas, albeit compromised by the availability of statistics. The historic 
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agricultural emphasis in policy is clearly reflected in lack of rural statistics, specifically on 
non-agricultural employment and activities of rural population. 
Secondly, the rural-urban divide in Poland appears stronger than intra-regional rural 
variation. With evidence of rural spatial disadvantage in attracting scarce capital in the 
transition period in Poland, the rural-urban divide remains a useful policy focus, unlike in 
the EU where diseconomies of scale have reversed the traditional rural spatial 
disadvantage (Terluin, Post, 2001; Saraceno, 2002), with the concept of a local 
economy substituting for the rural focus. 
Thirdly, there is evidence of spatial variation in the resources and structures across 
Poland. The regions cluster into meta-regions (dating back to historical settlement 
patterns). The new geography of rural development (outside agriculture) does not 
neatly fit the meta- regions logic, but rather appears to reflect the access to benefits of 
trade. There is little correlation (0.2) between the regional GDP per capita and the rural 
resource index. In addition, most regions seem to feature a variety of ruralities, far more 
reasonable candidates for researching rural cohesion, at least to function as benchmarks 
for evaluation. On the other hand, there are clear dependencies between urban and 
rural economies, calling for a rural dimension in regional policies, especially focused on 
small towns. 
Fourthly, FEOGA structural policies are likely to have different absorption patterns 
depending on rurality type. Rurality 1, well connected with urban centers, has a natural 
advantage for non-agricultural business and is thus most likely to attract funding from 
rural diversification schemes. In addition, communes in rurality 1 have a relatively high 
investment potential, likely giving them an advantage in co-funding of infrastructure 
projects. 
Rurality 3 features a high share of landless population, often unemployed. Since FEOGA- 
Guidance is targeted at farmers it can have a bias against rural dwellers without farms in 
rurality 3. However, rurality 3, especially in the Western Poland, has a relatively good 
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rural business potential, which might need support in training measures. In addition, the 
rural unemployed, mostly landless persons in rurality 3 are not likely to be eligible for 
support under FEOGA. Yet, rurality 3 has a reasonably strong commune own revenue for 
co-funding of infrastructure and potential village renewal projects. Rurality 2 might have 
problems with uptake of rural development funding such as on-farm investment (due to 
very fragmented farms), rural business development (due to a structurally low level 
already) or even of infrastructure projects due to relatively weak own commune tax 
base. Most unemployment in rurality 2 is "hidden" in agriculture: as such redundant 
farm labour will be eligible for FEOGA support, albeit might have problems with market 
linkages due to relatively poor regional economic structures and peripheral location, 
especially farms in the Eastern Poland. Rurality 2 has not only the smallest farm pattern, 
but also the lowest level of rural business development. Thus, rurality 2 will have 
difficulties in accessing FEOGA investment funding. Some of this negative effect is likely 
to be balanced by potential LFA payments, early retirement schemes or environmental 
payments. With jobs created more easily in towns, rurality 2 could benefit from 
specifically targeted regional policies and facilitate commuting, provided complementary 
training measures are in place. 
Rurality 4 is likely to have similar problems to rurality 2, yet less acute. With slightly 
bigger farms and more businesses, some investments are likely to progress. 
Nonetheless, ruralities 4 in peripheral areas in the East of Poland are still going to face 
difficulties. Some funding from a special measure for semi-market oriented farms are 
likely to be absorbed in rurality 4, yet if it was to be ensured that FEOGA funding is to 
bring equitable effects for Polish ruralities, rurality 4 is most likely to absorb non- 
investment funds such as agri-environmental schemes. Small farming structures in 
rurality 4, albeit not as fragmented as in rurality 2 could benefit from land consolidation 
measures. 
Finally, rurality 5 appears well developed, both in terms of agricultural structures and 
non-agricultural rural businesses, likely able to undertake investments. The spatially 
differentiated resource structures in ruralities and regions are likely to limit a potential 
111 
Chapter 3: Spatial analysis of Polish agricultural and rural development 
for absorbing FEOGA policies. (Chapter 4 addresses the issue of territorially "fair" 
financial allocations). 
In a nutshell, although there is a spatial differentiation of rural resources and structures 
in Poland, voivodships do not seem an appropriate unit to capture the most important 
dimensions of this variation54. Individual programmes designed for regions are likely to 
miss economies of scale as major rural characteristics are shared by meta-regions. On 
the other hand, most regions feature considerable internal variety on the commune 
level: a truly spatially sensitive regional programme would need to be internally (within 
region) differentiated, for example by rurality class, as outlined above. Given the 
predominant visible horizontal urban-rural divide, the preparation of individual rural 
policies at voivodship' level appears to bring little added value. However, close linkages 
between rural and regional policies and economies seem to make it a complementary 
task for regions to design and implement rural-friendly regional policies, especially 
focused on small towns. 
54 Similarly, the Integrated Regional Development Plan (ME: 2003) makes a point that the key problem of 
Poland is a low level of economic development, rather than interregional differentiation. 
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Phapter 4 
Regionally formed preferences for structural and 
rural development policies in Poland 
4.1. Objectives and outline of Chapter 4 
This Chapter examines the proposition that spatially heterogeneous policy preferences 
(Oates, 1972) underpin rural policy regionalisation in Poland. The analysis employs data 
triangulation (Denzin 1970; Burgess, 1982), based initially on a grounded approach 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967) and participant observation experience in designing and 
conducting regional consultation exercise in 1999, and drawing upon regional 
development strategies prepared by the regional authorities. The process of preference 
formation is explored on the basis of inductively determined categories (Lee: 2002). 
Discourse analysis is employed to examine the formal regional development strategies. 
Data analysis based on an emerging theoretical framework leads to conclusions on 
preference heterogeneity, consistency and legitimacy in a broader context of 
"communicative governance" (Healey et al, 1993). 
The Chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 briefly presents the participant 
observation experience in the regional consultation process and outlines some key 
questions to be validated through examination of documentary evidence. Section 4.3 
discusses the main theoretical categories employed in the analysis. Section 4.4 deals 
with methodology, in particular the use of discourse analysis in policy and planning. 
Section 4.5 examines discursive legitimising strategies employed in regional 
development, focusing in particular on narratives of regional identity and participation in 
policy formulation. Section 4.6 draws these threads together for the regional preferences 
for rural development policy in Poland, examining in particular their internal coherence 
and intra-regional spatial sensitivity. In conclusion (Section 4.7), regional preferences for 
rural policies are presented in a broader context of emerging communicative governance 
in Polish regions. 
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4.2. A regional consultation exercise: grounded in experience 
The question of what people really want, nourished by the EU partnership principle 
(Christidis, 1998; CEC, 1993) and facilitated by value-laden regionalisation reform in 
Poland in 1999 (cf. Section 1.7), encouraged the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development in Warsaw to undertake an extensive regional consultation process for 
formulating the EU-driven SAPARD programme. The author co-designed the exercise 
and managed the process55 in spring 1999 and co-chaired 5 (of the 16) regional 
seminars56. The seminars were followed up by regional consultation questionnaire57. The 
results of the questionnaires were analysed (Andrychowicz, 1999) and fed back to 
regions in early summer 1999. 
The process, conceived in the excitement of early regionalisation reform and beliefs in 
more democratic and more efficient decentralized governance, were seen by some as a 
risk. It was in distinct contrast to the traditional cognitive hegemony of the central 
bureaucracy. If the Ministry is supposed to be professional enough to provide solutions, 
why should it ask opinions? What if a multitude of dissimilar preferences were revealed? 
Surprisingly enough, however, to the relief of the organisers, the regions made strikingly 
similar choices. 
A search for pertinent theoretical categories and the availability of additional data 
(notably regional development strategies) have prompted the re-definition of the original 
ss The seminars took place in all regions (Marshall offices). The Ministry recommended a broad 
representation of participants (a total of approximately 100 in each region) as well as background and 
agenda setting. Technical support was provided by the regional authorities. Each seminar consisted of two 
parts: Information on the SAPARD programme and the potential choices followed by subsequent group 
work. The groups, of approximately 25 people each, chaired by a regional facilitator (total about 60 working 
groups), were asked to produce a brief SWOT analysis for their regional agriculture and rural areas; with 
implied selection of SAPARD measures and an indicative budget breakdown. The seminars followed a 
standard format designed by myself in conjunction with the Department of Pre-Accession Assistance and 
Structural Funds, MARD, Warsaw. Each conference was chaired by a senior regional politician, whilst the 
Ministry was represented at the technical level. 
56 Notably in: Malopolskie, Opoiskie, Slaskie, Zachodniopomorskie and Mazowieckie regions. 
57 The questionnaire encompassed: SWOT analysis, a selection of short- and medium-term measures, 
indicative breakdown of funding between measures, as well as issues of co-financing, regional partnership 
networks, advancement of strategy development and elaboration of measures. 
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questions. The concept of "regional preference formation" raises further questions. What 
legitimizes territorial preference formation logics relative to the central systems? How 
are preferences formed and defined? To answer these questions, it is necessary to 
clarify the concepts involved. 
4.3. Theoretical categories and issues 
4.3.1. Preferences, preference ordering and transitivity 
The concept of preference, central to economics and political economics, is probably as 
simple in theory as it is difficult in practice. It is strictly linked to the core assumption of 
the rational paradigm, namely that of utility optimisation (or, in other words, welfare 
maximisation: Doel, Velthoven, 1993). The concept only acquires its proper meaning 
under resource constraints - how do you choose between alternatives, rather than 
simply what do you want? Doel and Velthoven (1993: 4) observe the obvious, yet often 
overlooked fact: "every choice demands sacrifices consisting of the foregone goods and 
services: you cannot have your cake and eat it, too". If the objective of the state policy 
is welfare optimisation relative to budget and socio-technical constraints and 
possibilities, mere knowledge of preferences may be valuable in itself. However, 
preference ordering, be it ordinal or cardinal, requires an individual to be able to 
attribute a utility rank to each preference. The (present and/or future) utility however, 
needs to reflect opportunities foregone. Clearly, such estimates, particularly when 
applied to dissimilar entities, pose difficulties for consistency and comparability. For 
example the (present and future) utilities derived from "having a glass of wine" might be 
hardly comparable with those associated with "belonging to NATO" (Doel, Veltholten, 
1993: 18). An individual might well find it difficult to choose between the provision of 
public goods and potential private goods, such as for example the utility coming from 
the provision of road, versus the telephone connection, let alone comparing access to 
training or farm improvement grants, when there are only sufficient resources for one or 
the other. Though it is difficult to conceive of the practical circumstance that would 
make these two events necessary competitors for an individual's scarce resources, those 
choices are not rare in collective domain (Minogue, 1986). 
Another practical problem with preferences is their dynamic nature. As demonstrated by 
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welfare economists (e. g. May, 1954) even individual preferences are likely to change 
with context and circumstance, and thus, at the very least, exhibit intransitivity and 
inconsistency over time. The problems of collective preferences are even more manifest 
as different rules of the game can bring different collective outcomes (see, e. g. McLean. 
1987; Gerber, Jackson, 1993). As resources are finite, one person's preferences can be 
met only at the expense of others, so any order of collective preferences tends to be 
subject to debate, meaning that any given collective choice are likely to be intransitive. 
Indeed, according to Arrow's impossibility theorem (see, e. g. McLean. 1987) there is no 
majority-voting procedure that can be relied upon to produce a well-behaved collective 
choice. Gerber, Jackson (1993: 654) note that the rationality of preferences depends on 
the substance (and related information costs): choices amongst alternatives with very 
uncertain outcomes may imply irrationality or very plastic preferences underlying those 
decisions. They conclude that (p. 654): 
"in these very important cases the process of discussion and preference 
formation must precede preference revelation and aggregation. The role of 
institutions in preferences development may be more important than their 
role as aggregator of those preferences" 
Even if we preserve the fiction that individual preferences are consistent, transitive and 
well behaved, the collective outcome will clearly depend on the political system used to 
aggregate and balance individual preferences. Not only are the outcomes prone to 
being intransitive and inconsistent, they will vary according to the methods use to 
generate the political preference. Indeed, it can be argued that this observation is 
nothing more than a characterization of the very essence of political debate, continually 
seeking compromise through agenda-setting, platform and coalition building and so 
forth (e. g. Heap et a/. 1992, McLean, 1987). In other words, Arrow's impossibility 
theorem is the very reason why human communities find politics necessary, if 
inconvenient and hardly sufficient to resolve the inherent difficulties of reaching rational 
collective decisions. 
However, whilst reservations as to the validity of the term "preference or even more so, 
"collective preference" are fully justified, their denial is not. A large body of development 
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literature (for example: Chambers, 1996; Lewis, 1955) suggests that, to succeed, 
development policies need to be in line with peoples' motivations, perceptions and 
preferences. The literature agrees univocally that it is important to know what people 
want and to create policies accordingly. 
All these issues are pertinent to regional preference formation process in Poland. For our 
further analysis we need to keep in mind that valid preferences require the comparison 
between alternatives (preferences are necessarily relative and not absolute) and that the 
mode of collective aggregation matters. For this reason, we now move to the issues of 
the legitimacy of regional preference formation (which, in practice, competes with the 
alternative legitimacy of central authority, frequently based on notions of the logic and 
reason of social mechanisms, especially economics). 
4.3.2. Legitimacy of regional preference formation 
The question of legitimacy lies at the heart of regionalisation debate. As argued by 
Donahue (1997, quoted in Rodriguez-Pose, Gill, 2002), ultimately the most important 
asset that government can command is not legal authority, or fiscal resources, or even 
talented personnel, but legitimacy. However, the actual meaning of legitimacy is 
essentially contested both in its theoretical and practical dimensions. Bentham (1993) 
conceives legitimacy as a mixture of power, rules and consent, yet fails to offer a means 
of defining or reaching a balance between them. A definition by Donahue (1997) 
extends to encompass popular support and citizen cooperation (as an expansion of the 
notion of consent and the relations with power) but, again, offers little indication how 
these qualities are to be achieved. 
A more elaborate discussion of legitimacy is found in Dryzek (2001). He questions the 
feasibility of direct legitimacy constructed as "reflective assent through participation in 
authentic deliberation by those subject to decision in question", arguing that "reflective 
participation" is simply incongruent with the practicalities of big groups. Instead, he 
developed a concept of "discursive legitimacy" achieved when a collective decision is 
coherent with the constellation of predominant discourses (rather than with 
participation). 
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A final kind of research agenda on legitimacy, mostly represented in American political 
science, relates to its practical assessment and measurability (e. g. Weatherford, 1992). 
These approaches, usually based on empirical quantitative data, relate policy satisfaction 
to the characteristics of political systems and also to the personal traits of individuals, 
revealed through questions about their attitudes to authorities. 
So how can regional governance obtain its legitimacy? In some views legitimacy is 
tautological in democratic systems. Weber (1993) for example, argues that legitimacy is 
implicit: rules commonly created are commonly accepted. Legitimacy is, thus, simply 
embodied in legal and political systems. A similar tautological position, though for 
different reasons, is advanced by regulation theorists (cf. Section 1.5.3. ). In their view, 
regional governance simply emerges as a result of natural evolution in regulation 
regimes, making the attainment of legitimacy automatic -a necessary condition for the 
survival and continuation (replication) of the governance structures. In this sense, the 
evolutionary approach answers the obvious question raised by the Weberian view - 
what happens when existing institutions (rules, laws and conventions) do not embody 
(sufficient) legitimacy? The answer is that institutions are changed and adapted to 
improve legitimacy. A third view of implicit legitimacy depends on "negative" legitimacy. 
Regional governance simply receives a credit of support in the absence or decline of the 
central legitimacy and efficiency58. Where the central government has proven 
disappointing, trust (with yet little proof for actual improvement) becomes credited to 
the regional tier. Hence, preferences for regional government may emerge as and when 
central government is found disappointing (or barely legitimate). 
4.3.3. Territorial identity and legitimacy 
Some researchers seek to establish a positive ground for regional legitimacy, especially 
relative to the central processes (Rodriguez-Pose, Gill, 2002; Donahue, 1993; Dardanelli, 
1998). For Rodriguez-Pose, Gill (2002: 7) "regional legitimacy is determined for the most 
part by processes of history. Of the former, culture, language and religion have 
traditionally been the factors behind a strong regional identity". Indeed a view that there 
s8 Pointed to me by Prof. John Tomaney of CURDS, University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne. 
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is a link between regional identity and regional legitimacy has acquired a particular 
salience (Dardanelli, 1998; Keating, 1998; Rodriguez-Pose, Gill, 2002; Les Galle, 1998; 
Paasi, 2002; Teune, 1992; Raagma, 2002). In this trend, a region is seen not merely as 
either a figment of imagination or as an objective economic entity, but as a socio- 
institutional reality (Les Galle, 1998), as a socio-economic phenomenon (Paasi, 2002), as 
a container for collective actions (Raagmaa, 2002), legitimized by people's affiliation to 
place (Teune, 1992). Thus, subjective motivation to participate or support regional 
groupings (relative to central state logic) can be attributed to regional identity. 
Participation in activities of groups with strong loyalty bonds provides vicarious 
satisfactions through collective achievements and assures security from threats by 
others as well as punishments for disloyalty (Teune, 1992). With no territorial identity, 
regional groupings are claimed to be empty, as Teune (1992: 105) emphasizes: 
"individual attachment is assumed to be a necessary condition for the legitimacy and the 
viability of any political system". Indeed, more universally, a group's success is heavily 
influenced by the loyalty of its members. For example Zdaniuk, Levine (2001) in their 
psychological research show that participants with high group identity would exhibit 
more loyalty59 than those in the low group identity condition. 
Moreover, the legitimisation of regions by identity is also recognized in the EU level legal 
practice. Article 1.1. of the Act on the Creation of Committee of Regions (1994) states 
that: 
the word region shall be taken to mean a territory which constitutes, from a 
geographical point of view, a clear-cut entity or a similar grouping of territories 
where there is continuity and whose population possesses certain shared 
features and wishes to safeguard the resulting specific identity and to develop it 
with the object of stimulating cultural, social and economic progress" 
(emphasis added) 
However, the concept of regional identity is highly complex and contestable for both its 
multiple meanings and manifestations. 
59Zdaniuk, Levin (2001) defined loyalty as adherence to a social unit to which one belongs as well as to its 
goals, symbols, and beliefs. 
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The first fact regarding Identity is its multiplicity. We can describe ourselves by affinities 
to our family, social class, profession, or territory. This has led Smith (1991) to develop 
a theory of concentric circles explaining the coexistence of outer, lighter identities with 
inner, deeper ones. Indeed, Franck (1996) observed that modernity gives individuals 
more freedom in (multiple) identity selection, which, as Franck argued, diffuses loyalties 
to any specific grouping. Loyalties, once focused on the state, may now be distributed 
among various referents, from the institutions of civil society to religions and affinity 
groups. Thus, in Franck's view, a major life-task of the modern person is to achieve 
deliberate self-definition to the extent permitted by law. Castells (1997) holds an 
opposite view. In his writings territorial identities are depicted as essentially defensive in 
the global world (echoing the notion of regional legitimacy as a negative response to 
failing legitimacy at the national or state level (noted above, section 4.3.2): 
"... an identity of retrenchment of the known against the unpredictability of the 
unknown and uncontrollable (... ) Thus, local communities, constructed through 
collective action and preserved through collective memory, are specific sources 
of identities. But these identities, in most cases, are defensive reactions against 
the impositions of global disorder and uncontrollable fast paced change. They do 
build havens, but not heavens. " 
Castells 1997: 64 
In the writing of institutionalists (Amin, 1999; Keating, 1998) identity is depicted in a 
positive light: as the satisfaction of needs for belonging, common stories, frames of 
reference and mobilisation. Keating (1998: 86) places regional identity in both the 
cognitive and affective domains. People must know where a region is, and also feel 
positively about it, possibly in competition to other sets of identities (such as class or 
nation). As such, when institutionalised, regional identity can play an instrumental role 
as the basis for mobilization of effort and resources. 
An operational analysis of territorial identity has been done by Roca (2000), who seeks 
to disaggregate the notion into socio-cultural and socio-economic dimensions, pointing 
out that the economic change undermines the identity and image of places, which 
dichotomises the traditional and modern, positive and negative, exogenous and 
exogenous forces of progress versus identity. 
Although there is no agreement about the basis of legitimacy of regional governance, 
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nor indeed, if it is tautologically necessary in the legal constitutions of modern states, 
strong linkages between legitimacy and territorial identities discussed literature have 
their merits. Firstly, Rodriguez-Pose and Gill (2002) note a strong link between 
legitimacy of regional governance and its real room for political manoeuvre. Indeed, 
what is termed as a "bottom-up" demand for regionalisation (Keating, 1998) links to 
political support, translating to political support for further decentralization. Secondly, 
affinities to place are conceptualized as playing a vital role in conflict regulation (Les 
Gales, 1998). Similarly, Paasi (2002) claims that a region and regional identity are social 
facts that can generate actions if people believe in them. He sees the positive impact of 
a regional identity that joins people together, provides people with regional values and 
self-confidence, and ultimately makes a region a cultural-economic medium in the 
struggle over resources and power in the broader socio-spatial context. The view that 
the power of regionalism lies in its ability to mobilize people on the basis of their 
historical occupation of a shared environment is supported by numerous researchers 
(Keating, 1998; Raagmaa, 2002; McLeod, 1998). However, numerous attempts to 
evidence an empirical link between territorial identity and economic mobilization (for 
example, Raagmaa (2002) in Estonia; McLeod (1998) in Scotland; Manu (2002) in 
selected regions in Europe) still appear incomplete. Even less research effort has so far 
been directed to examine a link between identity and the quality of regional public 
administration or levels of participation in regional elections. 
The implications of this-review for our considerations are not straightforward. On one 
hand, the regional legitimacy is almost univocally seen as linked to regional identity. 
However, if legitimacy is the key resource the regional government commands, it is by 
no means the only one. Thus, the regional identity contributes to the potential efficiency 
of regional governance, but need not guarantee it. Regional governance can fail on 
other grounds (for example being captivated by narrow elites, corruption, public 
management failures, etc. ), so the linkages between the regional legitimacy and 
institutional capacities need not be direct. Does the absence of territorial identity 
necessarily discredit legitimacy? Not always. Is regional governance bred by 
dissatisfaction with the central rule illegitimate? Again, not necessarily: in regions where 
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the discontinuities of history and displacement undermined or virtually destroyed 
territorial identities, the establishment of regional governance might contribute to the 
production of affinities to space and collective bonds. This brings us to the point that, in 
the longer term, regional legitimacy is highly dynamic, just like the processes of identity, 
or more broadly of socio-economic regions themselves. For the sake of the analysis in 
this chapter, however, we accept a weak version of identity-legitimacy relationship, 
treating regional identity as a legitimising factor rather than as a condition. We argue 
that regional preferences supported by loyalties coming from spatial affinities acquire 
additional strength, demonstrated, for example, when competing with the central logic 
or backing up regional politics in the national arena. Other legitimizing strategies, such 
as discourse and participation are discussed below. This research is confined to 
indicative discourse analysis, other issues of identity fall beyond its scope. 
The main source of data to analyse those phenomena comes from documentary 
sources, notably the formal regional development strategies. At the very basic level the 
documents are a piece of language. What role does language play in policy making? 
What conclusions can we draw from linguistic analysis in policy context? Section 4.3.4 
seeks to address these questions. 
4.3.4. Language, politics and communicative governance 
Bonds between politics, planning and language have been explored by political and 
social scientists and linguists alike. Social scientists have developed a concept of 
"deliberative democracy" and "communicative governance" (Healey, 1993) primarily 
drawing upon speech-act theory (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969) paraphrased into 
"communicative action" (Habernas, 1984). 
The speech-act theory views language not merely as affirming truth but "doing things" 
such as manipulating, guiding, counseling, exerting pressure, suggesting, extorting, 
blackmail, coercion, advising, instructing, commanding, demanding, promising, helping, 
or reassuring, to name but a few. A fundamental distinction between constatives and 
performatives introduced by Austin (1962), and later elaborated in Searle's (1969) 
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concepts of illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, has encouraged linguists to analyse 
utterances for their success in fulfilling their objective ("felicity conditions") rather than 
merely for their truth value. 60 To that Gazdar (1981) added an obvious, yet useful 
distinction between explicit and implicit speech acts. Van Dijk (1977) proposed a 
concept of macro speech acts, chains of utterances intended for one aim, 
communicative interaction examined for its aim, execution strategy, constitutive actions 
and global effects. Those linguistic developments formed the basis for Habernas's theory 
of communicative action (Habernas, 1984) applied in the context of policy. 
Underlying the emergence of speech-act theory were the debates on meaning, 
especially Wittgenstein's revolutionary assertions (cf. Wittgenstein in Pearce, 1970) that 
language is context specific, and does not necessarily relate to intrinsic meanings. The 
socially constructed nature of language, where meanings are not inherent but essentially 
contested (Gallie, 1968), contextual (Wittgenstein) or even solely subject to power 
exercise (Foucault, 1984) have encouraged linguists (e. g. Bennett, 1980; Bell, 1975; 
Huckfeldt et al, 1998; Edelman, 1977; Wilson, 1990) to analyse the discourse of politics 
largely as a macro speech-act with specific properties and felicity conditions. Bennett 
(1980) notes that vagueness and ambiguity is deliberately employed in political accounts 
to deal with potential opponents. Avoidance of testable propositions is an important 
feature of highly fragmented or conflicting environments. Bell (1975) observes that no 
matter how desirable clarity might be, politics is a process of conducting social 
communication and transactions, with associated "communication costs" (equivalent to 
transaction costs in economics) (p. 31). Huckfeldt (1998) adds that political 
communication is likely to be embedded in ambiguity and uncertainly, with a recognition 
that "the costs of social communication sometimes increase when disagreement is 
present in a relationship" (p. 999). The Foucaldian idea of power through language is 
supported by Edelman (1977: 25), who writes: 
60 Please note that this distinction echoes the philosophical debates on the nature of truth. Three competing 
views hold that the truth is merely a judgement established in reference to other statements (coherence 
theory); in contrast to correspondence theory of truth underlined by a parallel between the statement and 
the facts and, finally, to the performative theory viewing truth as a collective action of acceptance of 
particular ideas and concepts. (for more see: e. g. 
http: //www. staff. ncl. ac. uk/david. harvey/AEF801/Why/Why. html) 
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"Language is more than a tool for manipulating others. In ways often 
undetected, it structures our ideas about those with whom we interact. " 
Where both the encoder and decoder are faced with complex realities, with much 
disturbance in the communication channel, language tends to be banal and highly 
redundant (Edelman, 1977). Moreover, following Levi Strauss' ethnographic observation, 
contradictory beliefs are a common social phenomenon (echoing both Arrow's 
impossibility and psychologists' concepts of cognitive dissonance): 
"In every culture people learn to explain chronic problems through alternative 
sets of assumptions that are inconsistent with one another; yet the contradictory 
formulas persist, rationalizing inconsistent public policies and inconsistent 
individual beliefs about the threats that are widely feared in everyday life" 
Edelman 1977: 5 
Frequently language manipulates through its implicit assumptions. As noted by Edelman 
(p. 16), even a seemingly objective phrase common in governmental programmes, such 
as the training programmes for the unemployed, makes such assumptions. The phrase 
seeks to suggest that unemployment merely springs from ill training or mismatch of 
qualifications with market demands, rather than as a major outcome of macroeconomic 
policies. It is through use of grammatical structures, as noted by Wilson (1990), that 
politicians might choose to distance themselves from assertions they make. 
These linguistic developments have led to a communicative strand in policy analysis 
(e. g. Healey, 1993; Schedler, Folke, 2001), often labeled deliberative democracy. Healey 
(1993) observes that, in the policy process, communication has moved from being the 
final stage of policy-making into its heart. Simply with more and more open access to 
information, the government no longer achieves sufficient credibility to just 
communicate the policy results. Broader communicative practices serve policy 
legitimizing. Those communicative practices are seen as being embedded in institutional 
traditions (e. g. Healey, 1993) and more importantly, need some degree of stability in 
the system, with shared responsibility and reasonableness of players (Schedler, Folke, 
2001) as in a "risk society" not even experts have complete knowledge. Thus Healey at 
a/ (2002: 6) declare a" 'turn' away from rationalistic and positivist approaches to how 
policy is made and delivered, towards social constructivist understandings of the 
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constitution and role of discourses and practices in structuring governance processes". 
A sample of literature presented above is relevant to our analysis. First of all, this 
literature poses a question: does language (or, specifically, formal regional development 
strategies) merely communicate the results of the political process, or, in the mode of 
communicative governance, does it represent the core of policy making, constituting its 
separate dimension. There is an inherent tension between perceiving the strategies as a 
demonstration of regional preferences, a policy outcome, or the policy-making process 
itself. Which view is more appropriate in this case can only be determined from 
examining the data. 
A working theoretical framework for the analysis following the literature review is 
summed-up in Section 4.3.5 below. 
4.3.5. Core analytical framework for regional preferences 
The key points identified in the reviewed literature can be summarized as follows: 
" collective preferences matter for policy making, but they are likely to be 
dynamic, and possibly, intransitive; 
" the outcome of collective preference formation is sensitive to the aggregation 
process, so preferences revealed via the regional logic need not correspond to 
preferences revealed via central logic; it follows that the legitimacy of the 
regional formation, relative to the central one is crucial; 
" one factor through which the regional governance acquires its legitimacy lies in 
references to regional identities; other legitimizing strategies might be involved; 
" language constitutes both the means of communicating policy outputs and lies at 
the core of policy process itself ("communicative governance"). 
Based on these insights and in line with the original research proposition of 
heterogeneity of preferences, Figure 4.1 (below) represents the core analytical 
framework for this chapter. 
As identified in Section 3.8, most regions tend to exhibit intra-regional variation. This 
analysis includes the perceptions of regions themselves of internal variation, both in 
125 
Chapter 4: Regionally formed preferences 
for structural and rural development policies in Poland 
rural circumstances and in policy preferences. This is an example of method 
triangulation. More detailed examination of methodological issues is presented in Section 
4.4 below. 
Figure 4.1. Central concepts for analysis of regional rural policy preferences 
I Heterogeneity f Spatial sensitiviity f Consistency 
Outputs Reqional rural policy preferences 
Regional preference 
formation process 
for rural policy 
Communicative governance 
Discourse strategies 
Legitimising strategies 
Inputs 
Legitimacy 
Regional identity 
Source: own 
------------------ 
Competing central logic 
----------------- 
Participation, others 
4.4. Data and methodological considerations 
Method triangulation (Brannen, 2002) is used to investigate the regional process of 
preference formation. Data are derived from the consultative process carried out in 1999 
as well as the formal regional development strategies produced by the regional 
authorities in 2000. 
4.4.1. Methodological issues connected with documentary research 
The literature recognizes that documentary research can tell us a great deal about how 
social events are constructed (cf. May, 1997; Blaxter et al., 1997). In fact, from the 
methodological standpoint, "documents as the sedimentation of social practices, have 
the potential to inform and structure the decisions which people make" (May 1997: 157) 
126 
Chapter 4: Regionally formed preferences 
for structural and rural development policies in Poland 
The question of the meaning of a document is rather a complex one. At least two 
meanings can be distinguished: intended and received: 
"Documents should never be taken at face-value. In other words, they must be 
regarded as information which is context specific, and as data which must be 
contextualised with other forms of research. They should, therefore, only be 
used with caution". 
May 1997: 158 
However, 
"This amounts to saying that where a systematic procedure has been used it 
should be described, and the results reported will then carry the conviction which 
the procedure deserves. The issue thus comes back to that of devising 
satisfactory systematic procedures of analysis and interpretation" 
Platt 1981: 62 
The data used to explore regional development preference for structural and rural 
development policies across Polish regions exhibit limitations, and biases. These have to 
be acknowledged, but cannot be explored or counteracted without far more information 
than is currently available. 
4.4.2. Regional development strategies and data constraints 
The full texts of all the regional development strategies are accessible in Polish on the 
internet, with an exception of Lodzkie, Warminsko-Mazurskie and Kujawsko-Pomorskie. 
Those strategies were not available on-line at the time of writing.. For Lubelskie, only an 
abbreviated version was available (for details see: References). 
They were produced according to Polish Iaw61. Few guidelines were pre-defined as to 
the content of the documents. With the genre of strategies essentially associated with 
(heavily criticized) past central planning practices, the new planning procedures and 
redefinition of planning were left largely open to institutional creativity. The strategies 
are legally required to: 
"enhance the Polish patriotic feelings and civil awareness, boost economic 
activities, enhance competitiveness and innovativeness of regional economy, 
provide for the protection of cultural and natural heritage, create spatial order, 
facilitate development of social and technical infrastructure (of regional 
importance) education, as well as promotion of regional resources. " 
Art. 2 of Law on the Regional Governments 
61 Law on the regional self-government of 5 June 1998 (03 91,18 July 1998) 
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The regional authorities have been legally committed to cooperate with local authorities, 
professional organizations, governmental authorities, NGOs, academic and research 
centers as well as international organizations and regions (Art. 2) in the development of 
these strategies. 
A major methodological problem for comparative analysis is that the regional 
development strategies do not follow a standard format (Jazlowiecki, Gorzelak: 2000). 
These authors discuss the lack of clarity in strategy definition: for some regions the 
regional development strategy is a strategy for regional authorities only, for some it is 
the strategy of all development stakeholders, including private and public sectors, and 
for the rest the strategy implies a strategy for all regional actors (as opposed to the 
central competences). Obviously, those differences are reflected in the policy 
preferences listed. 
Secondly not all documents have a clear indication how they were elaborated or indeed 
which stakeholders were involved and in what way. Also, the omission of preferences 
does not necessarily mean that the authorities do not feel the priorities should not be 
implemented in their region, but perhaps that the priority is considered an issue for 
central government rather than being one of regional competence. 
Thirdly, the preferences do not always recognise resource constraints and necessary 
policy choices. Wish-lists were not ruled out in the procedures specified for the 
production of these documents. Indeed, such an approach was encouraged by the 
system. Since the planners realized the strategy document would constitute the basis 
for future allocations, they rationally pursued a wide range of objectives. 
For those reasons, the comparative analysis below can only be treated as indicative. 
4.4.3. Regional consultation process for SAPARD and its biases 
In analysing the SAPARD consultation process, some data constraints were obvious and 
important. 
The consultation process for SAPARD priorities had a biased composition of participants. 
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The regions received a suggested composition of participants so as to ensure a 
representative coverage. Out of the proposed 80 participants in each region, the 
Ministry suggested the following breakdown: marshall officers (5-7 persons), voivodship 
officers (2-3 persons), agricultural advisors (5-7 persons), agricultural chambers (1 
person), farmers organisations (5-7 persons), regional employment officers (2 persons), 
district mayors (10 persons), commune chiefs (10 persons), wholesale markets or 
producer groups (2-3 persons), regional development agencies (2 persons), regional 
statistical offices (2 persons), forestry (2-3 persons), water management (2 persons), 
and local leaders. Nonetheless, the process featured a high percentage of local, district, 
and regional authorities, with relatively low share of farmers, and the private sector 
representatives in general. 
Moreover, it is important to realise that the breakdown of funds might not reflect an 
ordinal ranking, but may simply reflect cost differences between the provision of 
particular goods and activities. The provision of training tends to be less expensive in 
absolute terms than, say, infrastructure projects. 
Finally, the results of the consultation process are conditional on specific questions and 
constraints introduced. Choices made from a closed set (as in SAPARD) may not be 
directly comparable with preferences given an (almost) unlimited potential solutions (as 
in the strategies). 
4.5. Legitimacy of regional rural development preference formation 
This section will examine various legitimizing strategies employed by the regional 
authorities in their regional development strategies. The analysis, however, is confined 
to textual data only (for more detailed information on the strategies, see Appendix 15). 
4.5.1. Legitimising regional identities 
This Section provides a textual analysis of role of regional identities in legitimising Polish 
regional authorities and their strategies. 
Three North-Western regions (Dolnoslaskie, Zachodniopomorskie, and Lubuskie), assert 
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deficits in territorial identities, clearly for historical reasons (see Section 3.3). Notably, 
these regions score highest on the resource index. In view of the absence of territorial 
loyalties, the regional authorities exhibit a varied commitment to developing them. For 
example, the Dolnoslaskie strategy text elaborates the importance of regional bonds, 
and even indicates positive events in post-war period, upon which such frameworks can 
be built, using a strongly marked discourse of civil involvement and moral values62. This 
stands in contrast to a brief factual statement in the Zachodniopomorskie strategy that 
the region is perceived as non-coherent and difficult to cooperate with" (p. 52), though 
the development of identities belongs to one of the hundreds regional objectives. 
Lubuskie perceives identity and social bonds as high on the list of regional objectives, 
but needs to assert and facilitiate cohesion, as the region has emerged out of two 
equivalent "small voivodships". 
Three regions assert their territorial identities, albeit at levels smaller than the region. 
Mazowieckie admits "the level of regional identity or a sense of regional belonging is low 
or does not exist at all" (p. 39). Affiliations of "small" voivodships, and a resulting lack of 
territorial cohesion lead some authorities to admit openly that: "Mazowieckie is a region 
of very weak social and cultural integration. The level of regional awareness and 
common interests is very low". A similar issue faces Slaskie region. An aggregate of 
three "small" voivodships, Slaskie presents its strategy as a strategy of three former 
named voivodships (bialskie, czestochowskie and katowickie) on the title page. Although 
Slaskie boasts the presence of strong local identities and "an area of clear diversified 
cultural pattern", a larger collective regional identity is missing. Similarly, Pomorskie 
reveals a lack of distinct regional identity, and expresses a preference for fostering such 
regional affinity based on the local traditions of smaller communities. 
Two regions (Podlaskie and Swietokrzyskie) briefly admit their strongly developed 
regional identity and social activity, though do not elaborate the point in their text. Since 
those regions are relatively poor, their authorities use merely two lines in the text to 
stress them, possibly fearing the negative image. 
62 In fact, Dolnoslaskie regional ellites have been organised around a strong university, based on professors 
arriving from the former Polish city of Lvov, which is an example of "imported ellites". Imported elites 
contrast with late elites in the city of Szczecin, where the university was only established In the late 80s. 
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A strong defensive identity characterizes the Opolskie regional strategy. The smallest 
region in Poland had to fight a battle to preserve its separate boundary (Regulski, 1999). 
Proud of "defending their region" (p. 8), the Opolskie regional strategy asserts that the 
region has been historically formed and is coherent. 
Three regions (Podkarpackie, Wielkopolskie and Malopolskie) positively draw on their 
identities. Podkarpackie's identity goes back to a pre-1975 administrative division (cf. 
Section 3.3): "although in the last 25 years the territory (of Podkarpackie) developed 
separately, due to bonds emerging in the past, it can be treated as an economic region 
(... ) There is a sense of common tradition and cultural identity, and first of all they 
function in social awareness" (p. 7). However, only two strategies use a collective "we" 
in their rhetoric, as a strong indication of discursive identity (de Cillia et al, 1999): 
Wielkopolskie and Malopolskie. All other texts use impersonal sentences or the passive 
voice. An open assertion that the "Wielkopolskie region is historically and culturally 
identifiable" is supported by the use of grammatical "we". Moreover, the region needs to 
assert the seemingly obvious: "the region is part and parcel of Poland, a unitary state; 
the strategy cannot adopt provisions with negative consequences for the state of a 
whole or for its constitutional functions" (p. 32). Such an assertion certainly, yet 
indirectly addresses local concerns or refers to local ambitions for limited autonomy, 
while giving the impression of being sufficiently secure in its local identity to admit at 
least limited dependency, and wider allegiance. Similarly, the Malopolskie "we" relates to 
maintaining an already existing identity, yet does not indicate any separatist 
underpinning. 
To sum up, most regional authorities perceive the value of regional identities. Identity 
development and creation is often mentioned amongst the strategic regional objectives. 
However, present deficits in regional, and sometimes even broader territorial identities 
are revealed. Three North-Western regions, ranking highest on rural resource scores (cf. 
Section 3.7), reveal deficits in both regional and territorial identity in their strategic 
discourses. Three mid-ranking regions (Mazowieckie, Pomorskie and Slaskie) reveal 
131 
Chapter 4: Regionally formed preferences 
for structural and rural development policies in Poland 
territorial, albeit not regional affinities. Two poor regions (Swietokrzyskie and Podlaskie) 
barely mention their existing identities, not least for the fact that they have been 
traditionally lagging behind with a possibly negative image. Three regions 
(Wielkopolskie, Malopolskie and Podkarpackie) positively present their present regional 
identities, albeit only Wielkopolskie and Malopolskie use the strong discursive "we". One 
region, namely Opolskie demonstrates a strong defensive identity. 
4.5.2. Legitimising participation 
Participation has been used by all regions as a legitimising tactic for a regional 
development strategy (see Appendix 15). 
The authors of strategies usually devote a substantial amount of text to the description 
of consultation exercises. For all strategic documents, with notable exception of 
Podlaskie, specific information on participatory process has been given. Podlaskie, 
though asserting consultation, failed to provide details for credibility. All strategies, apart 
from Lubuskie and Pomorskie, and partly Swietokrzyskie (relying on external academics 
from Warsaw or a foreign consultancy firm) have been established by endogenous 
resource mobilization and at least limited participation. 
The scope of the participation process has been broad, typically involving 300-800 
persons in each region. In all cases, the key group consulted involved local (commune 
and district) authorities, which reflects the regional political networks; academic circles, 
and less frequently business representatives. Most regions have established special 
governance structures, such as task groups or working groups as partnership 
mechanisms. 
Clearly, consultative governance has been used extensively in legitimising the regional 
strategies. Where the processes of consultation occupy a central place in the text, the 
resulting strategy appears non-selective, and texts with 50 or so pages of mere 
objectives and priorities are by no means rare. The shortest strategies are those 
prepared by external experts (notably Lubuskie and Pomorskie). 
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Regions can be seen to have decided to mobilize substantial resources to respond to 
demands for more democracy and participation. One could argue that the 
implementation of deliberative democracy has been relatively straightforward for the 
strategic documents. The strategies tend to be inclusive, with few definite negative 
choices. A more cynical argument can be put forward that decisions with financial 
consequences, potentially offering political and bureaucratic rents, would bring more 
disincentives for local access and participation. 
4.5.3. Other examples of discursive legitimacy 
Other examples of discourses used to justify the regional legitimacy implicitly reveal a 
variety of demands to which Polish regionalism responds (cf. Section 1.7. ). 63 
Seeking legitimacy by demonstrating break-up with central planning tradition 
Numerous regions (especially Pomorskie and Lubuskie) used the strategies as a forum 
for demonstrating that they understand the mechanisms of free market conditions. 
Elaborate academic texts, as well as university prestige (in the cases of Pomorskie and 
Lubuskie, professors imported from Warsaw) are used as a legitimising strategy. Direct 
assertions (as in Lubuskie), that the strategy "should not be mistaken for a central plan 
characteristic of the previous era" and a multitude of general statements of the nature 
of new world under free market economy have been used. Elaborate academic lectures 
on the nature of market economy (e. g. In Pomorskie and Lubuskie strategies) seek to 
establish a common framework of understanding of the transition. Evidencing their 
ability to comprehend and function in a new market economy is partly a response to a 
demand for reassurance in the new changing regions. Some strategies, which note a 
tension between planning (associated with central planning) and the nature of free 
market, try to address this apparent cognitive contradiction. In contrast to Western 
concepts of a "risk society", which now eschews experts' comprehension in favour of 
group deliberations, faith in omnipotent academic experts appears high, especially in 
regions featuring weak internal bonds (Lubuskie, Pomorskie, but also Lubelskie). 
63 This Section serves merely as an indication of legitimizing discourses, substantiating our previous analysis 
(especially in Section 1.6. ). A more elaborate study of regional discourses, though undoubtedly interesting, 
lies outside the scope of this thesis. 
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This discussion raises a further point about the legitimacy that the regional authorities 
are seeking. Regional governments need to be legitimized by both their own 
constituencies, and also by the central government, from which they will derive much of 
their own resource and thus effective power. One interpretation of the elaboration of 
market economics and the substantial use of academic experts and recognized external 
consultants is that these elements are being used to establish regional credibility, and 
thus legitimacy, with central government, as much as with their own constituents. Thus, 
the competing central logic also enters the construction of the strategy. 
Legitimacy by europeanisation 
Another important legitimising device is reference to EU standards, featuring in most 
strategies, a feature characterising the Polish regionalisation debate (cf. Section 1.7. ). 
Opolskie asserts that "creation of the strategy has been conducted based on the 
principles given by the European Union for such documents" (p. 7) and that the 
resulting document has met the felicity conditions. This belief in the underlying single EU 
requirement has been also successfully used within a europeanisation framework 
elsewhere (Grabbe, 2002)M. Again, establishing credibility and legitimacy with European 
authorities is also an important aspect of regional governance in practice in Poland at 
this time. 
Legitimacy by ascertaining defensive regional governance 
Authorities of some poorer regions (such as Lubelskie, Podkarpackie and Swietokrzyskie) 
assert their legitimacy by claiming their capacities to defend their societies from the 
supposed oppressive nature of the market. Paradoxically, more power is claimed by 
these authorities than elsewhere (echoing the conventional conflict between state and 
market). Lubelskie (p. 3) asserts that the strategy seeks "to identify actions protecting 
from the negative outcomes of the market". Similarly, Podkarpackie claims that "the 
strategy is the most important document of the regional authorities, who act as the 
initiator and coordinator of development activities" (p. 5) (emphasis added). Clearly, the 
64 Grabbe (2002) argues that In the europeanisation process, the applicant countries tend to perceive the 
EU and its requirement as a single entity, failing to recognize its diversity and national solutions. Meanwhile, 
the territorial organization, and of course, the structure of regional strategies is not regulated by the EU at 
all. 
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communicative act of authorities, asserting their capacity to initiate development, 
implies an absence of other initiating actors, or, at the least, consigns other actors to a 
necessarily subordinate role. Again, discursive reassurance is provided that the 
authorities can do what the market fails to provide. At the same time, Podkarpackie 
authorities reveal that "the strategy is by no means designed "to set actions in particular 
time or place" (p. 4). Exactly the same contradiction features in the Swietokrzyskie 
strategy. On one hand, the regional strategy is claimed to be "a management tool for 
regional authorities to p/an development" (emphasis added) and on the other hand, 
objectives are admitted to be merely "hypothetical". Mazowieckie authorities claim 
discursive power, too: "the duty of public authorities is to act for encouraging the 
development and competitiveness where no development impulses reaches from the 
market mechanisms, as well as helping the people to participate in economic 
development" (p. 10). However, few details of how this can be achieved are to be 
found further in the text. 
Legitimacy by promising good governance and trust 
Postulative acts are employed as a communicative strategy by Dolnoslaskie. Rather than 
directly committing themselves to action, the regional self-governing authorities produce 
self-referential statements such as "a wide decency in action of self-government is 
necessary, which would be seen through willingness to help, openness and partnership 
in treatment of inhabitants" (p. 4). Note that statements of what the world "should" be 
(rather than "is") escape their logical false/true constative value and are appropriately 
categorized as speech acts. " 
Legitimacy by value-neutral managerialism in public administration 
Extensive use of statistical data and a command of technical vocabulary is used as a 
discourse strategy to legitimise the Zachodniopomorskie strategy, at least amongst a 
perceived audience and ratification authority consisting mostly of professionals (the 
65 For example, consider a sentence: "Regional governance should demonstrate civil decency" (Dolnoslaskie 
strategy). This sentence cannot be attributed any logical true/false value for it does not relate to any 
testable reality. It can be more appropriately described as a speech act (Austin, 1965) of suggestion, or a 
macro speech act of implicit promise that the regional authority will behave decently. This promise is made 
Implicitly in contrast to the current "indecent" practices. Otherwise there would be little point In making such 
assertions. 
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regional administration, working in consultation with the people). Largely in line with 
New Public Management, in this strategy little value-laden language is used, to imply 
that the rational, well-informed and competent administration is able and willing to 
contribute to development, as an outcome of technocratic and expert work. 
Slaskie's strategy has employed a more sophisticated discursive device. The authors 
claim that the strategy is "compliant with local as well as central programmes", thus 
presupposing that such a compliance can be, and that it has been, assessed. Given the 
general, vague, and all-inclusive nature of the strategic texts, this claim can either be 
questioned, or amounts to little more than a tautology - the text can mean whatever 
anyone wants it to mean. 
Legitimizing by relating to existing collective bonds 
The only strategies that explicitly refer to existing territorial values are those of 
Malopolskie and Wielkopolskie. Wielkopolskie perceives the strategy as "collective 
inspiration for rational action for the region" (p. 13). Malopolskie authorities see their 
role not as opposing the market, but supporting and coordinating actions: "Putting some 
order on thinking of the development process, the strategy is supposed to assist in 
coordination of action of independent environs and actors (p. 12)". 
Concluding remarks 
In a nutshell, in 1999-2001 the regions employed numerous legitimizing strategies. Due 
to the relatively weak legitimacy emerging from regional loyalties, the regional 
authorities have used considerable resources to establish participative governance. 
Other legitimizing strategies exemplified include assertions of knowledge of market 
economy, and compliance with the EU standards, a response to the demands of 
breaking with the communist regime, reassurance in dealing with the free-market and 
europeanisation. 
In the context of highlighted legitimacy of the regional preference formation processes 
in Section 4.5, we now move on to our core question of heterogeneity of rural policy 
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preferences. 
4.6. Regional preferences for rural policies 
4.6.1. Regional preferences for rural policies as revealed by regional 
development strategies 
Table 4.1 shows the rural policy preferences as indicated in regional development 
strategies. A brief clarification is due. Preferences treated as revealed usually come 
under the labels of "objectives, or priorities". However, there is sometimes an 
incompatibility between the analytical part and priorities proposed (e. g. in Podlaskie 
strategy). In such cases, only preferences mentioned under the "objectives (or 
priorities)" section are included. In instances of no separate rural and agricultural 
component in the strategy structure, a list is combined based on dispersed preferences 
relating to rural development made throughout the text. 
Secondly, only priorities related to the rural development policy are mentioned, using an 
EU rural development policy definition (which, for example, does not cover rural health 
services provision). Of course, to some extent the border-line is not always clear, 
especially with environmental, regional and tourism policies. Finally, in most cases only 
explicitly mentioned preferences have been included. For example, many regions 
express their preference for "multifunctional rural development", yet the implicit rural 
measures are not drawn on the basis of such a general preference. One exception is the 
LEADER initiative. Where regions refer to building on their own endogenous potential 
and culture, etc. an implicit preference for LEADER has been assumed. 
Initial inspection of the Table 4.1 strongly suggests that the preferences are being 
driven by the existing EU and national policies. Few choices have been made that are 
not already reflected in the current legislative frameworks. Importantly, no region 
proposed any support or assistance for semi-subsistence farming (item 23 in Table 4.1), 
66 a measure only emerging in the Commission's proposal in January 2002. 
66 The regional strategies of Kujawsko-Pomorskie, Warminsko-Mazurskie and Lodzkie were not available on 
the web at the time of writing and they are not included in the analysis. 
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Considerable homogeneity characterises the preferences for improvement of rural 
infrastructure, diversification of economic activities, marketing and processing as well as 
producer groups. Less univocal support is shown for investments in agricultural holdings, 
training or young farmer schemes (at the bottom of choice list), which might be 
attributed to regions' belief that these belong to central competences rather than to 
regional authorities. 
Measures such as agri-environment, village renewal, water management and 
afforestation are popular, yet tend to be restricted to a subset of the regions. Some 
simply view them as a central, sectoral competence. Measures such as early retirement 
or extension, phytosanitary standards etc. are only occasionally mentioned in regional 
strategies, arguably because they more clearly belong to central competences. Other 
potential initiatives in, for instance, rural financial insitutiuons, small town revitalization, 
special attention to post state-farm revitalization or rare-breed and traditional farm 
preservation, are not mentioned at all, though aspects may have been considered to 
have been included in those priorities which were mentioned by some regions (investors 
in rural areas, support for co-operatives, support for rural commuters). 
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Table 4.1. Preferences for structural and rural development policies across Polish regions 
(from developmen t strate documents 
SAPARD compliant (1 - 15) 
Other FEOGA et. (16 - 25) 
Other Prefs. (26 - 37) 
o 
m 
_j 
m 
J 
J 
ö 
J 
a- 
2 
0 _j 
f0 
1. Diversification X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
2. Technical infrastructure X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
3. Processing and marketing X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
4. Support to producer groups X X X X X X X X X X 
5. Farm investment X X X X X X X X X X X X X y' 
6. Education and training X X X X X X X X X X X 
7. Village renewal X X X X 
8. Extensification & Env. X X X X X X 
9. Water management X X X X X X X X 
o. Aforestation X X X X X X X X 
I. Land amalgamation X X X X 
12. Technical assistance 
13. Land register 
14. Vet &phytosanitary X X 
15. Farm relief 
16. Quality improvement (farm) X X X X X X 5 
17. Non-food production X X 2 
18. Young farmers scheme X X 2 
19. Forestry X X X X 3 
20. Rural services X X 2 
21. LFA X X 
22. Early retirement X X X 
23. Semi-subsistence farms 0 
24. Extension of good farming X X X X X X X X 7 
25. LEADER type initiatives X X X X X X X 7 
26. Wholesale mkts. & infrastruct X X X X X X X X 8 
27. Promotion of export activity X X X 3 
28. Support to genetic progress X X X X X 4 
29. Land purchase X X X X 2 
30. Support to co-operatives X X 1 
31. Market information system X X 2 
33. Investors in rural areas X 1 
3 3. Support for rural commuters X X 1 
35. Aquaculture X 1 
36. Organic agriculture X X X 2 
37. Collective use of machines X X 1 
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4.6.2. Preferences for rural policies revealed by SAPARD regional consultations 
The results of SAPARD consultation exercise are summarised in Table 4.2. The regions were 
asked to select instruments from the menu of eligible measures. A clear resource constraint 
was introduced to the exercise for each chosen instrument, which was expected to be 
associated with a clear indicative budget allocation, in clear contrast to the context of 
preference expression in the strategy documents. Short- and medium-term selections were 
requested. 
The preferences fall into three categories: those chosen by all (or almost all) regions, those 
chosen by selected regions only, those largely ignored. Regions univocally chose measures 
for improvement of infrastructure, diversification of rural economic activities, support for 
marketing and processing as well as to producer groups. A univocal choice of "diversification 
of economic activities and job creation", especially associated with high budget allocation, 
appears partly a political narrative. Aside from its phrasing of "job creation", incontestably 
desirable, the measure in fact provides for the provision of public grants to private investors, 
who plan to create employment opportunities". The narrative sounds reassuring, yet the 
questions of the availability of private rural investors willing and able to find suitable viable 
business opportunities with a limited demand remain questionable. Not all regions opted for 
support to investment in agricultural holdings: indeed this measure was not selected by 
Kujawsko-Pomorskie, or Podlaskie regions, paradoxically those which already use a 
substantial share of funding of the national agricultural investment scheme (cf. Section 
5.4.3. ). Indeed, they were probably left out because they felt this was the responsibility of 
central government, or that this requirement was already being met. 
The second group of measures, such as development of training, village renewal, agri- 
environmental measures as well as water management, afforestation and land reparcelling 
appear to show regional selectivity. The heterogeneity of training measure choices again 
could be interpreted as a result of feelings of central competency. Improvement of veterinary 
and physanitary standards and land register (rarely listed measures) also lie in central 
competences. A measure to set-up farm relief services (temporary outsourcing of farm 
labour) was ignored by all regions, probably because farm labour is abundant on farms. 
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Table 4.2. Regional preferences for rural development policies (as revealed in SAPARD 
consultation exercise) 
0. In CO 0 no CL CL 
w a x 
j. Diversification of 
rural economic X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 16 
activities 
2. Technical 
infrastructure X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 16 
3. Imp. of proc. & 
marketing 
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 15 
4. Support to 
producer groups 
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 14 
5. Agric. structures & X X X X X X X X X X X X 12 farm investment 
Education & 
training X X X X X X X X X X X 11 
7. Village renewal X X X X X X X X X X X 11 
8. Extensive & env. X X X X X X X X 8 
9. Water man. X X X X X X X 7 
10. Aforestation X X X X X X X 7 
11. Land amalg. X X X 4 
12. Technical ast. X X 2 
13. Land register X 1 
14. SPS standards X 1 
15. Farm relief 0 
Frequency 8 5 8 8 8 6 9 8 8 7 9 9 11 10 8 7 N 
Source: own anaiysis Symbols: X- revealed preference, 
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4.6.3. Consistency of preferences revealed via SAPARD and via strategy 
documents 
The dynamic and changeable nature of collective preference formation processes, discussed 
in literature (cf. Section 4.3.1. ), could lead to inconsistencies in preferences expressed in the 
strategy documents versus those expressed in the SAPARD exercise, since these two events 
did not happen at the same time. In addition, since the nature of the two exercises was 
rather different, it is possible that preferences expressed in each will appear inconsistent, 
even though regions' underlying preferences remain the same. In particular, since the 
SAPARD exercise required explicit choice within an overall budget constraint, the SAPARD 
preferences are likely to exhibit more selectivity than the strategy documents. However, the 
extent to which the particular programmes identified in the SAPARD exercise are also 
indicated in the regional strategy documents can be compared. The results are summarised 
in Figure 4.2, which shows those instances where the particular programme was identified 
in one but not the other. Apart from village renewal, the most obvious inconsistencies are 
shown for land and resource use related policies. It would seem that the idea of village 
renewal simply did not occur to 7 of the provinces when they were drawing up their strategy 
documents. Land resource measures may be inconsistent as some regions viewed them as a 
central competence. 
Given that the SAPARD exercise explicitly included resource constraints on the choices 
made, it would be expected that regions would restrict their choice of programmes under 
SAPARD compared with their strategy proposals. In other words, it would not be expected 
that any region would express a choice for a programme in the SAPARD exercise that was 
not also expressed in the strategy document. However, this unexpected choice pattern is 
expressed in 8 of the 15 comparable programme titles. Furthermore, for 5 of these titles, 
regions show considerable inconsistency, choosing the programme in one or other of the two 
modes, but not both. Three possible explanations suggest themselves. First, the 
interpretation of the programme and its possibilities differed between the two events, and 
thus were not treated as equivalent. Second, regional groupings responsible for making 
these choices differed between the two modes, and thus reached different decisions. Third, 
the regional groupings simply changed their minds between the two events as the policy 
learning took place and preference expression changed. 
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Figure 4.2. Consistency of regional preferences (as revealed through SAPARD 
consultation exercise and regional development strategies) 
Consistency of regional preferences for rural policy (SAPARD and regional development 
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4.6.4. Discourses of intra-regional differentiation in conditions and policy 
preferences 
Whatever the inconsistencies, few distinct regional patterns of policy preferences can be 
distinguished at the level of regions on the basis of this analysis. This may reflect the fact 
that the regions themselves are not homogeneous within themselves, but exhibit substantial 
intra-regional diversity (as demonstrated in Chapter 3). A brief analysis below shows how the 
regional authorities perceive the intra-regional variation, if/how this differentiation is 
presented in the text, and if the presented variation in the diagnosis is accompanied by a 
variation in the instruments. Particular emphasis is given to ruralities, in reference to the 
rural regional profiles developed in Chapter 3 (Figure 3.10. ). 
Most of the strategy documents discuss intraregional differentiation in conditions. However, 
they do so with different emphasis and, only in one case (Wielkopolskie), translate this 
discussion into specific policy instruments. In general, the discourses of intraregional 
variation correspond broadly to the intraregional variation identified in Figure 3.10. albeit 
with a few exceptions indicating more intra-regional variation than perceived from the central 
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statistical standpoint. Below, an indicative comparison is made. A detailed analysis would 
require GIS software and detailed maps, beyond the sciope of this project, and not necessary 
to our purpose here. 
The most homogenous regions of Lubuskie and Zachodniopomorskie see themselves 
differently in the strategy documents. Zachodniopomorskie has delineated four functional 
zones for its rural areas with attributed key functions (agriculture, services, tourism) based 
on spatial capital (closeness to the border) and the presence of tourism attractions. Lubuskie 
does not address intra-regional spatial differentiation in their strategy, except for an 
acknowledgment that the region is an aggregate of two "small" voivodships with two 
separate systems of transport, and different social bonds, obviously a feature missing from 
the rural profiles available from the statistics. 
Regions with mid ranking rural resource indices and heterogeneous rurality structures tend 
to assert some variations in their strategies. Dolnoslaskie has specified three zones with 
respect to natural and economic conditions. Pomorskie has recognized three types of rural 
areas (good agricultural conditions, suburban and tourist zones, and former post-state 
farming territories), however without providing a clearly geographic delineation. Opoiskie has 
identified an intraregional division into four natural geographical ruralities. Similarly, the 
Slaskie region has identified three separate areas for strategic actions, based on the types of 
agricultural structures, plus a separate mountain zone. 
Wielkopolska emphasises its high internal differentiation, and is the only region with a clear 
indications of sub-regional structures, coupled with proposed policy selectiveness and 
targeting. The analysis (prepared by Poznan academics) encompasses four types of rural 
areas in the region, distinguished with respect to farms' linkages with the market and 
intensity of agricultural production. The relative importance of associated rural and 
agricultural policy instruments is indicated for each area in both medium- and long-term 
perspectives. Suggestions are made to designate principal small towns and villages for 
focusing rural development activities. 
The Mazowieckie region, the largest in Poland, is also characterised by the highest internal 
divergence in rural resource structure. The region recognizes its internal cohesion problems, 
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albeit mostly in relation to the capital city. Despite rhetorical assertions for regional cohesion, 
most of statistics used in the text are presented for the aggregate regional level, disguising 
the inequalities and differences. The text asserts the presence of poorly developed Eastern 
regions as well as post-industrial decline areas near Radom, which are claimed to present a 
threat to the overall cohesion of the region. Large intra-regional economic disparities are 
recognised in the strategy, but do not translate into indications of differentiated policy 
instruments in heterogenous areas nor clearly modified financial allocative principles. 
Regions with relatively homogenous profiles, though with low rural indices, tend to make 
more internal differentiations in their strategic text, albeit again not echoed in their policy 
preferences. The strategy of Malopolska distinguishes very briefly three rural zones, all 
described in one paragraph, according to criteria of intensity of agricultural production and 
topography, yet a list of policy preferences does not include any spatial separation. The 
Podkarpackie region perceives itself as a "region with large internal differentiation". The brief 
designation of five subregions (at district level) adopted for the whole strategy is not 
elaborated for the rural areas in particular, nor reflected in the specification of rural policy 
instruments. Likewise, Swietokrzyskie has devoted much room in their strategy to illustrating 
intra-regional spatial differences. However, again the intra-regional angle is missing from the 
strategic analysis, and also from the range of proposed instruments. 
Finally, the relatively homogenous and poor regions of Podlaskie and Lubelskie do not note 
any spatial differentiation in their strategies. 
To sum up, most regions have made an effort to describe their internal spatial 
differentiation, but their descriptive and analytical efforts have been translated into the 
spatial differentiation of policy instruments only in one case (Wielkopolskie). Clearly such 
translation is as problematic for researchers and advisors (cf. Chapter 3) as for policy 
makers. How regions see their internal spatial differentiation differs from the central 
perspective, primarily due to different benchmarks. However, most categorization of rural 
areas have been made in terms of agricultural structures, tourism attractions and spatial 
capital, clearly seen as both ptential engines for economic growth and as current problem 
areas. 
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4.7. Conclusions: regional preference formation for rural policies in Poland 
- communicative governance? 
This chapter has discussed regional preferences formation for structural and rural 
development policies in Poland, based on participant experience with SAPARD regional 
consultation exercise in 1999 and on the documentary evidence of regional development 
strategies. 
A regional process of preference formation can by no means be taken at face value. An 
apparently simple question of what people want is underlied by difficulties in comparing the 
utilities associated with each choice (Doel, Velthoven, 1993). Essentially flawed with 
intransivity and an inherently dynamic nature, the process and its outputs are highly 
dependant on the mechanisms of aggregation (see, e. g. McLean. 1987; Gerber, Jackson, 
1993) and the timing and context of observation. For this reason, it is argued that the 
validity of regional preference formation needs to be seen in relation to the central 
preference formation. Much of the regional studies literature in fact perceives the legitimacy 
of regional policy making as coming from territorial identities (e. g. Dardanelli, 1998; Keating, 
1998; Rodriguez-Pose, Gill, 2002; Les Galle, 1998; Paasi, 2002; Teune, 1992; Raagmaa, 
1986). More general views on legitimacy are linked to participation and communication 
(Dryzek, 2002), in contrast with tautological views on legitimacy as part and parcel of 
democratic legal systems (Weber, 1993) or regulation theories (cf. Section 1.5.3. ). 
Based on the theoretical considerations above, a working theoretical framework has been 
formed inductively (Fig. 4.1. ) around preference legitimacy, heterogeneity, spatial selectivity 
and consistency. 
The regional development strategies reveal a variety of legitimising discourses. Significant 
deficits in regional (or, in some cases, even territorial) identity are revealed in the strategy 
texts. Only Wielkopolskie and Malopolskie (and, partially, Podkarpackie) consistently use the 
discursive "we". Opolskie boasts of a defensive identity. The strategies of Slaskie, 
Mazowieckie and Pomorskie reveal some territorial, albeit not broader regional identities. The 
strategic texts of regions of North-Western Poland (Zachodniopomorskie, Lubuskie, 
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Dolnoslaskie) indicate a deficit of both territorial and regional identities. In the absence of 
genuine common histories or territorial frames of references in most new voivodships, a 
variety of communicative actions are performed as legitimizing strategies. Participation has 
been the main legitimization strategy. Regions have mobilized substantial resources for 
exercising participative consultation, typically 300-800 persons per region. Clearly, the 
process provided an important beginning to participative governance. However, one could 
argue, the growth and development of such local participation in governance may not easily 
survive the emergence of political and bureaucratic rents as and when the processes and 
associated structures of regional governance become more established. Other strategies 
include assertions of breaking-up central planning traditions, europeanisation and 
reassurance, all acting as push factors towards preferences for more regional governance 
and participation. 
In line with the public choice theories (cf. Section 4.3.1. ), the preferences exhibit 
inconsistency and a dynamic nature. This is especially the case with those preferences that 
could be spatially selective, such as such as development of training, village renewal, agri- 
environmental measures as well as water management, afforestation and land reparcelling. 
For homogenous policy instruments, such as rural infrastructure, diversification of economic 
activities, training and support to processing industry, finer differentiation, for example in 
criteria targeting the beneficiaries or in budget breakdown are possible, yet the evidence for 
such decisions is missing from both the available data sources. In addition, choices exhibited 
under regional development strategies did not pay attention to resource constraints, thus 
corresponding more closely to a wish-list rather than with explicit choices associated with 
opportunity costs. But, requiring the chooser to be explicit about how much they are willing 
to allocate to particular priorities also requires them to take account of the "supply prices" of 
the things on offer, not just their demand prices (their preferences). Budget constrained 
choices will thus better reflect the reality, and provide choices on the basis of the perceived 
benefits versus costs of particular provisions, while unconstrained choices (based solely on 
the perceived benefits) are clearly likely to be naive and inconsistent with reality. The 
experience of the strategy documents also indicates that all-inclusive choices result from 
participative governance being under pressure from a variety of stakeholders. The real 
choices will only become apparent as these strategies are made operational, during which 
the opportunity costs of various policy options will become evident and binding. 
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In conclusion, the strategies of Polish regions in 2000 may well be best understood as 
incidents of embyonic"communicative governance" (Healey, 1993) rather than as pure 
manifestations of collective choice practices. 
To some extent, the homogeneity of strategies simply results from bureaucratic logic. Where 
the regional authorities have limited own budgetary resources (cf. Section 1.7), their 
strategies are bound to form the basis for requesting external assistance. For that reason, a 
straightforward approach is to make the strategies as broad as possible, so as to align them 
with most funding opportunities available now and in the future. Furthermore, expressed 
preferences have apparently taken account of the drafters' perceptions of regional versus 
national competencies and responsibilities. Given that regional authorities are still learning 
about their roles and place within the national structures, it would not be surprising if these 
perceptions change substantially in the future. 
Nevertheless, administrative templates in the strategy formulation have so far failed to 
demonstrate visible regional patterns for rural policies. Indeed, although policy learning is 
happening in regions, regional authorities need time (and resources) to establish their real 
presence. As confessed by a regional politician: 
"Sometimes people do not believe us when we tell them that something is not 
possible. For such circumstances we need to resort to Warsaw and prove that the 
decision has been taken by the ministry". 
from interviews 
However, regions are increasingly pursuing differentiation. 
"in the beginning, we all had the same strategy for pursuing highest agricultural 
productivity. But with time we have realized that all regions cannot be the main 
agricultural producers. I have learnt so much since the strategy was produced. First 
of all, we need to seek our regional unique offer. I have managed to persuade 
communes that this is the only way forward". 
from interviews 
Regions are learning and changing their preferences quickly, particularly in preparation for 
EU integration. They are already beginning to pursue uniqueness and differentiation from 
others (a quasi market response as opposed to a central planning response - where to be 
different was to be exposed and vulnerable to censure or worse). Whilst the basic 
preferences for public services are likely to remain unchanged (for which, considerable 
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resources are needed), more and more scope for genuine differentiation is likely to emerge 
with time. It is hard to say how much time it will take for powers of diversification and 
regional identities, substantiated by genuine regional governance processes and structures, 
to become visible. And, perhaps, the main rural differentiation in preferences is likely to 
happen at the more local rather than the regional (voivodship) scale, though this will depend 
on the extent to which localities are provided with sufficient autonomy and resource to 
exhibit and exploit their differences. 
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Regional distribution of funding for structural and 
rural development policies in Poland 
Politics is about who gets what, when and how 
H. Lasswell 
5.1. Objectives of Chapter 5 
No analysis of regionalisation can be complete without budgetary considerations (cf. 
Table 1.1. and Fig. 1.2. ). Indeed, the financial allocation and distribution typically lies at 
the heart of policy making, at least from the operational bureaucrats' perspective. The 
financial distribution resulting from any policy is often a central factor in the judgments 
of a policy's legitimacy by both donors and recipients. This chapter deals with the 
financial allocation of rural development funding between regions in Poland. An explicitly 
regional distribution of rural development budgets has been required in Poland for two 
major but connected reasons: one internal and the other external (i. e. EU driven). 
The EU cohesion policy context, although both imprecise and partly contradictory, was 
seen in Poland as setting an overall framework within which policy legitimacy will be 
judged by the EU authorities. EU legal provisions, in conjunction with an increased 
amount of funding and intensive administrative procedures, have encouraged some 
policy deconcentration. Such deconcentration itself requires an element of regional 
budgeting for internal management reasons. As a consequence, a budget allocation 
based on a regional framework, instead of on horizontal sectors or target groups, was 
seen as a primary requirement in Poland. 
This chapter examines the logic of a regional structure to the rural development budget 
and looks into the extent to which the actual budget absorptions appear to follow this 
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logic. Section 5.2 deals with the contextual framework for spatial allocative decisions as 
defined by the legislative and political environment of EU cohesion policy. This 
discussion necessarily includes the theoretical foundations for spatial equity 
considerations, especially in the provision of rural policies (in particular for investment 
support). This discussion reveals the thinking underlying the development of the 
SAPARD programme for rural development with regard to regional funding envelopes. 
Section 5.3 reports on the SAPARD regional funding allocations, which included specific 
regional equity modifiers, with special emphasis on their spatial targeting and 
congurence with cohesion objectives. Section 5.4 examines the regional distribution of 
previous national rural development schemes in relation to the SAPARD allocation 
criteria, in order to determine whether the absence of regional equity mechanisms 
results in significant territorial imbalances in policy absorption. Section 5.5 concludes the 
debate on spatial allocation of rural development funding, in particular referring to the 
use of regional budgetary benchmarks as a regional equity mechanism. 
5.2. Context for undertaking spatial budgetary allocations for rural 
development programmes 
5.2.1. Ambiguities in EU cohesion policy and in its rural component 
The EU rural development policy67, financed from FEOGA, belongs to a wider framework 
of the EU cohesion policy, which is often characterised by its ambiguous political context 
(Rynck and McAleavey, 2001; Amin, Tomaney, 1995; Bachler, Turok, 1997). 
Why is a territorial logic for funding allocation necessary, in an otherwise sectoral and 
central structural and rural development policy such as SAPARD? The primary answer is 
relatively simple. Demands for a regional dimension of essentially sectoral policies, even 
in its basic monitoring, are the result of europeanisation (cf. Section 1.7. ). Regional 
budgetary allocation is often believed to be an EU requirement (Lodkowska-Skoneczna, 
2002). "EU compliant", as a quality mark, is expressed by Lodkowska-Skoneczna (2002) 
as confirmation of legitimacy. However, at the EU level, there is no single template for 
demonstrating legitimacy in funding allocation, especially within policy areas. This 
67 SAPARD was modeled on the EU rural development regulation. 
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demonstration has been left to Member States. 68 The concept of regional allocation of 
development funds (as opposed to other types of allocative mechanisms) is clearly 
recent, with no precedent in horizontal national aid schemes in Poland. Till now, those 
policies have been essentially central and sectoral, administered by the Agency of 
Restructuring and Modernisation of Agriculture (ARMA) and little if any attention was 
paid to spatial distribution. However, the simple answer to why regional funding 
distributions are important quickly generates more complex discussions and 
negotiations. 
The first question (for any policy which is necessarily designed and implemented within 
the context of the European Union's framework) is that of the meaning of cohesion, 
especially in relation to competitiveness. Although, cohesion and competitiveness are 
not regarded as equivalent to social justice and economic development respectively, 
they nonetheless relate to equity considerations versus private sector dependent growth 
(Fainstein, 2001). The concept of cohesion is embedded in the wider context of the 
European model of capitalism, and especially in the ongoing debate on the relationship 
between the markets and state intervention. Hooghe (1998) points out that cohesion 
policy is justified as long as it empowers weaker actors so that they can compete and 
increase economic productivity. In this context, cohesion policy can be seen as both an 
counterbalance to European neo-liberalism and also to either ineffective or more 
expensive national welfare policy. 
However, since European (as opposed to national) policy is so severely constrained by 
its limited total budget (legally required to be no more than 1.27% of GDP), it is clearly 
quite unrealistic to expect European policies to result in any substantial re-distribution 
from the rich to the poor. Hence, in order for European policies to cater for cohesion 
objectives, they necessarily have to emphasise self-help or enabling assistance. Such 
rural development policies (with an explicit cohesion objective) are thus strongly 
associated with competitiveness, rather than set to meet social goals such as equality 
and solidarity. Likewise, the funds are earmarked for productive effort, and only 
secondarily for the reduction of disparities in the living standards (Scott, 1995). Thus, 
68 Notwithstanding EU criteria for the availability of EU policies. However, those criteria need not be applied 
within Obj. 1, or 2 areas. 
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the redistributive function of EU cohesion policy is severely limited, while cohesion itself 
is, as yet, far from perceived as a social entitlement (Hooghe, 1998). In this light, the 
definition of cohesion offered by Begg (1995) appears reasonable: 
"cohesion is political tolerability of the levels of economic and social disparity that 
exists and are expected in the EU and of the measures that are in place to deal 
with them. As such, it is a dynamic and subjective concept". 
Obviously, "the political tolerability" is an essentially contested concept with no objective 
measurement. Nevertheless, it is clearly an alternative expression for practical 
legitimacy, as granted and demonstrated through the available political systems. Many 
researchers argue that in practice, the cohesion policy functions as a side payment for 
the less developed regions, to persuade them not to obstruct market liberalisation or 
dispute loss of monetary control (Leonardi, 1995; Borras, Johansen, 2001). Indeed, the 
budgetary provisions for cohesion objectives (of a mere 0.24% of the EU gross national 
product) have long been argued to be insufficient for a major progress (McDougall, 
1977)69. Linked with the fluid nature of cohesion targets is cohesion measurement. 
Despite criticisms for failing to encompass the quality of growth (Scott, 1995; World 
Bank, 2000), the main yardsticks for cohesion deficits are restricted to GDP per capita 
and unemployment rates rather than multi-dimensional indices or indicators, which are 
argued to be more appropriate by, for example, Scott (1995) and Heijman eta/(1999). 
The second point is about the units to which cohesion objectives actually refer. There 
are several possibilities, a mix of which is reflected in the EU legislation (Rynck and 
McAleavey, 2001). It appears reasonably clear from the legislative viewpoint, that 
cohesion in the EU is a spatial concept: it refers to geographical areas rather than to 
the vertical organisation of the society or to individuals. However, the basic spatial unit 
of reference remains ambivalent (Rynck, McAleavey, 2001). The cohesion objectives 
(enshrined in the Treaty, Article 130a) are formulated as aims "to develop and pursue 
actions to develop and pursue its social and economic cohesion" and "reducing the 
disparities between various regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions, 
including rural areas". These statements reflect the elaboration of Article 2 of the Treaty 
69 As MacDougall reported already in 1977, a federal Europe of reduced disparities would need inter-regional 
resource transfers of 20-25% of GDP while looser federation would require of around 5 to 7% of EU GDP. 
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(referring to "promoting economic and social cohesion amongst the member states") to 
encompass this same promotion within member states. This sense is also reflected in 
the Cohesion Report, which reports on cohesion both amongst the member states and 
between regions within member states. (CEC: 2001). However, while the definition of 
member state boundaries may be taken as given and beyond current dispute, this same 
condition clearly does not apply to most regional dis-aggregations of member state 
performance or character. There seems little doubt that cohesion within member states 
is both very imprecisely captured by the chosen yardsticks, and is also likely to be 
contentious even within the narrow confines of these yardsticks because of the 
dependence on the debatable spatial definitions of the regions themselves. 
The third point relates to the relevance of rural development policy for cohesion 
objectives. The Treaty (Art. 130c) envisages a regional role for the European Regional 
Development Fund, but not explicitly for either FEOGA or the ESF. As a result, FEOGA is 
horizontal and available to all rural areas across the EU and, with exception of Objective 
170 and Objective 271 areas, is not (yet) integrated with the regional programming 
(Saraceno, 2002). Indeed, the rural development policy is evolving from agricultural 
(sectoral) policy, rather than being specifically designed as part of the cohesion 
package. This historic origin is reflected in the preamble to the Rural Development 
regulation, referring primarily to the complementarities with the CAP. However, the rural 
development regulation does provide for the coherence with the cohesion objectives 
(point 10 and 109 in the preamble) by contributing to Objective 1 and Objective 2 
programmes. In simple terms, it translates into differentiated levels of aid, favouring 
lagging regions (Objective 1) or regions undergoing economic restructuring (Objective 
2). As a consequence, cohesion problems of inter-regional (or other spatial72) 
distributions are effectively completely ignored if the whole member state is classified as 
Objective 1 area, as is the case for Poland. 
70 Objective 1 areas are defined as lagging behind in their development ("Objective 1") where the gross domestic product 
(GDP) Is below 75% of the Community average. 
71 Objective 2 areas face structural difficulties such as agricultural or industrial decline leading to high levels of 
unemployment. 
n Except for LFA scheme (Rural Development Regulation, Chapter V). Less Favoured Areas are defined mountainous 
areas and areas with worse natural conditions for agricultural production. The specific designation of LFA is in 
competence of the member states. 
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The final point relates to the evaluation of the cohesion offered by a policy that is 
effectively denied a specific spatially differentiated funding. Such evaluation forces 
concentration on the actual or potential achievement of convergence (related to the 
competitive base), which is clearly a much more demanding task than simply asking 
whether or not the redistribution actually involves a transfer from the rich to the poor, 
or a distribution which favours poorer regions or ruralities, either in impact or effect. 
Boldrin and Canova (2000) argue that regional policies serve mostly a redistributional 
purpose, motivated by the nature of political equilibriums, and that they have little 
relationship to fostering economic growth, or convergence. However, in the case of EU 
funded and sanctioned programmes, this can hardly play an important part in the 
process, given the severe restriction on overall funding levels. Herve (1999), on the 
other hand, indicates that the eligibility of EU funding often results in cuts in the 
corresponding national funding, thus limiting the policy impact, in spite of the fact that 
the EU's provisions on additionality are supposed to prevent this happening. Clearly, 
there is a strong temptation, especially for relatively poor countries, to gain as much 
national advantage as possible from external (EU) assistance, and ways are frequently 
sought to evade or avoid Union rules. 
These conditions seem to force the conclusion that the cohesion objectives and effects 
of current conceptions of EU rural development policy are very largely politically 
rhetorical, rather than containing any substantive content. Nevertheless, having given 
voice to the rhetoric, the political system is then obliged to demonstrate the significance 
of cohesion as far as rural development policies are concerned, in order to maintain the 
legitimacy of the programmes (as it does, for instance, through the classification of 
Objective 1 and 2 regions, and the design and implementation of specific instruments 
and criteria applicable only in these areas). The rhetoric, therefore, drives the 
regionalisation of policy in spite of, rather than because of any inherent logic or 
empirical rationale for a regionally defined policy package to promote cohesion. 
Furthermore, there is a clear political attraction to the idea that the regional distribution 
of funds resulting from these programmes demonstrates some re-distribution from the 
better off to the disadvantaged. A defensible regional distribution of funds thus becomes 
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a political imperative for these programmes. 
5.2.2. Distributional effects on policy and spatial fairness 
Acceptance of the political reality of the importance of regional distributions of funds, 
however, then raises a further question: how are regional distributions to be judged, or 
(equivalently) according to what criteria should regional funding envelopes be defined or 
designed, and thus defended? The natural and obvious answer to such questions is 
'fairness' or'justice'. 
Distributional effects of public policies can assessed in terms of social classes groups, 
gender, income classes, or a number of other social groupings. However the rise of 
regionalism, often associated with devolution within the national policy arena (cf. 
Section 1.7. ), has brought a regional, or even broader territorial "fairness" to the 
agenda. supported by political actors, nowadays concerned not just who gets what and 
how, but also where this happens. Obviously, there is a substantial difference between 
reducing disparities between regions and individuals. Reinforced territorial agenda 
should not, however, obscure the simple fact that it is the people who are ultimately 
poor, not territories (Morgan, 2001), so territorial justice (however defined) cannot be 
seen as a substitute for social justice, however sympathetically one views the general 
concept of cohesion 
Discussions about territorial distribution refer implicitly, or explicitly, to "territorial 
justice", or even more ontologically to "justice" or "fairness" as such. Whilst the 
multitude of ancient and contemporary philosophical discussions (for a review see e. g.: 
Fabre, 2002) are unlikely to bring a universal definition of justice, current practical and 
rather fuzzy definitions of the concept are set around "opportunities", and rights to 
enjoy "a combination of private and public goods" (Fabre, 2002), rather than necessarily 
an equal outcome. 
The concepts of territorial justice reflect the contradictions and imprecision of justice in 
general. One contradiction is that the definition by the central authority of a central 
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template for a level of services within a territory paradoxically leads to a potential lack of 
appreciation of locally varied preferences. However, if territorial justice is to be 
operational, some definition needs to be adopted. Davies (1968: 10) defines the concept 
of territorial justice as follows: 
"In the services for which the most apparent appropriate distribution between 
individuals is "to each according to his needs", the most appropriate distribution 
between areas must be "to each area according to the needs of the population of 
that area". Since the former criterion is synonymous with social justice, we can 
call the latter "territorial justice". 
It follows, that: 
"the statistical definition of territorial justice is a high correlation between indices 
of resource use, or standards of provision and an index measuring the relative 
needs of an area's population for the service". 
Davies 1968: 16 
However measurable the above definition appears, the concept of need is an essentially 
contested concept with multidimensional and fundamentally relative components, 
leading to the obscure distinctions between "rights, deserts and needs". Morgan (2001) 
offers a simpler, yet potentially more workable guideline for a fair territorial allocation: 
regional allocation can be higher in one region than in another due to higher needs; 
higher costs of provision, or local policy choices. Importantly, because of aggregation 
properties, equity at a higher territorial level does not necessarily imply equity at a lower 
level. All in all, Powell and Boyne (2002) argue a modern welfare state is caught in a 
trade-off between efficiency and equity. As costs of provision differ spatially, the state 
can only provide for territorial justice within a finite budget, if it decides to reduce the 
total amount of need being met in at least some areas. An essential lack of precision in 
theoretical as well as implementing concepts must result in failure of modern welfare 
states to demonstrate a spatial equity strategy. 
Once again, as soon as policy makers seek to translate the political rhetoric of fair and 
just regional allocations into practice, the sophistry (or at least the imprecision) of the 
rhetoric becomes self-evident. Policy makers thus take refuge in seeking more specific 
justifications for particular regional variations in funding allocations. One important set 
of possible justifications involves the potential biases of government funding initiatives. 
157 
Chapter 5: Regional distribution of funding 
for structural and rural policies in Poland 
5.2.3. Allocative biases in structural and rural development policies 
On a more specific level, it is argued that the uptake of rural development measures (in 
particular investment grants) features inequalities of a vertical nature. Two streams in 
the literature are useful in understanding biases in the distribution of development 
policies: principal agent theory (and its applications to rural credit systems) (e. g. 
Swinnen and Gow, 1998) and fiscal federalism, explaining the bias respectively towards 
bigger farms and wealthier localities (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1965; Oates, 1972; 
Begg, 1998). 
Swinnen and Gow (1999) argue that the fact that credit is subsidized by the state by no 
means ensures that it is accessible to all farmers or rural businesses. Credit availability is 
constrained by the borrower's net value as well as by availability of collateral. Higher 
risks, poor availability of collaterals and costly business plans lead to the perverse effect 
on small farmers of further restricting their access to subsidised credit (Swinnen and 
Gow, 1999). Indeed, this theoretical effect is confirmed by the empirical data (Kulawik, 
2000; ]ozwiak, 1999). 
Likewise, federal finance frameworks (Musgrave, 1965; Begg, 1998) explain the 
potential implication of using conditional, matching transfers73 from the central level to 
the local authorities. Such grants require co-funding and monitoring and thus, entail 
additional administrative costs, more likely to be borne and accepted by richer regions. 
Although biases towards larger farmers and richer local municipalities are not spatial per 
se, farm size and commune revenue base are geographically distributed in Poland (as 
shown in Chapter 3). Hence, it becomes possible to argue substantively in favour of a 
regional funding distribution that favours the poorer regions and smaller farms, at least 
in the Polish case. 
73 Conditional matching grants stipulate specific uses of the funds, and require match-funding. Such grants 
are part of EU policies, notably grants for infrastructure in our case. 
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5.3. Regional funding in practice: the SAPARD regional envelope 
experience. 
The ambiguous logic of EU cohesion policies was well reflected in the Polish search for 
allocative mechanisms for SAPARD. Data on allocation between regions for the SAPARD 
programme, along with a detailed methodology, has been obtained from direct 
experience as well as the Agricultural Analysis Unit (SAEPR) in Warsaw via e-mail 
communication (SAEPR: 2001). The author participated directly in discussions on the 
design of methodology for allocating SAPARD funding to regions in 2000-2001. A search 
for objective and fair criteria began for all SAPARD measures (except for the processing 
industry, where spillover between regions were recognised and central perspective was 
adopted). The task was contracted to SAEPR, a Polish think-tank, independent from the 
Ministry, and, perhaps more importantly, from any political pressures. 
The debate was generated as the concerns of inter-regional spatial distribution of 
horizontal rural development funding emerged74 (see also: Reiner, 1999; CEC: 2001) - 
largely according to the evolution of the arguments rehearsed in outline above. 
However, there was also an important practical need for regional budgetary envelopes 
to enable the programmes to be administered in a decentralised mode. Furthermore, the 
objective, transparent design of regional pockets of funding was meant to serve as a 
means of avoiding clientelism (for definition cf. footnote in Section 1.3.5). Moreover, it 
was felt that ring-fencing "fair" shares of funding between regions would ensure fair 
access by beneficiaries and prevent the more affluent regions from spending the bulk of 
the total budget. Such a concern was also voiced in the ex-ante evaluation of the 
SAPARD Programme (Dalton et al: 1999), while the practical dangers are illustrated by 
the Cohesion Report, which indicates reduced disparities between the Member States 
concurrent with enlarging gaps between regions in some member states (CEC: 2001). 
On the other hand, the implementation problems could also give rise to a "pork barrel i75 
74 It is important to note, that besides regionalised budget mechanism, other equity mechanisms are built in 
SAPARD policy: such as preferences in the project selection criteria for communes with lower own revenue 
per capita, or beneficiaries from districts with high unemployment. Those mechanisms will impact Intra- 
regional distribution, but are beyond the scope of present study, simply because of the lack of data on the 
outcomes of the SAPARD programme, which has not been in existence long enough to generate any results 
to date (Chapter 1). 
75 "Pork barrel" Is a legislative appropriation designed to ingratiate legislators with their constituents. 
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(Rynck, McAleavey, 2001). The practical pressure to ensure that funds would actually 
be spent forced the designers to include an indication of absorption capacity, as an 
estimate of the likely demand for and uptake of grants. From strictly absorption 
arguments, the budget fragmentation could diminish the uptake. There is little point in 
allocating funds to regions on an equity basis, if the funds are unlikely to be used. 
Virement of unspent funds between regions would be politically difficult and time 
consuming. 
A regional budget is a function of the criteria selected, their relative weights and the 
aggregation method. The two general dimensions for calculating the envelopes were 
determined as equity and efficiency. On one hand, the envelopes were to function as 
indications of regions' relative effective demand for grants - the justification on 
efficiency grounds. On the other hand, they were meant to provide equitable access 
(SAEPR: 2001) and avoid the potential bias that the already efficient would command 
the bulk of the funds. More detailed examination of the mechanism sheds more light on 
the thinking of Polish national and regional policy makers of "fair" regional distribution. 
In general, as reported by an expert in charge of calculating the envelopes: 
"I did not really have any problems to agree them as they were based on 
clear and transparent logic; they were easily adopted". 
W. Guba, electronic communication 
The criteria were transparent and discussed in the SAPARD Monitoring Committee 76 1 
which delegated experts to oversee the process. Even within the "objective", there is 
some room for maneuvre: regional arguments were, of course, specifically designed to 
increase their share: e. g. by moving threshold values or altering indicators: e. g. instead 
of number of cows, using milk sales etc. Broad consensus was easily achieved and 
legitimised by the agreement of the territorial partners within the Monitoring 
committee. " Another point was the choice of the formula: the distribution (flatter or 
more differentiated) is sensitive to the method of indexing and aggregation. "Flatter" 
76 The Monitoring Committee, is a collective body made up of central authorities as well as regional and 
social partners, charged with overseeing the Structural Funds operations, e. g. approve monitoring reports, 
approve programme alterations, and commission studies. The MC, however, is separate from the project 
selection. 
"This discussion goes in parallel with a broader debate on the formula to divide regional funding, especially 
in the context of the whole set of Structural Funds as provided for in the National Development Plan (for 
more see: Lodkowska-Skoneczna, 2001). 
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distributions turned out to be more politically palatable compared to the more 
concentrated ones, a demand easily satisfied by adjusting the formulae for indexing and 
aggregation. 
So, what did the final regional funding envelopes for three SAPARD measures look like? 
In particular, how does the funding allocation correspond to the EU cohesion policy? 
Two yardsticks of spatial cohesion deficits were chosen for the supporting analysis: a 
standard regional GDP per capita indicator, and an indicator of rural potential (the rural 
development index developed in Section 3.7, Table 3.21). In addition, a descriptive 
analysis was used to determine the level of spatial selectivity: high variation between 
the per capita indexes suggesting more spatial targeting of funding. 
5.3.1 Rural infrastructure regional budget 
The regional "fairness" envelope for the rural infrastructure measure has been 
constructed according to the logic of need (weight of 0.4), access/poverty (weight of 
0.5) and costs of provision (weight of 0.1). The mechanism can be summarised as 
shown in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.2. below indicates a relatively low level of regional targeting of the rural 
infrastructure measure. While the allocation has followed a principle of dispersion at 
least in spatial terms, the ratio of the highest to the lowest per capita allocations is only 
1.66. Please note that such a calculation is underlined by an implicit assumption that all 
localities have the same needs for infrastructure, a concept referred to in literature as 
the "municipality paradox". 
Table 5.3 shows the correspondence between this regional allocation of funds and the 
cohesion yardsticks. Although the correlations are weak, nonetheless they are of the 
right sign, indicating that the funding allocation does flow in the direction of the 
cohesion objectives, as measured at the regional level. 
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Table 5.1. Model of 'fair" budget regionalistion for rural infrastructure (SAPARD 
0 A B C 
0.4*A + o. 5*B 
+0.1*C 
Equal piece of Need Access* Cost of "Fair" piece of 
cake** Index of Index of provision* cake** 
infrastructure commune own Population 
provision revenue (G) density 
DOLNAAS 1 1.072 0.68 0.96 0.86 
KUJAW-POM 1 1.130 1.03 1.06 1.07 
LUBELSKIE 1 1.335 1.32 1.17 1.31 
LUBUSK 1 1.800 0.94 1.38 1.33 
tÖDZ 1 1.257 1.00 1.00 1.10 
MALOPOL 1 1.039 1.15 0.46 1.04 
MAZOW 1 1.404 0.99 0.99 1.16 
OPOL 1 0.959 0.86 0.69 0.88 
PODKARP 1 0.863 1.45 0.78 1.15 
PODL 1 1.041 1.33 1.97 1.28 
POM 1 0.955 1.00 1.33 1.02 
kbSKIE 1 0.757 0.87 0.63 0.80 
tWIUOK 1 1.075 1.18 0.81 1.10 
WARM-MAZ 1 1.286 1.02 1.83 1.21 
WIELKOP 1 1.003 0.90 0.88 0.94 
ZACH-POM 1 0.893 0.86 1.59 0.95 
*Indexed in relation to the lowest level (=1) **Expressed as unit of finance / head rural pop. 
Source: own presentation based on SAEPR (2001) 
Table 5.2. Regional envelope for rural infrastructure measure in SAPARD: 
descriptive statistics 
N min max mean std. max/min a- 
deviation ratio coefficient 
Regional 16 . 80 1.33 1.0750 . 1618 
1.66 0.16 
envelope for 
infrastructure* 
Valid N (listwise) 16 
*Expressed as a unit of finance per rural capita. 
a-coefficient calculated as the standard deviation divided by its mean, reflecting spatial disparities 
Source: own 
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lame 5.3. Kegionai envelope for infrastructure measure against conesion 
yardsticks (Pearson correlations) 
Regional envelope 
for infrastructure measure 
Rural resource and structure index -. 213 
(rural cohesion measure)* 
GRP/capita -. 361 
(regional cohesion measure) 
Expressed in unit of finance per rural capita, indexed. *See Table 3.20. In Chapter 3. Source: own 
The poorer regions do tend to get more funding for infrastructure (per head of the rural 
population), as seen in Figure 5.1. below, but the correlation between GDP per head and 
funding levels is by no means strong, and there are significant outlying regions from the 
general tendency. The regression improves when the main outlier (namely the 
Mazowieckle region, with the capital city) is removed (R-square=0.55). The regression, 
albeit of limited significance due to a small number of cases (16), does not exhibit a 
much better match (R-square of 0.15), when both a rural index and GDP/capita are 
used as dependent variables (infr env= 1.32- 0.33*GDP_cap - 1.4*Rurind). 
Figure 5.1. Regional allocation for rural infrastructure and linkage with 
GDP/capita 
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5.3.2 Rural diversification regional budgetary envelope 
The regional "fairness' envelope for rural diversification in SAPARD has been based on 
the programme's objectives. The envelope has been calculated as the region's share in 
total (registered and "hidden") rural unemployment. No references to absorption 
potential, or capacity (by e. g. relating the envelopes to the number of rural businesses) 
are made. The inclusion of these factors would be likely to `bias' the allocation of 
funding towards those regions which were already exhibiting internal capacity to 
diversify, hence defeating the objective. 
Table 5.4. Model of "fair" budget regionalistion for rural diversification (SAPARD) 
Budget 
Regionali 
-sation 
2 
A 
3 0.5*A *0.5*B per 
B rural capita 
Region's share In registered Objective "Fair" piece of cake 
rural unemployment Per Hidden unemployed Per rural capita 
DOLNOkAS 178 1 0.5 
KUJAW-POM 1 1 0.67 
LUBELSKIE 1 1 1.09 
LUBUSK 1 1 0.41 
t6DZ 1 1 0.9 
MALOPOL 1 1 1.07 
MAZOW 1 1 0.77 
OPOL 1 1 0.37 
PODKARP 1 1 1.39 
PODL 1 1 0.7 
POM 1 1 0.57 
tLkSKIE 1 1 0.6 
tWIkMK 1 1 1.23 
WARM-MAZ 1 1 0.66 
WIELKOP 1 1 0.46 
ZACH-POM 1 1 0.47 
78 "1' in each column signifies that the regional share in the total national official or hidden unemployment Is 
weighted equally. 
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Table S. S. Regional envelope for rural diversification measure in SAPARD: 
descriptive statistics 
N Min Max Mean Std. Dev. max/min ratio ß-coefficient 
Regional 16 . 37 1.39 . 7413 . 3095 3.75 0.53 
envelope for 
diversification* 
Valid N (listwise) 16 
*Expressed as a unit of finance per rural capita, indexed in relation to the lowest level. 
As demonstrated in Table 5.5 above, the regional budgetary allocation has been highly 
regionally differentiated with relatively high regional concentration, as evidenced from a 
high level of a-coefficient. The resultant regional policy budgets correlate strongly with 
the cohesion objectives (as seen in Table 5.6. ), especially with the measures of rural 
cohesion. 
Table 5.6. Regional envelope for diversification measure against cohesion 
yardsticks (Pearson correlations) 
Regional envelope 
for diversification measure* 
Rural resource and structure index -. 807 (rural cohesion measure) 
GRP/capita -. 361 (regional cohesion measure) 
*Expressed In unit of finance per rural capita 
Source: own 
Figure 5.2. Rural diversification financial allocation and its linkages with regional 
rural cohesion objectives 
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*Div_sap - expressed as unit of finance per rural capita, indexed 
Source: own 
The analysis shows an allocative efficiency, i. e. regions with a cohesion deficit 
(measured as either rural potential or regional GDP per capita) obtain a relatively higher 
share of funding for rural diversification. The regression only improves slightly (R-square 
of 0.68) when both GDP per capita and rural resource index are included as independent 
variables (Dive-sap = 1.02 - 0.19*GDP_cap - 0.764*Rur_ind). 
5.3.3. Agricultural investment regional budgets 
The regional envelopes for investment in agricultural holdings have been calculated on 
the basis of potential absorption capacity, by calculating a region's share in the sales of 
supported types of production (animal husbandry) as well as the share of agricultural 
land of supported farm size (of min. 5 ha). Such a defined pattern is simply designed to 
reconcile the sectoral logic with the required territorial dimension. The resulting regional 
envelopes need to be seen in this case as a fiscal management tool rather than as a 
specific equity modifier. 
In particular, the envelope has been set by calculating the share of each voivodship in 
the production of supported commodity (milk, beef, pork, poultry, total plant, sheep) 
weighted by the share of a given scheme in the total budget of the measure. It is 
important to note that alternative formulae have been discussed for this envelope, 
based for example on the number of farms. Yet, ultimately the variant chosen (per unit 
of production) appears the most efficiency oriented. 79 
79 Albeit not entirely coherent with the logic of the programme, targeted to medium-sized farms. 
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Table 5.7. "Fair" regional envelopes for agricultural investment support schemes 
and its equity 
Budget SAPARD "fair" regional envelopes 
Regionali "Fair" piece of "Fair" piece of cake 
-sation cake (Unit of finance per 
(Unit of finance ha. of agric. land) 
per rural capita) 
DOLNOkAS 0.41 0.46 
KUJAW-POM 0.79 0.72 
LUBELSKIE 0.79 0.54 
LUBUSK 0.37 0.42 
tODZ 0.76 0.68 
MALOPOL 0.15 0.35 
MAZOW 0.71 0.67 
OPOL 0.4 0.58 
PODKARP 0.1 0.16 
PODL 0.94 0.49 
POM 0.59 0.55 
6LASKIE 0.28 0.56 
SWIkTOK 0.21 0.25 
WARM-MAZ 0.58 0.36 
WIELKOP 0.79 0.88 
ZACH-POM 0.39 0.31 
Source: own calculations based on SAEPR 
Table 5.8. Regional envelope for agricultural investment measure in SAPARD: 
descriptive statistics 
N Min Max Mean Std. max/min CF. 
Deviation ratiocoefdent 
Agricultural 16 . 10 . 94 . 5163 . 2620 9.4 0.50 investment 
measure* 
Valid N liistwise) 16 
*Expressed as a unit of funding per rural capita, indexed 
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Table 5.9. Regional envelope for farm investment measure against cohesion 
yardsticks (Pearson correlations) 
Regional envelope for agricultural investment 
Rural resource and structure index . 100 
(rural cohesion measure)* 
GRP/capita . 088 
(regional cohesion measure) 
*See Table 3.21. In Chapter 3. 
Source: own 
Figure 5.3. Agricultural investment regional envelope and its linkage to regional 
cohesion 
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the resulting allocation did conform to cohesion measures. It does not, as shown in 
Figure 5.3. 
The regional allocations under SAPARD have been politically agreed with the regions. As 
such, they can be seen as constituting a valid reference benchmark for regional fairness 
in rural development policy distribution in Poland. The allocations of two of the territorial 
measures: rural infrastructure and diversification; are in line with the EU cohesion 
objectives measured at the regional level. It means that the regional funding allocations 
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for those two benchmarks tend to be higher for regions with lower GDP per capita and 
rural resource endowment. However, the relationship is not strong. Poorer regions get 
relatively higher allocations, but not much higher. 
5.4. Regional envelope as an equity modifier - evidence from past 
policy experience 
One function of the SAPARD regional envelopes was as a territorial equity modifier. 
Section 5.4 is designed to test if, in the absence of territorial modifiers, the distribution 
of rural development policy in Poland would be uneven, biased towards better-off 
regions due to their higher absorption potential. The analysis below examines the 
interregional distribution patterns of past rural development policies in relation to the 
SAPARD benchmarks80. 
Data on past national horizontal schemes, administered by the Agency of Restructuring 
and Modernisation of Agriculture (ARMA), was obtained from the ARMA Analysis Unit in 
January 2002 via email communication and downloaded from the web (ARMA: 2002). 
The data is remarkably scarce. A time series of only two years offers very little scope for 
analysis. In addition, the population is only 16 regions, which again seriously limits 
regression analysis, typically requiring a minimum of 30 observations. Also, since 
funding available for national policies in total is very small, comparison of percentage 
shares can be misleading. However, some general relationships can be tentatively 
indicated. 
5.4.1. Regional distribution of rural infrastructure grants 
ARMA provides conditional matching grants for projects to develop rural infrastructure 
such as roads, sewage treatment plants, water and sewage systems81. Grants were 
distributed on the first-come-first-served basis by decisions taken in the central ARMA 
office. 
80 At the time of writing (late 2002), the data of actual SAPARD absorption across regions was still very 
limited as the Programme only started in mid-2002. 
81 Grants are provided for communes and association of rural, rural-urban and towns up to 5000 dwellers. 
The maximum grant per applicant amounts to 300,000 PLN (about 80,000 EUR) and might cover up to 50% 
of the total eligible costs (for communes with lower tax revenue) 
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Patterns of regional absorption of infrastructure grants under ARMA central schemes in 
relation to the SAPARD "fairness" benchmark are shown in Figure 5.4. 
Figure 5.4: Regional distribution* of ARMA infrastructure schemes compared to 
equity benchmark (SAPARD) 
Regional distribution of ARMA infrastructure grants 
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Source: own compilation based on SAEPR (2001) and ARMA (electronic communication) 
A basic analysis of the limited data (Table 5.10) indicates a dynamic pattern between 
years, but an overall close match between the SAPARD benchmark and the total bi- 
annual share. 
_ýý:.. 
, ýý. _. :' Yý;. 
Table 5.10. Regional absorption of rural infrastructure schemes 
(Pearson correlations) 
5 
1 
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Regional Regional Total regional 
absorption absorption absorption 
ARMA 1999 ARMA 2000 (ARMA 
2000+2001) 
Regional 0.03 
absorption 
ARMA 2000 
SAPARD 0.88 0.13 0.89 
benchmark 
In order to examine whether the absorption patterns favour regions with a higher 
potential (in relation to the SAPARD benchmark) the following matrix table is used 
(Figure 5.5) presenting the regional resource index category (horizontal axis, cf. Section 
3.7) in relation to the absorption (in comparison with the "fairness" benchmark). 
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Source: own 
The matrix indicates that there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that in the 
absence of a regional equity modifier, the funding of horizontal support for rural 
infrastructure schemes would have been allocated disproportionately in favour of better- 
off rural regions. On the contrary, regions lagging behind (category 4 of rural resource 
index), tended to fare relatively better (+) compared with regions of highest rural 
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resource potential (category 1). 
5.4.2 Regional distribution of support for non agricultural business and job 
creation grants 
ARMA operates two schemes (MP and FP) to provide subsidized credit to businesses 
which create permanent jobs in rural, and rural-municipal communes as well in towns 
below 20,00082. The applicants are required to produce a business plan, and obtain 
approval from the local advisory center (reporting to ARMA). The final decision is taken 
by the local bank. 
Figure 5.6. Regional shares in total schemes budgets for ARMA diversification 
schemes as compared to equity benchmark (SAPARD) 
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Statistical analysis suggests that the pattern of regional distributions of these schemes is 
not highly dynamic (Table 5.11), yet with correlation between the total allocation and 
the individual values. 
82 The maximum amount credit is 25,000 PLN per job creates (circa 6,000 EUR) up to a ceiling of 4 million 
PLN (circa 1 million EUR). The minimum contribution of the investor is 20% of the total eligible project 
costs. The interests are variable (in 2002: around 7 per annum) with the maximum re-payment period of 6 
years. 
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Table 5.11. Regional absorption of ARMA rural diversification schemes 
(Pearson correlations) 
Regional absorption Regional absorption Regional absorption Regional absorption Total regional 
ARMA 1999 ARMA 1999 ARMA 2000 ARMA 2000 absorption 
FP MP FP MP (ARMA 1999+2001) 
Regional I 
absorption ARMA 
1999-FP 
Regional 0.32 1 
absorption ARMA 
1999- MP 
Regional 0.21 0.58 1 
absorption ARMA 
2000-FP 
Regional 0.60 0.68 0.74 1 
absorption ARMA 
2000-MP 
Total regional 0.58 0.70 0.90 0.98 1 
absorption 
(ARMA 
1999+2001) 
SAPARD 
-0.01 0.22 0.61 0.43 0.51 benchmark 
The matrix of regional rural resource index (Fig. 5.7) indicates that indeed regions with 
higher resource index (category 1 on the horizontal axis) tended to obtain relatively 
more resources for the rural diversification scheme, compared with the regions of lower 
resource base (category 4). 
Figure 5.7. Regional absorption patterns of ARMA schemes for rural enterprises 
(1999+2000) in relation to regional rural resource category 
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Source: own 
However, this association needs to be treated with caution. Firstly, the total budget 
allocated was quite small (cf. Appendix 12). Secondly, the SAPARD benchmark was 
more spatially selective, favouring weaker regions compared with the benchmark for 
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rural infrastructure. On the other hand, this might suggest that the utilisation patterns of 
grants for private beneficiaries are likely to be more spatially selective, compared to 
grants for public recipients (who receive equalisation grants through the basic state 
distribution system). 
5.4.3. Regional distribution of horizontal schemes to subsidise investment in 
agriculture and food sector 
ARMA operates a scheme for providing subsidies to interest rates on credit for 
investment projects in agriculture and agri-food processing. The credits are provided 
from through a network of banks with whom ARMA has contractual agreements83. This 
scheme is fully central and horizontal with no regional dimension ("0" regionalisation 
scheme as per scale of Table 1.1. ). 
Table 5.12 indicates that the relative demand for agricultural investment schemes, 
assessed and expressed relative to the SAPARD regional envelope, has been precise. 
Indeed, the regional absorption patterns of agricultural investment schemes were fairly 
stable, closely matching the SAPARD envelope. In this case, however, the SAPARD 
envelope itself was designed to encourage uptake and efficiency, rather than to include 
a substantial equity modifier. In this case, therefore, the strong correlations between 
the ARMA scheme and the SAPARD envelope simply demonstrate that the latter was 
effectively designed to reflect the absorption capacity of the regions. 
83 The maximum credit available for a project is 4 million PLN (around 1 million EUR), which can amount to 
a maximum of 80% of the total project cost. Applicants need to produce a business plan, have it approved 
by an expert from the advisory center and finally the bank. Re-payment period varies from 8 to 15 years 
with longer periods for young farmer scheme, sectoral programmes and land purchase. Variable interest 
rates are applied: for example in 2002 the subsidized interest rates applied of between 3% and 7.5% 
(compared to commercial interest rates of about 17% and the Inflation rate of 10%). For the processing 
industry, the maximum amount of credit is 8 million PLN (around 2 million EUR) not more than 70% of the 
total project cost. 
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Figure S. S. Regional distribution of ARMA agricultural credits and its regional 
"fairness" as legitimised by SAPARD allocation (% of total budget) 
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Source: own compilation based on SAEPR (2001) and electronic communication from 
ARMA 
Table 5.12. Regional absorption of agricultural investment schemes 
(Pearson correlations) 
Regional Regional Total regional 
absorption absorption absorption 
ARMA 1999 ARMA 2000 (ARMA 
2000+2001) 
Regional 0.98 
absorption 
ARMA 2000 
SAPARD 0.95 0.94 0.95 
benchmark 
175 
Chapter 5: Regional distribution of funding 
for structural and rural policies in Poland 
5.5 Conclusions 
Chapter 5 has explored the budgetary dimension of regionalisation of rural development 
policies in Poland, addressing the concerns of policy makers in Warsaw and analysts 
(e. g. Reiner, 1999) about the potential inter-regional imbalances in the allocation of 
structural funding across a single Objective 1 area. 
The literature widely recognises the ambiguity of EU cohesion policy, expressing 
criticism for both uni-dimensional yardsticks for measuring cohesion deficits (Scott, 
1995) as well the ambiguous units of reference for cohesion measurements (Rynck, 
McAleavey, 2001). Nested in deeper conceptual ambiguities related to the neo-liberal 
market model of EU capitalism (Hooghe 1998; Fainstein, 2001) and still far from 
enshrining social entitlements, the cohesion policy rests on the outcome of multi- 
national political bargaining rather than on a specific socio-economic rationale. Whilst 
the spatial meaning of cohesion remains widely acknowledged, basic doubts emerge as 
to the reference units (Rynck, McAleavey, 2001), even in the Treaty inconsistently 
mentioned as either regions or Member States. Notwithstanding the apparent EU 
commitment to some form of cohesion, the structural rural development policy financed 
from FEOGA is applicable horizontally in all rural areas across the EU with limited 
targeting on regions (Saraceno, 2002) with the major concerns being sectoral, rather 
than territorial issues. 
On the other hand, spatial fairness, no matter how defined, need not imply vertical 
social justice (Powell, Boyne, 2001). Indeed, insights from fiscal finance literature 
(Musgrave and Musgrave, 1965; Oates, 1972; Begg, 1998) and principal agent and rural 
credit frameworks (Swinnen and Gow, 1999; Baland and Kotwald, 1998), explain the 
unequal distribution of matching grants and rural credit favouring bigger wealthier 
beneficiaries. Territorial equity in general is poorly defined both in conceptual and 
practical terms in modern welfare states (Powell, Boyne, 2001). This is especially true 
for development policies, which seek facilitate the convergence process (cf. Section 
2.4.1. ). 
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The budget regionalisation is frequently simply necessitated by policy deconcentration 
(cf. Section 1.7.1), as a necessary fiscal management tool for the operation of 
programmes funded from central sources. In our example of the SAPARD programme, 
the debate about the "fair" regional budgets was also partly driven by concerns of 
regionally biased policy distributions and motivated by the avoidance of clientelist 
practices. The debate between the centre and regions generated a set of politically 
legitimised criteria for the SAPARD programme, constituting a revealed benchmark for 
the "fair" financial distribution of programme funds within Poland, at least at the time of 
the SAPARD programme design. However, the coherence of these benchmarks with both 
the basic cohesion objectives and with spatial targeting turns out to vary across 
measures (Section 5.4). The analysis has shown a broad correspondence between 
infrastructure and diversification envelopes and cohesion objectives: regions with a 
cohesion deficit (measured as either low GDP per capita, or low rural resource index) 
tend to have higher per rural capita allocations (Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2). The 
benchmark for agricultural investments is not consistent with the cohesion objective: 
there is a (weak) positive correlation between per capita allocations and the regional 
GDP (Figure 5.3). In addition, the envelopes show differentiated spatial selectivity: the 
"flattest" distribution for rural infrastructure (Table 5.3) and the highest spatial 
distributional disparities for agricultural investment schemes (Table 5.9). 
Whether the absence of "fair" regional envelopes tends to favour the better off regions, 
was examined on the basis of limited data from the past national rural development 
programmes (Section 5.4). The analysis, though limited due to scarce data, has 
indicated that the better-off regions tended to do well (relative to the SAPARD 
benchmark) in rural diversification schemes (Figure 5.8), but quite the contrary in rural 
infrastructure programmes (Figure 5.5). Uptake of the programmes was however quite 
changeable across years. The absorption of agricultural investment support closely 
matched the SAPARD benchmark, which suggests that the latter should perform well in 
matching funds with demand under this programme. 
In summary, it has been shown that the financial implications of rural development 
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policies need not be in line with the cohesion principles. Indeed, a division between 
territorial and sectoral policy instruments within the rural development framework 
(FEOGA) proposed by Saraceno (2002) has been substantiated by the above analysis 
with territorial measures (rural diversification and infrastructure) potentially enhancing 
rural regional cohesion, unlike the sectoral instrument of agricultural investments. 
Whether the "fair" regional budgetary arrangements serve as an effective equity 
mechanism depends on policy demand. The mechanism is only triggered when the 
applications exceed the budget available. With slow uptake, complementary measures to 
boost the number of applications in poorer regions might be required. However, in order 
to maximise programme uptake, regional envelopes, if used, should be multi-annual, to 
allow for an apparently inevitable variation in uptake rates between individual years. 
Even then, territorial "fairness" at a higher level does not necessarily result in equity at 
lower levels. Intraregional variation of resource base among Polish voivodships might 
suggest that this is strongly the case. Therefore, for territorial fairness assessments, the 
typology of ruralities (cf. Section 3.8. ) is relevant for evaluation, at least as case studies. 
Nonetheless, as the regional envelopes for the SAPARD programme have been approved 
as being fair by the SAPARD National Monitoring Committee, we may take them as a 
useful and legitimate benchmark of "fairness" against which the actual patterns of 
horizontal programmes, especially those which are operated on a regional rather than 
sectoral basis, might be assessed. 
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t 
The Regional dimension of 
Polish EU structural and rural policy processes 
6.1. Objectives and outline of chapter 6 
Chapter 6 examines the final research proposition, namely that of the feasibility of 
regionalisation in the EU structural and rural policymaking in Poland84. The analysis is 
carried out from the participant observation perspective (cf. a briefing in Appendix 13), 
supplemented by a series of semi-structured interviews (cf. Appendix 14) and rests on a 
grounded theory approach (Glaser, Strauss, 1967) (cf. Section 1.6). Findings from 
previous chapters are recalled for their relevance as inputs into the policy process. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 explores the methodological 
reservations on empirical data used and the application of an ethnographic approach. In 
section 6.4 a brief review of theoretical approaches to EU policy making processes is 
undertaken, concluding with an assessment of their relevance to the participant 
observation experience. Section 6.5 builds on these considerations to develop a short- 
term analytical approach. In conclusion, long-term forces of rural policy regionalisation 
are identified in section 6.6, inspired by an advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier, 
Jenkins-Smith, 1993). 
6.2. Participant experience in Polish EU rural development policy 
This chapter reports the core experience of the thesis. The author's motivation to study 
and analyse the policy process arose from considerable experience in doing policy. 
Although the reverse of a more logical progression from analysis to practice, this 
experience is probably more typical of actual and real practice of policy development, 
especially in economies in transition. 
8' In line with the europeanisation debate, the EU level added to the national policy making patterns tends 
to change conditions for policy making by extending the policy network beyond the national partners only. 
Thus, the analysis in this chapter is applicable to the Polish EU rural policy making, does not necessarily 
translate into the conditions of national rural policy making. 
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In 1996-1998 I was employed in a translation and liaison capacity for a UK Know-How- 
Project advising the Polish Ministry of Agriculture on policy development in the EU 
accession process. In those days, the idea of EU integration was still distantly abstract 
and of apparently little relevance to reality both to me specifically and to the policy 
cadres in Warsaw generally. The knowledge of EU languages, yet alone policy 
perspectives, was vague. I participated in countless debates trying to build and develop 
mutual understandings both within the Warsaw polity and the EU bureaucracies. 
Feelings of frustration and suspicion intermingled with a sense of participating in historic 
developments and excitement of being exposed to totally new perspectives. Since my 
original interpretation role was by no means confined to linguistics, but more often 
extended into translating administrative and cultural approaches, experience of tension 
between the new opening horizons on one hand and the loss of security and suspicions 
of the new sources of power on the other, were daily experiences for both myself and 
my Polish colleagues. After all, having grown up in a largely isolated but externally 
governed society, we Poles knew little about this new world of apparent cooperation 
coupled with self-determination. 
Yet, beginning from initial orientation and fact-finding visits to Brussels, our experiences 
surprisingly quickly transformed into structured responses both in terms of institutional 
and organisational procedures and policy documents. In 1996-1998, the project 
provided extensive support for ministerial working groups for dairy, cereals, beef 
markets as well as for Structural Funds. Most of this work, from my perspective, began 
with translating EU directives with a pocket English dictionary and discovering that "EU 
speech" is simply not included in conventional English dictionaries! 
Although the Ministry staff had to perform their daily routine duties, some were keen to 
develop new expertise on the side. In 1998, I was coordinating the production of the 
first draft of the National Programme of Preparation of EU Integration, the first concrete 
plan in Poland for achieving compliance in priority areas of the acquis. This was the last 
occasion on which foreign experts were directly engaged in the preparation of policy 
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documents. All subsequent documents were prepared by Polish staff. 
In 1998 I represented the Polish Ministry at a Brussels conference, at which the SAPARD 
Programme was first officially announced. The idea was brand new. No appropriate 
expertise existed. Everybody could, and had to, learn fast. I took it as an opportunity for 
organising a series of internal follow-up workshops for Ministry staff, in particular its ad- 
hoc working group for structural funds. At the same time, I wrote a more 
comprehensive background report for the Ministry about institutional, economic and 
organisational aspects of EU rural development policy-making. At the time of accelerated 
learning in the organisation, despite my still limited experience, I was then made 
SAPARD coordinator in the Foundation of Assistance Programmes for Agriculture (FAPA), 
working in advisory and coordination capacities, supporting the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Rural Development (MARD). 
The launch of SAPARD preparation coincided with the decentralisation reforms in 
Poland. As Mr. Buzek, the Polish prime minister, promised in his New Year's 1999 speech 
to wake up in new Poland", the initial response to decentralisation, fuelled by EC 
rhetoric of subsidiarity and partnership, was full of excitement. The Ministry initiated 
communications with the regions soon after they came into being, even before the new 
regional authorities had telephones installed, still less before they had time to develop 
organisational practices and strategic responses. Nonetheless, in spring 1999 the 
SAPARD group, under my coordination, organised a structured consultation process with 
the aim of discussing regionalisation with the newly formed regional authorities and 
regional representatives directly. The process was largely designed by myself, involving 
major meetings in each region to discuss regional priorities. 85 This decision was judged 
highly risky: after all, the ministry was then expected to know rather than needing to 
ask. What would happen if everybody wanted completely different things? However, the 
new regional bodies and groups clearly needed to be both consulted and involved. 
Participation and inclusion are necessarily risky. To our relief, regional responses turned 
out to be strikingly similar, after the original confusion about why the central 
government felt it necessary to seek regional advice and input. Nevertheless, the 
weakness of specific regional cultures, identities, and especially homogeneity of 
85 For detailed discussion see: Chapter 4 
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preferences were evident in these seminars. Later, in 1999-2001, I participated in 
numerous meetings around Poland, in all regions, which confirmed these initial 
observations. 
In autumn 1999, on the basis of Ministry inputs, I drafted the overall Operational 
SAPARD Programme for Poland. This job was as much about skilful coordination and 
effective extraction of policy inputs as about skilful rhetoric or logical analysis. 
Most of 2000 witnessed negotiations with the European Commission, with usual 
phenomena of obscurity, inadequate information or simply differences in perspectives. 
But, having participated in most negotiations sessions, I had a chance to follow and 
reflect on its dynamics. In September 2000, during a joyful celebration of the 
Programme adoption by the EC STAR Committee at the dinner in Brussels, hardly 
anybody could think that the worst was still ahead of us. We were soon to find out as 
the next 2 years proved that the arrangements in the EU are never final until ultimately 
signed off. Procedural codes and auditors' procedures are not to be underestimated. 
Having (unsuccessfully) participated in the design of specific implementation 
procedures86 (for 6 months), this lesson was hard learned. Sometimes, however, more 
can be learnt from mistakes than from successes. Two years later, as I seek87 to draw 
policy conclusions, the procedural paralysis has only just been relieved. 
6.3. Struggle between policy participant and policy researcher 
But how can participant88 observations such as outlined above be related to academic 
and theoretical study and research? Relations between policy practice and research are 
well known for their lukewarm if not an overtly tense nature (e. g. Minogue, 1986). 
Indeed, Minogue recognises that 
"in the policy science (.. ) we find the field full of alternative, competing 
constructions of reality. The practitioner shuns theory because the gap between 
86 Following the approval of the Programme, Brussels has requested the preparation of specific written 
procedures for its implementation by the SAPARD Agency so as to ensure its transparency. The procedures, 
subject to approval by the EU auditors, required a major bureaucrat effort, well above anything so far 
required in the EU. Finally in mid-2002, the total text of procedures of a few thousand pages was approved. 
87 Last redrafted 10 April 2003. 
18 With the background in linguistics and business studies, my participation in policy environment was in 
general not coloured by political science frameworks or concepts. 
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theory and practice is more self-evident to the practitioner than it is to the 
theorist" (Minogue 1986: 12) 
This is perhaps one reason why surprisingly little participant research focuses on policy 
studies. On one hand, the value of participation can hardly be questioned. As May 
(1990: 134) put it: 
" Knowledge of the social world does not come from the propositions of logic 
upon which the theorist then descends upon the world to test. Knowledge comes 
from experience and the undertaking of detailed and meticulous inquiries 
through which we generate our understandings". 
My location in the policy process was unique compared to a typical research situation in 
that I had a privillaged access to information and policy actions. Strictly speaking, 
contrary to the usual participant observation: diary keeping exercise with access 
controlled by a gatekeeper; my role could be likened to the gatekeeper himself. The 
initial stages of the process were not strictly intended to be for research reasons, hence 
gaps in the documentation. The moral dilemma - of the extent to which the information 
(so recent and politically sensitive) should be revealed - has been addressed by sending 
a draft policy paper for consultation with the main actors, which encountered mixed 
responses. 
The cognitive analysis of participant observation is obviously not neutral to the facts 
themselves. 
"It implies that the orientations of researchers will be shaped by their socio- 
historical locations, including the values and interests that these locations, confer 
upon them. This represents a rejection of an idea that social research... Is, or can 
be, insulated from the particular biography of the researcher" 
May 1990: 136 
If the participant is clearly biased by his/her background, controversies arise to the 
status and significance of any political theory that might arise from the associated study. 
Indeed, recent discursive frameworks make strong self-reflexive reservations (Shapiro: 
2002). Questions are increasingly raised about whether political sciences can go beyond 
being "just so" stories, plausible conjectures about the creation and operation of 
(political) phenomena, driven by method rather than by real problems or experience 
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(Shapiro: 2002). If political science draws on practice (Grant: 2002), what added value 
can theoretical insights bring for the practitioner? If the validity of any framework lies in 
its predictive capacities, political sciences arguably fail the test (Shapiro: 2002). 
Nevertheless, even if political science cannot offer the truth, any analysis of experience 
needs a coherent set of concepts, underlying assumptions and, perhaps most 
importantly, questions. It is this coherent set that theory seeks to provide. What does 
the literature provide which might illuminate the participant observations briefly outlined 
above? 
6.4 Core Western European political theories, and their relevance to 
Polish EU rural development policy context 
Political sciences in Western Europe have generated a prolific body of concepts related 
to government and policy processes, as well as motifs of actors and power. For an 
overview in a rural and agricultural policy context see, for example, Cloke, Little, 1990; 
Liefferink, Lowe, Mol, 1993; Moyer, Josling 1990. 
An array of models of government extends from a highly centralized system to an 
artificial and imaginary neutral actor. At one end of the spectrum lies a rational model of 
the central, fully-informed and powerful actor/benefactor, who pursues maximum 
welfare and stability epitomised in the conventional economic cost-benefit approaches. 
On the opposite end lies a pluralistic framework with government seen as a process, a 
market place for political consensus between groups' power, access and preferences 
(Dahl, 1961; Polsby, 1963; Beer, 1965; Richardson and Jordan, 1979; Gilg, 1984). 
Somewhere along the line of the conceptual continuum lie elitist and managerial 
concepts. Elitist views (Hunter, 1953; Bottomore, 1966; Ham and Hill, 1984; Saunders, 
1981; Buchanan, 1982) rest on the premise that state power is vested in minority elite 
(power) groups. The particular institutional setting leads to policy outcomes benefiting a 
particular section of society, represented via elites typically associated with resource 
command. The managerial approach, on the other hand, highlights the role of managers 
who run systems of policy and implementation (Pollit, 1990a). Professional bureaucrats 
are depicted as possessing technical expertise, enabling the manipulation of outcomes 
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of the political process, often to their own ends, rather than necessarily towards 
collective welfare. 
Alongside these fundamental notions of government, a variety of policy analysis 
frameworks have been developed with different emphases and discoursive structures. 
Here, those most relevant to the Polish experience are best characterised through 
network and public choice models. Public choice models (Buchanan, Tullock, 1962; 
Buchanan, Tollison 1984; Dunleavy, 1991; Olson, 1965) explain political reality in terms 
of vested interests of beneficiaries, interests of politicians who need votes and the 
interests of bureaucrats who pursue power bases, responsibilities and career 
opportunities, typically through complex regulations (Downs, 1967; Nieskanen, 1971) 
with typical agency problems of oversupply of public services (Doel and Velthoven, 
1993). Lindblom (1959,1965) proposes a model of partisan mutual adjustment for 
reaching public decisions (see, also, Moyer, Josling, op. cit. ). The public choice 
literature, however, is criticised for ignoring the roles of values, ideas, and paradigms, 
which are presumed to underlie the actors' self-interests. These factors are 
encompassed in policy network frameworks (Daugbjerg, 1999; Marsh, Smith, 2000), 
along with the linkages between formal and informal policy actors and their interests. 
Another relevant body of political science literature is developed specifically around EU 
polity (review: in Lodge, 1993; Wallace, Wallace, 1995). However, this has been 
inconclusive about how to model or represent the EU itself. Some researchers (e. g. 
Lindberg and Scheingold, 1971) still view the EU merely as a regional economic 
integration entity, where the political agenda is restricted to elites and carried out 
according to given procedural codes. Others, grouped under the label of 
intergovernmentalism, recognise the political dimension of the EU, yet still maintain that 
it is crucially the national actors who set the agenda and try to use integration to pursue 
their own self-interests. Neither of these perspectives accords neatly or comprehensively 
with the reality experienced in Poland in rural policy contexts. Similarly, the federalist 
perspective claims that a new supranational organisation with recognisable state 
features is replacing the nation state, though again with only limited apparent relevance 
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to the Polish experience. Finally, an interdependence perspective treats the EU as an 
international organisation charged with coordination under conditions of complexity 
(Keohane and Nye, 1977). In their view the role of international organisation is 
threefold: to help agenda setting (thereby influencing domestic priorities), to facilitate 
coalition formation, and finally, to engage actively in coalition formation, with multiple 
issue linkages at various levels (Haas, 1980). 
Of numerous approaches to studying EU policy processes, two have recently gained 
popularity: multi-level governance (Hooghe, 1996; Marks, Hooghe, Blank; 1996), and 
the europeanisation perspective (for a review see: Radaelli, 2000). Hooghe (1996: 18) 
presents the following definition of multi-level governance approach: 
"Multilevel governance is defined as no center for accumulated authority. 
Instead variable combinations of government on multiple layers of authority - 
European, national and sub-national - form policy networks for collaboration. The 
relations are characterized by mutual interdependence on each others resources, 
not competition for scarce resources". 
The Europeanisation perspective denotes a body of research concerned with the impact 
of the EU accession process on the national patterns of governance (e. g. Grabbe: 2002) 
with a relevant search for common patterns in organisational adjustment. The 
europeanisation literature examines, for example, the impact of europeanisation on 
policy preferences, mobilisation of actors, inspiration for policy alternatives and policy 
learning. 
The relevance of these theories to Polish EU rural development policy context varies. In 
one sense all are relevant. On the other hand, none is singularly sufficient. In fact, any 
complex social piece of reality necessarily has more than one theoretical or abstract 
description (Shapiro: 2002). In the post-communist institutional vacuum, the pluralist 
perspective still appears most distant from the daily policy making. The participant 
experience demonstrates that the government has so far been definitely perceived, both 
internally e. g. by the Ministry, and externally e. g. policy beneficiaries, in terms of a 
rational choice model, with the key policy actor treated as the benefactor, often 
assuming complete information and welfare maximisation objectives. However, the 
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practice brings numerous problems in public administration, well explained in public 
choice theories. With EU integration, initially carried out by narrow elites, if not mainly 
bureaucratic circles, managerial concepts seem to be relevant, though desirable models 
frequently fail in practice. From the point of the applicant states (albeit as yet outsiders), 
the EU appears as a single, yet highly inconsistent, even capricious organisation. The 
Europeanisation framework seems promising in generalising the impacts of accession, 
however it remains to be seen to what extent patterns will persist with the first 
enlargement to create differentiated membership classes (Meythew, 2002). 
Any policy account and analysis requires a framework or storyline. If one assumes that a 
policy making is a replicable process rather than a one-off event, a systematic approach 
demands that political behaviour can be represented as a system with inputs or states at 
time (t) transformed into outputs or new states at time (t+1) through a set of more or 
less comprehensible transformation processes. Since this characterisation of the policy 
process is the most general capable of yielding analytical insights, it should be capable 
of encompassing the relevant elements from alternative characterisations of the process. 
This eclectic and general framework can be most immediately related to the Josling and 
Moyer (1990: 17-18) representation. It also has the advantage of being transparent to 
the non-specialist. This framework has been previously used for explaining the past 
policy outcomes for EU agricultural process. The framework, augmented by insights 
from public choice, managerial, policy networks and europeanisation approaches (as 
outlined in its simplest form in Table 6.1) is used here to shed light on current and 
short-term future processes, informed by the evidence bases outlined in the previous 
chapters of this thesis. 
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Table 6.1: Theoretical model for policy analysis (short-term) 
(applicable to Polish EU rural development policy process) 
BARGAINING 
POLICY INPUTS (Trnasformations) POLICY OUTCOMES 
Rules and procedures 
Initial situation: economic 
and political context 
Past policy precedents 
Scope for adhocaction 
Levels and actors (and their 
dynamics) 
Economic, ideological, 
institutional and political 
implications/values 
Group involvement in 
policy implementation 
Policy networks Distribution of power related to (Inclusive) cost and benefit 
resource dependencies calculation, including 
Actors, motifs and process contribution to 
of their interests formation Overall policy benefits on the development 
agenda 
Winners and losers 
Source: Adapted from Josling and Moyer (1990) 
The regionalisation or centralisation of rural policies decisions is this seen as part of 
policy shaping at the lowest, sub-systemic level in a multi-tiered system representing the 
EU (Petersen, 1995). This framework is now used to analyse the development of rural 
development programme in Poland, as a "short-term" analysis, in the sense that the 
analysis is conducted in terms of one single round or phase of this system' s operation. 
A major feature of transition from central planning towards market democracy and 
accession is the change and development of these processes. The elaboration of this 
model to represent the transformation process - the development of policy negotiation 
or bargaining systems themselves, is postponed for the present (see later, below). 
6.5 Polish EU structural and rural development policy process: short-term 
analysis 
Preliminaries; timing and change 
A problem with policy research is often that it evolves as one researches it, so we begin 
by clarifying the timing. The short-term analysis is based primarily on participant 
observation, informed by secondary research and supplemented by a series of semi- 
structured interviews carried out in Warsaw and Szczecin in January 2002, and in 
Brussels in May 2002, updated in January and March 2003 (Appendix 14). A personal 
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knowledge of some interviewees assisted the process. This has been an advantage, 
especially in the Polish context, where there is little culture of transparency, particularly 
at the central level. At the central and EU levels, personal knowledge of interviewees 
appears less crucial. However, a close involvement in the process made it more difficult 
to achieve a distance from the particulars to see the general. Nonetheless, efforts are 
made to omit fine changeable policy details, and to concentrate on identifying and 
demonstrating a general process. 
The process of preparing FEOGA-Guidance started in 2001, but accelerated after 
January 2002, when the Commission officially announced a proposal for an accession 
package. In summer 2002, a draft FEOGA-Guidance programme was produced and 
published on internet (yet with no budget). National development programming 
documents have been available in draft form since summer 2002 (MARD: 2002; ME: 
2002a; ME: 2002b). Following the Copenhagen Council, the preparatory works have 
been boosted again with a view of agreeing the programme in 2003. This analysis is 
valid as per March 2003, with only preliminary policy outputs agreed so far. 
Key questions 
The key questions for short-term analysis are as follows: 
1) What were the key policy actors, motifs and power in shaping the policy agenda 
and do they relate to policy regionalisation? 
2) What are the key mechanisms of the policy process (rules, procedures, scope for 
ad-hoc actions) and how do they impact on the feasibility of and desirability for 
policy regionalisation? 
The short-term analysis covers the first programming period of 2004-2006. 
6.5.1 Policy inputs 
Economic context 
Poland is expected to join the EU in mid 2004, some eight years after the application 
and following six years negotiation and adjustment process. The reports of economic 
impacts of accession are mixed, with expected new opportunities arising through the 
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Single Market, a rise in foreign investment and structural improvements, but also 
additional competitive pressures and adjustment costs. Serious short- and medium-term 
problems are expected in agriculture, with probably rising unemployment levels before 
improvements kick in (Economist Corporate Network, 2002; Arnaud, Zaborowska, 2002). 
Without border controls, Poland's basic food industries, especially milk and meat, will 
face enormous competitive pressures from supposedly more efficient and subsidised EU 
producers (SAEPR, 2000; SAEPR, 2001; Majewski, Dalton, 2001), so the sector needs to 
improve its efficiency to capture the benefits of free trade (Gwozdz, 2002). With already 
high unemployment levels (at 18% in 2002) and slower economic growth (1% in 2001), 
economic and budgetary uncertainties arise, especially for the early days of EU 
membership. 
The economic situation is geographically differentiated. There are spatial differences in 
levels of development between rural and urban areas as well as between Western and 
Eastern parts of Poland, in addition to intra-regional differentiation (cf. Chapter 3), with 
the core gaps between rural and urban zones and between differing ruralities. 
Econometric models show (Orlowski; 2000) that the distribution of benefits and losses 
from EU accession are likely to be territorially unequal in favour of western, more 
affluent Polish regions, potentially benefiting more from unrestricted trade due to 
locational advantages (better spatial capital). 
Political context 
The political commitment to accession, demonstrated by the current Polish government 
of Mr. Miller, remains high. After the stale-mate of 2000, the government made 
considerable progress towards accession, reaching a climax at the end of the 
negotiations at the Copenhagen summit. 
The present Polish government, headed by Polish Social-Democratic Party (SLD) in 
power since 2001, stayed in a sensitive coalition with the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) for 
two years, both traditionally associated with the centralist sympathies (Ostoja- 
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Ostaszewska, 2002). After the dissolution of the coalition in March 2003, the minority 
SLD government has been forced to resort to short-term informal coalitions to ensure 
the necessary support in the Polish Parliament. 
The rural sector has been traditionally politically sensitive, giving rise to numerous 
tensions at the accession negotiation table, not least between the coalition partners. 
Despite loud concerns about the "sacrifice" of rural sector for the sake of accession, 
voiced by the main rural political parties (Self-Defence and Polish Peasant Party (PSL) 
threatening to withdraw their support for accession (Bielecki, 08-10-02), the Peasant 
Party (PSL) acknowledged the Copenhagen bargain as beneficial to the farmers (Szot, 
16-12-2002)89, though continued to challenge the government to win more support for 
the agricultural lobby. 
The EU proposals for the candidate countries, though perceived as unfair by some 
(Meythew, 2002; SAEPR: 2002) nonetheless appear broadly satisfactory to most Poles, 
as the recent opinion polls indicate significant support for accession. 
Past policy precedents, their relevance and regional dimension 
The preparation and implementation of structural rural development policies for 
accession is heavily coloured by past policy precedents, namely: the centralised EU pre- 
accession SAPARD programme (MARD: 2000); less strongly, the largely decentralised 
Rural Development Programme, financed by a World Bank loan (JKP: 2000). 
There is already evidence of a clear path-dependency between SAPARD and the new 
structural and rural development programmes. A high level of centralisation of SAPARD 
programme (MARD: 2000) colours the preparation of FEOGA-Guidance programme for a 
few reasons. First, the programming procedures are similar and coordinated by the 
same staff90. Secondly, the centralised implementation patterns have created a strong 
89 For details of accession package, see Section 1.3. 
90 Namely by the Department of Pre-Accession and Structural Funds, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development. The Deputy Director responsible for programming, and Head of Programming Unit for FEOGA, 
both carried out SAPARD Programming. Department Director was involved in the final stages. Although four 
member of staff dealing with SAPARD programming left (for ARMA), the SAPARD experience is still retained 
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basis for bureaucratic powers, namely the development of a large centralist agency for 
both payment and implementation (Agency for the Modernisation and Restructuring of 
Agriculture - ARMA). In line with the public choice theories (Niskanen, 1971), ARMA has 
demonstrated its desire to maintain the bureaucratic power base and expertise, and 
even, more an inherent bias for expansion (Trusewicz, Wildenstein, 10-08-02). As 
pointed out elsewhere (Lisztwan, Harvey: 2001), the creation of the agency, demanded 
by Brussels, went against trends for decentralisation of Polish public finance91. One can 
argue that, given the resources used to accredit ARMA as a payment agency as well as 
its political expediency, both Brussels and Warsaw need to ensure its utilisation beyond 
the SAPARD programme, despite differences in legal and financial procedures. 2 
Although, from a purely legal point of view, ARMA can delegate, and has93 delegated 
some duties to external institutions (for example, regional bodies), the experience so far 
has led to a distrust of extensive coordination with other bodies, which has been judged 
as very difficult and "not a good idea", as well recognised in literature on multilevel 
interorganisational coordination (Rogers, Whetten, 1982). However, the idea of 
delegation of functions by the central agency, possibly to the regional bodies, appears to 
indicate a line of reporting where the centre assumes the upper position in the 
hierarchy. Such an approach springs directly from EU legislation and seems very likely to 
lead to tensions between the central and regional authorities. 
Conversely, the World Bank Rural Development Programme (RDP) has a stronger, yet 
neglected, regionalised set-up, with a mix of central involvement for coordination, audit, 
monitoring and payments and implementation by regional administrations. Though 
in the Department. Supporting experts (e. g. from Foundation of Assistance of Programmes for Agriculture) 
are again involved. 
91 The distribution of funding to local authorities via central agencies are expected to be reduced in favour 
of decentralization of public finance and distribution of funding via regional structures (see: Law of Public 
Finance) 
92 The SAPARD implementation follows strict rules of financial management of FEOGA Guarantee. Upon 
accession, Poland, as an Objective 1 region, will avail from rural development programmes (except the 
Accompanying measures and Less Favoured Areas payments) financed from much less stringent FEOGA- 
Guidance. 
93 A legal procedure has been open for delegating some functions from the Payment Agency to other 
bodies: notably in SAPARD some selected implementation functions have been delegated to national 
advisory centers and Foundation of Assistance Programmes for Agriculture (FAPA). Delegated functions are 
supervised by the Payment Agency. Please also note that it is not the Ministry of Agriculture (Managing 
Authority) to formally appoint the delegated bodies. Indeed, this EU legal construction creates a situation 
where an central administrative agency (not even a line ministry) is seen to be in charge of delegating and 
supervision of selected regional bodies. 
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potentially a model for the structural programmes, the programme seems to be 
surprisingly ignored by both the Ministry of Agriculture and ARMA staff alike. Perhaps 
the reason is simply lack of local legitimacy, since as a Ministry negotiator confessed: 
"The World Bank worked on their own initiative (with little governmental 
support). This was solely Bank's idea. " 
Indeed, as the World Bank representative openly admits himself: 
"There was strong resistance (by the Polish government). It was a painful 
process of giving up some competences. " 
Indeed, the linkages between the RDP operations and the Ministry94 seem to be weak, 
as if the Bank created partnerships with regional authorities, by-passing the state. 
However, interestingly, and in contrast to the ARMA experience, the cooperation 
between the centre and regional institutions is seen positively by the centre and the 
regions alike, yet seems completely ignored by the Ministry. 
Core policy networks 
In general, two informal networks of actors can be differentiated for centralised and 
regionalised policy formulation, with some network members also playing the role of 
policy arbiters (double roles). The core members of the centralised network include the 
Agriculture Directorate (EU Commission) and the Polish Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development (MARD), linked with the centralist agencies (especially ARMA and FAPA) 
and farming lobby, whilst the main membership of the loose regionalist network includes 
the Regional Development Directorate of the EU (DG REGIO, DGXVI) and the Polish 
Ministry of Economy, linked with the regional authorities. 
Centralist network: actors, motifs and key interests 
The core member of the centralist network is the Agriculture Directorate (DGVI) of 
the European Commission. The European Commission, characterised by dynamic and 
complex interests, is seen in different hats at different negotiation tables, sometimes an 
initiator, sometimes a mediator or bargain partner (Lifferink, Lowe, Mol, 1993: 110), 
reflecting a confusing threefold function. With its triple function, the Commission holds 
94 As the Ministry of Agriculture has effectively no power in supervising the loan operations, they are not 
willing to do so. No bureaucratic or political actors appear to supervise structures they have no power over. 
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the ultimate edge in the bargaining process: it presents the programme for the 
acceptance of the member states, but more importantly has the authority to issue (or 
withdraw) payments, and to make the story even more complicated, retains ultimate 
financial control, where the key decisions are taken by a separate and distinct group of 
auditors and financial controllers. 
As a policy arbiter, the Commission is alleged to promote the "Community" views (as 
opposed to the national perspective) (Wallace &Wallace, 1995), and seek consensus 
while minimizing risk. In doing so, the Commission remains relatively open about its 
goals and main concerns of accountability, control and alleged "simplicity". Indeed, as a 
Commission official put it in his keynote speech in Warsaw in October 1998: 
"We are primarily the guardians of EU tax-payers money. We need to ensure 
accountability. " 
Such an approach, however, is not neutral to the regionalisation question. It implies, de 
facto, if not de jure, a reduction in the number of aid instruments, and, for reasons of 
convenience, a strong preference for a single national authority, rather than a collection 
of dispersed representations (e. g. regions). This tendency reflects a major public choice 
hypothesis (Downs, 1967): that the bureaucratic structure seeks to retain the highest 
possible discretion in programme management - which seems to be confirmed in the 
Polish experience. Any efforts to supervise the Commission (e. g. by the European 
Parliament or the Council) are by no means whole-heartedly welcome, though 
necessarily if reluctantly accepted by the Commission. However, as a policy arbiter, the 
Commission does not appear to exhibit direct interest in specific programme content as 
long as it complies with the acquis. Nevertheless, the tensions between the territorial 
approach of the Regional Development Direcotrate (DGXVI) and more sectoral 
focus of DGVI are well known (Saraceno, 2002; Depoele, 2000; Bryden 2000), and their 
affinities can be categorised as a fluid network membership, the term and the 
phenomenon itself alike, highly confusing to Polish regions. Political pressures from the 
Council for subsidiarity and regional participation certainly colour the otherwise highly 
centrist DGVI. Hence, although it seems convenient to consider the EU as a single 
entity, even within the bureaucracy, this unity is a complete fiction. 
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The main Commission's partner, as both the policy arbiter, and agent attached to the 
centralized network is the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 
(MARD), the core negotiator of the rural structural programmes for Poland. 
Its powers and interests are a function of assuring internal national support on one 
hand, and external EU approval on the other. Having experienced major difficulties in 
getting EU approval, demonstrated acutely by the delay in SAPARD preparation 
(Bielecki: 30/03/01), the Ministry has few incentives to incur the risks of going beyond 
existing administrative templates. At least in this stage of transition, MARD is likely to 
exhibit strong policy inertia born of the risks of assuming control in an uncertain and 
novel policy environment. 
In general, most decisions on technically complicated rural development programming 
issues tend to arise at the bureaucratic level, rather than at the political level, though 
the core decisions generating bureaucratic and political rents are taken at the political 
level. Whenever possible, political agents tend to avoid dealing with external EU agents 
with structural power. The relationship between the political and bureaucratic levels is 
governed past practices within a politicized civil service. In line with principal agent 
theories (Moe, 1984), the asymmetries between bureaucrats and politicians are visible, 
with politicians resorting to personal networks for higher trust and leverage. The 
Ministry (at both the political and bureaucratic levels) is apparently petrified by public 
mistrust, illustrated, for instance, by the Parliamentary motion to introduce a ban on 
Polish negotiators fromaccepting future employment in EU institutions, motivated by an 
apparent conflict of interest (EURO PAP: 26/09/02). 
The Ministry's attitude to policy consultations remains mixed. On one hand, managerial 
assumptions of completeness of information and central decision-making capacities, 
which permeate the Ministerial discourse, make participation and involvement, 
advocated elsewhere as good governance practice (CEC: 2002), simply redundant. 
Consultation is resource intensive, especially in terms of management capacity. With 
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under-resourced departments and weak incentives for experienced or highly qualified 
staff, the Ministry often resorts to think-tank experts (especially from the Economic 
Analysis Unit (SAEPR), who possess high technical expertise but little competence and 
power for coordinating activities. In fact, the number of bureaucrats trained in the 
prestigious modern Polish public administration school (KSAP) in the Ministry of 
Agriculture is small compared with other ministries. 
On the other hand, at least at the ideological level, the Ministry demonstrates 
considerable sentiments towards regional governance and decentralization, presented as 
a discourse of modern, more progressive models of policy making, and at least a 
rhetoric in favour of "EU level", "progressive and modern", "European" solutions. For 
these reasons, especially amongst more progressive Ministry bureaucrats, opinions are 
convinced that 'the regions should be given some training field", despite recognition of 
coordination difficulties, highly complex procedures and associated time and resource 
pressures. 
Despite ideological affiliations to regional structures and consultations, the Ministry is 
primarily linked with the central agencies, especially ARMA and FAPA. In political terms, 
regionalisation means simply giving up some power (at least posts and managerial 
responsibilities) to the opposition parties: regional elections typically bring party 
establishments and coalitions95 not reflecting the central government. A special division 
for dealing with regions, situated within the Department for Pre-Accession Assistance 
and Structural Funds, has been recently dismantled (1999). 
The second key national actor in the centralization network is Agency of Restructuring 
and Modernisation of Agriculture (ARMA), featuring strong agency biases and 
technocratic procedural thinking, set in a politicised and highly hierarchical environment. 
95 The regional election in November 2002, brought the following results: leftist coalition of SDL-UP 
(Socialdemocrats and Labour Union) won 189 mandates (33%), Self-defence peasant party received 101 
mandates (18%), the right party of League of Polish Families obtained 92 mandates (16%). The 
conservative liberal parties of Civil Platform and Law and Justice got 94 mandates and Polish Peasant Party 
(PSL) got 58 representatives elected. The results, interpreted as disappointment to the winning coalition, 
indicated high fragmentation of Polish political scene, as only In one region (Lubuskie) the winning party had 
a majority. (Rzeczpospolita, 8 November 2002). 
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As predicted by the public choice approach (see Dunleavy: 1991; Downes, 1967) ARMA 
has demonstrated that it pursues its organizational interest by maximizing budget 
allocation, and ensuring highest possible discretion in programme implementation. 
Following the new logic of organization theories (see Moe: 1987), ARMA is also keen to 
assure a maximum potential budget on the operational costs, albeit only justifiable by a 
multiplicity of roles. 
Importantly, ARMA is a central, heavily politicised hierarchical agency with regional staff 
selected and appointed by Warsaw in accordance with a party membership key 
(Trusewicz, Wildenstein: 13/08/02), which leads to strong conflicts, both at the regional 
level as well as with Brussels. Operating on the basis of central politics and procedures, 
the regional ARMA offices have been mostly disconnected from the regional and local 
networks. Similarly, hardly any feedback is sent from the regional offices back to the 
central management. 
However, after the frantic fight for new EU-related functions in 1998-2001, ARMA has 
moved in its life cycle (Downs: 1967) with slight shifts in interests. Already barely 
capable of fulfilling the assigned functions (as has been demonstrated by a recent 
scandal with IACS implementation and the lengthy accreditation process for the SAPARD 
programme) the Agency no longer concentrates on winning new roles. This shift in 
approach in the agency cycle opens up a limited room for potential access for other, 
notably regional partners. 
At the bureaucratic level, ARMA's approach can be characterised as strongly procedural 
and highly technocratic. Any policy proposals are automatically mentally transformed 
into procedures, or rejected if unsuitable for audit, monitoring or control functions. A 
basic truth has been learnt: to please Brussels (characterized by ill-defined and moving 
requirements and power levers) is a demanding and risky job: additional burdens and 
risks of "chaos" in doing this job need to be well justified. Regionalisation, coordination 
and heterogeneous standards or demands are certainly perceived as major risks. Yet, 
some ARMA staff also demonstrate considerable affinity to the idea of decentralisation 
197 
Chapter 6: Regional dimension in Polish EU structural and rural policy process 
and tapping onto local information resources, at least at the rhetorical level. 
Associated with the sectoral centralised network is the farming lobby. It did not take a 
significant part in the SAPARD programming, not least because of their lack of 
preparation for the early stages of policy development (Lisztwan, Harvey: 2001). The 
farming lobby is well represented in the Parliament by the Peasant Party (PSL), the Self- 
defense (Samoobrona) party, and the League of Polish Families (LRP). The lobby 
operates at the central, and increasingly at the Brussels level, rather than at the regional 
level, as regional competencies in agriculture are rather limited96. Contrary to intuitive 
predictions, the farming lobby has not progressed much with their policy learning: their 
input into the programme technicalities remains insignificant. 
Regionalisation network: actors, motifs and key interests 
The centre of the regionalised network lies in the Ministry of Economy (ME). The 
Ministry has established a strong network of contacts with the regional level, developed 
through past policy experience in dealing with both Polish and EU regional policies. 
However, its involvement in FEOGA-Guidance programmes is limited, largely for reasons 
of perceived agricultural and rural "specificity" and because of percieved MARD 
competences. 
ME's counterpart in the Commission is the Regional Directorate (DG REGIO, DGXVI). 
DG REGIO has a primary concern with the resources needed for the implementation of 
the EU's structural funds, for which they believe regional structures are of paramount 
importance. Polish Regions have not yet established any working contacts with DG 
REGIO, except for information and training channels. However, similarly to the ME in 
Poland, DG REGIO perceives FEOGA-Guidance programmes as a distinct prerogative of 
DG AGRI. 
Last, but not least are the regions themselves, the most numerous members of 
regionalisation network. Past policy experience revealed a relatively weak power base 
for the Polish regions in shaping agricultural and rural development policies (for details 
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see: Lisztwan and Harvey: 2001). This can be explained by their lack of resources, lack 
of clear ideological distinctiveness and poor solidarity and group identities and loyalties 
(Dunleavy 1990). As demonstrated in Chapter 4, bottom-up regionalism for rural 
development remains still relatively weak, strategies lack selectivity, and policy 
preferences exhibit both regional homogeneity and also inconsistency. Their legitimacy 
remains problematic (cf. Section 4.5. ). As a regional bureaucrat admitted: "sometimes 
people do not believe us and we need to show clearly that this is Warsaw's rule, not 
ours". Obviously this is likely to be the case for uncomfortable decisions for which 
Warsaw can more easily be blamed. Some regional officers openly doubt their ability to 
ensure accountability and transparency of regional project selection processes under 
strong political pressures, though others indicate more confidence. Contacts between 
regions and the centre feature deficits of trust, particularly acute at the regional end 
(EURO PAP: 22-11-02). Regional politicians, isolated from the negotiation process, are 
inclined to be skeptical of recommendations received from Brussels. Paradoxically, even 
if only in rhetoric, more readiness for joint action is expressed at the central level than 
at the regional level. 
The collective representation of regional elected authorities - the Convent of Province 
Marshalls, established in March 1999 - is weak, as a regional politician explains: 
"we still have a lot to learn. All too often we see each other as 
competitors for scarce resources or "favours" of central befriended 
politicians" (as the Polish term 'za/atwianie spraW' can be loosely 
translated) 
A relative weakness of territorial lobbies is well explained in reference to more general 
patterns of group power (Dunleavy, 1991), due to poor rates of mobilization, non- 
excludability of benefits, and preference intensities (in contrast to vested interests of 
agricultural lobby). As provided for by the public choice theories, the newly established 
regional authorities97 are still seeking specific functions (Greer, 2002), and more 
97 In January 1999 Poland implemented a decentralization reform. A new administrative division of the 
country was installed with the arrival of 16 new administrative regions (voivodships) headed by elected 
authorities of the Marshals. Regional authorities were charged with the responsibilities for regional 
development. 
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importantly, budgets to legitimize their existence. However, at the moment their 
functions are legally imprecisely defined and budgets are too small for cofinancing (cf. 
Section 1.7. ), despite the rhetoric encouraging their development from both the national 
government and at least a part of the European Commission. It is also important to 
note that the intensity of regions' desire for participation varies across regions. In some 
regions, likely to due to a lack of historic democratic traditions, a dependency culture 
persists, manifesting as a yearning for ready-made top-down solutions rather than for 
empowerment and decision-making prerogatives. Zachodniopomorskie admits they 
would be happy to get central instruction from Warsaw and follow. Malopolskie and 
Wielkopoiskie, on the other hand, wish to lead. 
Interestingly, the Polish regions have opened flagship offices in Brussels. However, they 
do not seem to attempt to lobby the national or EU administration for participation in 
rural development programming. Polish regions are quickly developing linkages that 
bypass the state: horizontal linkages with EU regions are often stronger than vertical 
linkages with the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. This ad-hoc networking 
effort has been encouraged, inter alia, by the PHARE programme provision of twinning 
Pre-Accession Advisors. Civil servants from regional administrations in the Member 
States, charged with the provision of support in regions in their adjustment to the EU 
models, profess their country specific models, which can often be confused with EU 
universal truths in Poland. Indeed inconsistency of advice as to the standards required 
and of recommended or acceptable procedures underlines the whole accession process 
(Grabbe: 2002), but weakens the regional inputs into the Polish EU policy processes. 
In addition, regional authorities have very close networking linkages with local 
authorities (also Section 4.5.2. ), yet conflicts or, at best competition, between the 
regional authorities (Marshals) and the representatives of the central state (voivods) are 
frequent. 
Peripheral network members 
Peripheral to core networks are the individual EU member states. Only seldom do 
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they question programming proposals as long as they do not undermine their own 
sectoral Interests, more likely for sectoral than territorial measures. It follows that the 
member states do not directly reveal any preference for regionalisation outcomes either, 
except perhaps in cases of regional alliances initiated by PHARE twinning mechanisms. 
Finally, the Polish Ministry of Finance remains relatively neutral in the policy process, 
being largely preoccupied with the discipline of public expenditure and budget 
sustainability, typically by means of avoiding financial risks and cutting the costs of 
programme administration. 
On the basis of this discussion, the core policy inputs are summarised In Table 6.2 
below. In short, few of these policy inputs signal any strong expectation of a major 
regional or decentralized policy system in the short-term. On this basis, we should not 
expect that any distinct regional structures would emerge from the short-term policy 
process. 
Table 6.2. Policy Inputs and their Influence of regionalisation of Polish EU rural 
development policy (short-term perspective, summary) 
Policy Input Expected force 
towards (+)/against (-) regionalisation / (0) neutral 
1. Initial situation 
Economic: 
" Expected pressures for 
competition at Single 
Market 
" Spatial differentiation of 
resources 
Political: 
Leftist government 
(-) Concerns about horizontal sectoral adjustment 
(-) Core Inequality between rural/urban areas 
(-) Leftist coalition in Poland traditionally lukewarm towards 
decentralisation 
2. Past policy precedents 
9 Centralised SAPARD 
" Decentralised Rural 
Development Programme 
(-) strong centralist lock-in in programming and implementation 
(especially for the power basis - ARMA) 
(+/0) largely ignored because of questionable local legitimacy of 
external granting body (the World Bank) 
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3. Policy actors 
Centralist network (-) strong cohesion of the network 
" DG AGRI (-) sectoral concerns of compliance and transparency 
" MARD (-/0) risk avoidance, uDholdina Dower basis, sectoral and centralist 
0 ARMA 
Regional network 
" DG REGIO 
" ME 
" Regions 
approach (but also: 
(+) sentiments to regions as europeanisation & democratisation) 
(-) upholding current basis (but: 
(+) indications of sentiments to regions on "extra knowledge" 
basis) 
(-) loose coupling (especially for rural development) 
(-) weak interest in rural policies (as exclusive policy delineation) 
(-) weak motivation to participate 
(-) weak internal legitimacy, mistrust, patriarchal traditions 
Source: own analysis 
6.5.2. Policy bargaining 
Rule and procedures 
Rural development programming in Poland can be divided into the following stages 
" preparation of the National Development Plan98; 
" preparation of the sectoral/regional operational programmes and their 
approval nationally and by the EU; 
" preparation and approval of complementary programmes and implementation 
procedures. 
The National Development Plan, which constitutes the basis for all Community 
Intervention under the Structural Funds Including FEOGA-Guidance, is coordinated by 
the Ministry of Economy (ME: 2003b). It was submitted to the European Commission in 
January 2003. All other horizontal and regional plans need to demonstrate compliance 
with the National Development Plan. Under this Plan, Poland envisages the 
Implementation of seven operational programmes: Economic Competitiveness; Human 
Resources; Agricultural and Rural Development; Fisheries and Fish Processing; 
Integrated Regional Development; Technical Assistance. The plans for FEOGA-Guidance 
expenditure are included in the Sectoral Operational Plan (SOP) prepared by MARD and 
98 The National Development Plan Is the basis for Community Intervention In all member states under 
Objective 1 status. The Plan sets out national priorities for Intervention for all the 
Structural Funds, Including 
FEOGA. The Plan lists operational programmes to be prepared for all funds, as well as attributes 
broad 
financial breakdowns between horizontal and regional allocations. 
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in the Integrated Regional Development Plan (IRDP) coordinated by the Ministry of 
Economy, based on the regional inputs. All plans are subject to approval by the Polish 
Council of Ministers, presented by the lead Ministry. Each plan requires an elaboration, 
in a so-called Complementary Plan, subject to the decision and approval by the EU. 
Upon national approval, the plans are submitted to Brussels, where the EU Commission 
ensures their compliance with the acquis and addresses concerns of other Member 
States by negotiating with Poland. The implementing rules for the FEOGA-Guidance 
section, and also the majority of measures proposed by the Commission for the new 
member states, do permit more flexibility than FEOGA-Guarantee legislation, and at 
least in theory allow regionalised implementation. Conditionality on future legislation is 
yet another risk factor: if, for example, external audit units are compulsory in 
implementing institutions, regional institutions are unlikely to be able to meet this 
requirement. Moreover, as informally indicated in Brussels, it cannot be ruled out that 
the Commission will propose special arrangements for the new member states building 
on SAPARD Agencies. When satisfactory compliance is achieved, it is expected that the 
SOP will be submitted to the Council for an opinion. Upon a positive opinion, the 
Commission issues a programme approval decision. The final stage is preparation and 
approval of the implementation rules, mostly by the audit authorities In the European 
Commission. 
Bargaining process 
The preparation of FEOGA-Guidance programme involves a selection of measures, 
details of eligibility, and funding allocations as well as decisions on programme 
implementation and monitoring (cf. Section 1.3. ). The bargaining can be characterised 
by a multiplicity of conflicts, for example over choices of measures (sectoral versus 
rural), over selection of implementation institutions, as well as tensions between the 
central-sectoral and regionalised approaches. We concentrate on the latter only, 
outlining features that have an impact on the regionalisation prospects. 
Firstly, the process is not clearly codified and, sometimes, hard to access. Whilst it is 
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clear who takes the core decisions, the programming takes place in a confined 
technocratic circle. No ex-ante plan is elaborated in the decision-making processes: the 
core logic is that of partisan adjustment and reliance on past policy experience. The 
preparation team is in the Department for Pre-Accession Aid and Structural Funds, the 
same unit that programmed SAPARD, with most of the core staff from that programme 
retained. Already one can see that the preparatory procedures from SAPARD have been 
copied in the FEOGA-Guidance programme. For example, the Ministry decided to 
establish a set of working groups for each measure (albeit mostly central), largely 
following the SAPARD practice. But due to a lack of clear ex-ante procedures, the 
centralist policy network is opaque and hard to access for outsiders. 
Of course, the EU legislation provides for consultation procedures with the regional 
partners, but no definition is given as to what this consultation actually requires. The 
consultations may well turn out as yet another conference with a limited follow-up, as 
indicated in the FEOGA process. 
The Ministry bureaucrats perceive the regional demands as largely homogenous and the 
basic needs as huge. From the centre, the regions volunteer proposals for their own 
programmes for publicity reasons, yet in practice wait for central decisions. Measures to 
support technical infrastructure are easier for them to design and absorb, whilst 
instruments for SME, innovation and human resources are perceived as more difficult to 
design. To quote a high level official from the Ministry of Agriculture, dealing with 
regional matters: 
"I have an impression that regions expect specific guidelines, if not ready made 
solutions. Things happen so quickly... Regions would be happy if the 
programmes were prepared in Warsaw which they could simply adopt and 
implement. " 
Secondly, an apparently linear description of the process should by no means suggest 
that it is predictable, and thus easy to coordinate. With the unprecedented accession 
procedures, actors' behaviours are heavily conditioned by unpredictability and 
incomplete information. For example, the policy stages overlap in time, thus adding to 
the complexity, in particular in terms of resource planning and information flows, putting 
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additional demands on coordination. The need to have a programme approved by 
Brussels puts pressures on coordination capacity on both sides. The EC is already calling 
for "a simple approach - one programme", however, as the Polish official put it, it does 
not preclude 16 sub-programmes amalgamated into and negotiated as one. The fact 
that the policy transaction takes place between two rather different sets of institutional 
settings (Poland and EU), (burdened with all consequences of international contracting 
(Sommers, 2001, Koehane, 1984) such as imprecise contracting and lack of an arbiter in 
cases of disagreements) brings additional risks and difficulties with ensuring a sensible 
information flow. Time pressures tend to be significant, which discourage lengthy 
approval or consultation processes, and generate a further conflict between democratic 
accountability and programme development (Grabbe: 2002). 
The alleged resource dependencies between the regional and central levels for FEOGA- 
implementation tend to be limited. Regions have very scarce funding provisions for a 
possible co-funding of EU rural measures (cf. Table 1.2). The Ministry does need not to 
rely on the regions for implementation either, as ARMA has not developed established 
and well-connected regional offices. The regional monitoring structures have already 
been established for the SAPARD programme, through an essentially centrist agency. 
Accordingly, MARD has weak incentives to cooperate with the regions directly, apart 
from "localist sentiments" and political rhetoric. 
Whilst the programming exercise appears heavily conditional on the centralist SAPARD 
precedent, there is nonetheless a scope for ad-hoc action, especially in the area of 
coordination with the National Development Plan, and with the Integrated Regional 
Planning. This is a potential for introducing a regionalised framework, yet the present 
regionalist network appears unwilling or unable to take advantage of this opportunity. 
However, as presented in literature, the FEOGA-Guidance policy-making is primarily 
sectoral and horizontal. It does not encourage regions to participate (Saraceno, 2002). 
The Ministry of Economy (ME), the key regionalist network member, also demonstrates 
uneasiness in contributing to rural development matters. Rural development 
programming, though embedded in the overall national development programming, 
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tends to be separate for reasons of "specificity", technical considerations and clear 
attachment to the MARD competences. As a result, the rural divisions in regional 
authorities get few if any incentives to participate in FEOGA-Guidance programming 
either from MARD or ME. Nor are they willing or mostly presently able to take actions 
themselves. 
The regions have failed so far to demonstrate their distinctiveness in regional 
development strategies to the central level. The strategies are seen as comprehensive 
and all-inclusive, with a lack of regional focus. With memories of the SAPARD 
consultation process, which brought homogenous results and raised a lot of 
"unnecessary expectations" (as admitted by a former deputy Minister for Agriculture 
(Rzeczpospolita: 30/03/02), caution has led to the decision not to raise yet another 
public debate. The regional authorities have thus showed little initiative to be involved in 
the rural development programming. Also, as pointed by a regional politician, substantial 
lobbying efforts are unlikely in the early stages of policy cycle as the programming effort 
coincides with regional elections (October 2002). 
Another important determinant of policy content is timing. Indeed, the planning period is 
going to be short (of 3 years rather than a usual 7 years). This encourages calls for 
"policy simplification", targeting, and indirectly, for a reduction in the number of 
measures used (as each measure requires a long preparation time). 
Despite those purely bureaucratic and centralistic concerns, the paradigms of 
"subsidiarity" and europeanisation have encouraged some regionalisation efforts. These 
are realised through the networks of the Ministry of Economy. Despite a set of 
Ministerial contacts, the programming has nonetheless remained constructed around 
one central template (ME: 2002b). Coordination fatigue is only one reason for central 
steering and direction. The other is the tension between the voivods and mashal offices. 
The argument of regionalisation as a pre-requisite for Structural funds implementation 
has clearly lost its meaning as the Commission demonstrated an overtly centralist 
approach in the pre-accession phase. Whilst the past government (Post-Solidarity 
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coalition) provided for exclusive prerogatives for the Marshalls in the structural funds in 
regions, the present post-communist coalition has revoked the voivods participation 
(ME: 2002). The regional authorities shudder at a thought of being "at the voivod's 
mercy" (Rzeczpospolita: 11/12/02), while the government argues that the funds will 
enforce any necessary cooperation and mobilisation99. 
Table 6.3 summarises the bargaining factors that can be expectd to influence the shape 
and content of the final structural programme and its possible regional dimensions. 
Once again, we would be surprised to see much evidence of a clear regional pattern and 
structure emerging from this bargaining process. 
99 E. Freuberg, Deputy Minister of Economy in Rzeczpospolita: 11/12/02. 
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Table 6.3. Features of policy bargaining and their influence on regionalisation 
(summary) 
Bargaining feature 
Expected force 
towards (+)/against (-) regionalisation /(0) neutral 
Rules and procedures (0) Bureaucratic rationality 
(-) Need for coordination and information flow to feed to Brussels 
(+/-) Provision for consultations with regional partners but no 
formal specification how 
(+/0) Need for coordination with national development 
plan/regional plans (but not necessarily regionalisation) 
Scope for ad hoc action (? ) Yes, still some potential scope for ad hoc action (especially 
ensuring linkages with regional planning) but this potential access 
Is not being used by regions 
(-) Path dependency (linkages with SAPARD) 
Levels and actors (and (-) DG AGRI core power and emphasis on control & sectoral 
their dynamics) rationality 
(-) MARD risk avoidance 
(-) Hardly any access of regions to core decision making 
Distribution of power (-) Resource constraints (esp. managerial resources, which are 
related to resource scarce in Poland, especially in the regions) 
dependencies (-) Limited co-funding at regional budgets 
(+) Appreciation of "local knowledge" and regional networks 
Overall policy benefits on (") High potential rents (bureaucratic, staff, financial) encouraging 
the agenda bureaucratic monopolies 
6.5.3. Provisional policy outputs 
As expected, the policy process of FEOGA-Guidance has bred a highly centralised mix of 
centralized activities, yet with some indication of regionalised arrangements (cf. Table 
6.4). Seven out of ten policy measures are implemented by the central agencies (ARMA 
or FAPA), only three measures involve the regional authorities. Nine out of ten measures 
are programmed centrally. The allocation of funding between measures is still to be 
decided at the time of writing. 
Instruments from 2"d Pillar of the CAP (financed from FEOGA-Guarantee), such as: early 
retirements; afforestation; LFA; support to semi-subsistence farms; agri-environmental 
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measures; producers groups; support to farms on improvements of hygiene standards 
are all planned on a horizontal (non-regional) basis. 
Table 6.4. Intermediate policy outputs 
Regionalisation* of FEOGA Guidance in Poland 
Degree of regionalisation** 
Measure Programming Implementation 
Young farmers scheme 0: horizontal 1: regional ARIVIA 
Investment In agricultural 0: horizontal 1: regional ARMA 
holdings 
Training 0: horizontal 0: central FAPA 
Support to agricultural 0: horizontal 0: central FAPA 
extension 
Land amalgamation 2: regionally 5: marshall office 
differentiated policy 
details 
Agricultural water 0: horizontal 5: marshall office 
management 
Village renewal and 5: regional 5: marshall office 
protection of local heritage 
Diversification of rural 0: horizontal 2: regional 
activities ARMA+committee 
Development of 0: horizontal 1: regional ARMA 
Infrastructure dose to 
agriculture 
Improvement of 0: horizontal 0: central ARMA 
processing and marketing 
of agricultural products 
*Based on definition In Table 1.3. 
**budgetary regionalisation not yet decided. 
Source: based on MARD (2003 a, pp. 15-17) and MARD (2003b) 
6.5.4. Conclusions: key short-term determinants for Polish EU rural policy 
regionalisation 
The process of preparation of FEOGA structural policies in Poland takes place on the 
mezo-level (Petersen: 1995), driven primarily by a technocratic logic. Two broad policy 
networks, albeit of asymmetrical power, shape the policy process: central and regional. 
The centralised network Is primarily connected and driven by sectoral (traditional) 
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agricultural interests and a managerial logic. It is based around the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development in Warsaw and DG AGRI, supported by the central 
Polishg agencies (ARMA, FAPA), which are closely associated with the Ministry. The 
network is highly cohesive with few entrance points for non-members, and is mainly 
concerned with accountability, timing and spending the funds, as well as maintaining the 
present basis of power, especially amongst central agencies. Yet, on the cognitive level, 
some, especially younger network members demonstrate affiliations to policy 
regionalisation perceived as more "modern", "legitimate", and appropriate, which is 
closer to EU subsidiarity models. 
The regional network, focused around the Ministry of Economy and DG REGIO, with a 
set of regional members, enjoys only limited access to the decision making process in 
agricultural and rural development. The regional members have so far managed to 
acquire only limited EU policy capacity: for example they have failed to establish their 
collective representations or to produce clearly differentiated policy strategies. The 
regional authorities are additionally weak due to a poor resource base (especially co- 
funding and managerial capacity), an unwillingness to cooperate with the regional 
governmental institutions, and an underlying fragile local legitimacy. On the other hand, 
they have managed to create strong linkages with local communities. The network is 
motivated more by ideologically positive decentralisation scenarios in line with the 
"European model" than by concrete political forces and linkages, at least at present. 
The recognition that the EU agricultural and rural policies are more regionalised in their 
discourse than in bureaucratic reality has clearly surprised most members of both 
networks. Indeed, Poland (depicted in europeanisation framework as a taker rather than 
a policy setter (Grabbe, 2002)), has been obliged by circumstance to adopt historically 
shaped, largely centralist EU policy patterns, which have set the primary policy agenda, 
in spite of their incoherence with the regional ideologies and rhetoric. 
The centralist network, fuelled by safeguarding central agency power bases installed in 
the pre-accession SAPARD policy, is additionally strengthened by perceived links 
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between compensatory payments and rural development in the accession dialogue. 
Consequently, rural development funding is viewed as yet another pot of "farmers' 
money" and attracts attention from agricultural lobby as a consequence, albeit that the 
Polish farming lobby is as yet not well established in any formal sense. The bureaucratic 
logic of audit, control and coordination, has tended so far to petrify the centralist status 
quo. 
Yet the policy outcome (at least so far) has provided for some regionalised instruments, 
largely as a "learning ground for regions". A slight move towards regionalisation can be 
explained by a combination of the predominant 'regionalisation-as-the-European-model' 
paradigm (Ostoja-Ostaszewska: 2002) with the increasingly visible resource 
dependencies in terms of administrative resources, information, strategic capacities and 
political support at the regional level. This outcome perhaps signals long-term trends 
towards multi-level governance patterns and greater regionalisation pressures and 
outcomes in the future? 
6.6. Long-term factors affecting regionalisation of Polish EU structural 
and rural development policies 
Although political science has still to develop commonly accepted theoretical frameworks 
with predictive capacities (Schapiro: 2002), a speculative long-term analysis is now 
possible, based on policy experience and literature review. We return to the Josling and 
Moyer framework (1990), and identify the altering policy inputs, and changing 
bargaining conditions. 
On the policy inputs side, the rural development debate (discussed in Chapter 2, 
especially Section 2.3.2) indicates that, following a predominantly exogenous phase 
(with transfer of resources to non-agricultural sectors where they bring higher marginal 
returns), the role of endogenous rural resources increases, as does the demand for 
more differentiated rural products with higher added-value. More sophisticated rural 
products and recreational services, often based on natural and cultural capital, use as 
their unique selling point an underlying image of "village" and "rurality" instead of a 
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singular farmer, thereby encouraging collective provision and local cooperation. Policy 
responses to demands for local specificity and collective area-based provision in the EU 
15 include for example, the Leader Initiative, though this is still far from mainstream. 
However, these forces and trends imply that the natural territorial focus is local rather 
than conventionally or administratively regional. Nevertheless, these trends are currently 
long-term in Poland. The low purchasing power of Polish consumers, coupled with a low 
level of economic development, with rural sector merely cushioning the transition, 
means that medium-term demands for structural funds are most likely to come largely 
from agricultural restructuring and poverty alleviation, and thus to follow administrative 
boundaries and conventional bureaucratic channels. 
The impact of europeanisation on regions is neither clear nor homogenous (cf. Section 
1.5.3). Smyrl (1997) argues that europeanisation represents merely an opportunity, 
rather than a guarantee for regions involvement in EU policy. Exploitation of the 
opportunity depends on the political entrepreneurship of regional leaders. Others 
(notably advocates of a multi-level government framework) argue that resource 
dependencies, as well as complexity of governance structures, necessitate flatter, 
denser structures (Scharft, 2000), albeit at a risk of problems in efficient joint decision 
making. On the other hand, the transition from central government to multi-level 
governance, witnessed in Western Europe (e. g. in Godwin, Painter, 1996), is likely to be 
much less obvious in countries with post-communist legacies both amongst the 
governors and the governed, and also is likely to take time to emerge, since the 
transition is also clearly associated with the stage of economic development and the 
place of agriculture within the overall economic structure of society. 
On the bargaining side, accession should lead to a reduction in transaction risks, thus 
encouraging more creative, tailored made templates. In addition, the reform of the rural 
development policies in the European Union itself is moving slowly towards territorially 
integrated solutions (Saraceno: 2002), yet without a specific time frame. However, 
currently created power structures, notably the centralised agencies, are likely to stoutly 
defend the status quo. 
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To put it in a nutshell, regionalisation of rural development policy does not happen 
because it is an inherently more efficient or a more "European model" of policy making, 
nor yet because it Is inherently or necessarily more equitable. Policy regionalisation can 
better be conceptualised as a process: it will happen as it reaches sufficient critical mass 
in political, economic and cognitive paradigms, and as it becomes better fitted to the 
economic and social pressures from society. This will take time, just as it has taken time 
for the present EU to arrive at its current position. 
The question of what sort of conceptual framework might be most suitable for analyzing 
these issues and processes is the subject of the final chapter of this thesis. 
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Synthesis, conclusions, policy implications and new 
questions 
7.1. Objectives and outline 
This research has been concerned with the regional dimension in Polish EU structural and 
rural development policies. Two main questions have been addressed: 
" What (if any) policy regionalisation is desirable for Polish EU rural development policy? 
" How can rural development process and policy be conceptualised, to include regional 
dimensions? 
These two major strands have been explored on the basis of inductively defined, specific 
research propositions. The thesis originated from a practitioner's experience, adopting a 
grounded approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) with multi-triangulation (Denzin, 1970; 
Burgess, 1982) as the major research approaches. The analytical effort of this thesis has bred 
a series of empirical findings and multi-disciplinary theoretical considerations, albeit loosely 
connected. Now, building upon somewhat disconnected analysis, a single integrated approach 
to policy analysis to reconcile "academic excellence with policy relevance" (Harvey, 2000; 
Minogue, 1983) is attempted. 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 summarises the key empirical findings and 
their theoretical underpinning presented in the previous chapters. Section 7.3 presents a 
proposal for a theoretical synthesis, portraying policy-making as complex art with a three 
dimensional rationality, embedded in and feeding back to the resource endowment pentagon 
(cf. Figure 2.2). Section 7.4 shows how the new inclusive framework can be applied to rural 
policy regionalisation in Poland and how the empirical results fit in this unifying framework. 
Section 7.5 identifies some major general and specific policy implications following from this 
framework. Finally, Section 7.6 outlines some major new questions raised by this thesis. 
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7.2. Key findings revisited 
Under the EC legislation, Poland has the opportunity to implement rural development 
programmes at "an appropriate geographical level". This research has explored the relevance 
of Polish voivodships as a unit for the development of Polish EU rural development policies 
(mainly under FEOGA-Guidance instruments). Four potential rationales for policy 
regionalisation have been examined, with specific reference to current Polish conditions. 
Rationale 1: Policy regionalisation due to spatial variation of Polish rural 
resources between regions in Poland 
The analysis has indicated a multi-level spatial variation in Polish development patterns. 
However, the voivodship, as an administrative unit, does not seem obviously appropriate as a 
unit to recognize and tackle rural differentiation. Major differences exist at the rural-urban 
interface. Patterns of homogeneity cover meta-regions, primarily differentiated by population 
density and farm structures, and secondarily, by business development. Rural regions as 
represented by the administrative voivodship show a considerable level of internal 
heterogeneity, and hence seem inappropriate as levels for regionally effective and distinct 
development policies. 
Rationale 2: Policy regionalisation due to regional variation in preferences for 
rural policy instruments 
The analysis finds few clear and coherent regional patterns of preferences for rural policies in 
Poland'°°. Those that are expressed are associated with problematic legitimacy. Key 
preferences for rural measures (farm investment, infrastructure, diversification) are 
horizontally or univocally expressed. Regionally heterogeneous preferences (such as for 
example, village renewal, water management, land improvement) tend to be inconsistent. 
The regional logic of forming collective preferences for rural policies (as compared with the 
central logic) appears to be founded on limited legitimacy from specific and somewhat 
embryonic regional identities, albeit that some of these are based on long-standing historic 
traditions and experiences. Instead, Polish regions seek participative governance as their main 
legitimizing strategy (in addition to discourses of europeanisation and provision of 
democracy). Also, the presentation of internal differentiation of contexts within regions rarely 
100 As revealed via SAPARD regional consultation exercise and regional development strategies 
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gets translated into any variation of policy preferences at the regional level. Few regions opt 
for spatial selectivity in policy instruments within their own region. 
Rationale 3: Budget regionalisation due to regional funding allocations and 
relevance to regional cohesion 
The analysis concludes there is little evidence for regional budgetary envelopes to function as 
an effective regional equity modifier in allocating rural development funding. The regional 
funding allocation, politically defined as "fair" for SAPARD programme (defined internally by 
Poland), could, however, serve as a useful benchmark for territorial fairness in policy 
absorption101. Regional funding allocations for territorial measures (infrastructure and rural 
diversification) are broadly in line with EU cohesion defined at the regional level. Funding for 
farm investment, however, goes against such regional cohesion benchmarks. Past policy 
absorption indicates a bias toward better-off regions for rural diversification measures, and 
towards lagging regions for rural infrastructure (with reference to "fairness" envelopes). The 
conclusion under this rationale is ambiguous towards the need and desirability of explicit 
regionalisation. 
Rationale 4: Policy regionalisation based on feasibility of regionalisation in EU 
rural development process 
The analysis has demonstrated only limited feasibility of regionalisation of Polish EU rural 
policies. The policy process, governed primarily by DG AGRI and Ministry of Agriculture, 
exhibits strong technocratic logic with primary concerns of compliance, audit and 
coordination, with few entry points for regions (rural divisions). Regions themselves are not 
actively seeking inputs into (rural) policy. Nonetheless, a looser regionalisation network (of 
DG REGIO and Ministry of Economy) has an input into the process, encouraging some localist 
sentiments within the Ministry of Agriculture. There seems to be consistent support for giving 
regions "some training opportunities". Yet, the Ministry is likely to support its own basis of 
power - its own central agencies. The present institutional structure has so far delivered 
predominantly centralist policy outputs. 
101 As revealed by SAPARD discussion on "fair" regional funding envelopes. 
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In short, there is little evidence under any of the rationales that a regional dimension either 
will or should emerge as a strong theme in any medium term rural development strategy in 
Poland. 
7.3. Theoretical synthesis: towards an integrated framework for policy 
analysis 
The results of empirical and theoretical examinations obtained so far are only partially 
satisfactory. They contribute some answers as to whether EU rural policy regionalisation is 
desirable in Poland on the grounds of the selected propositions, though the answers are often 
conflicting. However, they fail to provide an inclusive framework for policy regionalisation. As 
stressed at the start, this thesis did not begin with a prior deductive integrated model, largely 
due the fact that present scholarship voices dissatisfaction with the present approaches to 
policy analysis, in particular its relevance to practice (Harvey, 2000; Minogue, 1983; Shapiro, 
2002). In short a new synthesis is due. 
Following the exploration of discursive, political and economic statistical data performed in the 
previous chapters, a re-construction of such a synthesis is now attempted. Delorme, 1995, for 
example, insists that the constructed character of reality itself necessitates a similar design as 
a research or conceptual method, and thus goes beyond the classic post-modern notions of 
deconstruction1°2. Whilst deconstructive tools can be applied to a variety of disciplines, not 
least for agricultural economics (Midmore, 1995), alternative (re)-constructed policy 
frameworks still appear incomplete. 
A re-constructed framework for rural development policy is proposed, summarized in Figure 
7.1 below. In this figure, three predominant conceptual paradigms are identified ((economic, 
political, cognitive), each with its own characterization of the policy agenda and likely 
solutions. The outcome of negotiations and consultations conducted through these 
negotiating planes produce the actual observed policies, which in turn have observable effects 
on the resource structure and capacity of the target region (represented as the resource 
pentagon from Figure 2.2 above. ) Use of these resources, and of their associated networks 
and transactions, then delivers outcomes that influence the next round of the policy debate. 
1°2 A term that, for all practical purposes, was introduced in the literature by Derrida. It means to undermine the 
conceptual order imposed by a concept that has captivated our imaginations and ways of seeing things. 
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The emphasis here is on a complex process of policy formulation, implementation, execution 
and reformulation. Observations of any specific element or facet of this process can only 
reveal a partial, and thus necessarily biased, insight into the nature of the whole system. 
Figure 7.1. An integrated framework for analysis of rural policy and process 
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The integrated framework rests upon the following propositions: 
" Policy-making has a multiple rationality, namely actors perform a multiplicity of actions 
and roles when setting and implementing policy; 
" Policy-making is embedded in, and feeds back to fundamental resource capacities; 
" The principal dimensions in which policy is agreed and implemented are economic, 
political, and cognitive; 
" Each dimension of policy-making can be researched, based on the data and 
techniques associated with it; 
" The linkages and interaction between paradigms are as important for understanding 
complex systems as are the processes and mechanisms within each paradigm; 
" Each paradigm is subject to endogenous and exogenous pressures for change; 
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" Change in each paradigm takes time and effort and is mutually inter-dependent. 
The major processes undergoing in each of the three paradigms of policy making are briefly 
summarised in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1. Integrated framework for analysis of rural policy and process: summa 
Key Key Primary policy 
Policy Core Rationality Theoretical Policy analysis feedback loop 
paradigm Frameworks Methods with respect to 
resource base 
" Correction of Mainly quantitative: Changes in: 
market failure & " Cost-benefit " Stocks of all 
provision of public " Public goods; " Supply/demand capitals 
Economic goods; " Principal agent; " Input/output " Relative prices, 
" Resource transfers " Transaction costs analysis incentives & 
to improve & systems " Livelihoods anal. penalties 
competitive base. " Social accounting " Resource use 
frameworks 
" Communicative " Impact on social 
Cognitive Creation of common governance; Mainly qualitative: & human capital: 
narratives & values " Deliberative " Discourse analysis " Identity creation 
governance; & mobilisation 
" Collective Primarily qualitative " Impact on social 
preference " Public choice " Interviews capital & 
formation " Policy networks " Participant Institutions 
" Support " Managerialism Observation " Legitimisation of 
political generation " Multi-level " Forensic Identities, & 
" Resistance governance deconstruction economic 
reduction " Pluralism " Archeological-type rewards; 
" Power network " Elitist models reconstruction " Legitimisation of 
adjustment (min. " Role-playing resource 
rent seeking) ownerships 
Source: own compilation 
Of course, as in any complex system, the total is more than the sum of its parts (e. g. 
Deutsch, 1997; Emery, 1969). For example, the cognitive paradigm can develop a common 
reference, which either acknowledges or denies economic change (Jessop's "negative 
coordination"). By the same token, political support can be sustained for policies with little or 
no economic justification, through legitimising cognitive discourses. Depending on the policy 
agenda, the paradigms might be mutually compliant, or incoherent. 
However, fundamental inconsistencies between paradigms would be expected to generate 
their own strong forces for change. Fundamental inconsistencies or incompatibilities in a 
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complex system are likely to generate fault-lines and fragilities in the face of changing 
circumstances or contexts (which happen all the time). This will tend to lead to change, as 
adaptation or innovation, which, if successful and therefore capable of survival and 
replication, lead to better fits in the future. These evolutionary changes necessarily entail the 
decay or disappearance of some features and characteristics of the previous system, and the 
emergence of new properties and responses. 
Separating the multiple and complex relations within policy processes requires simplification 
and abstraction (de-construction and reduction), which necessarily destroys the essential 
integrity and identity of the process under examination. In particular, since the dynamics of 
the process depend fundamentally on the interaction and reflection of the several parts 
amongst themselves, the separation of the various relations necessarily denies explicit 
consideration of the behaviour of the whole system through time. 
Ostensibly, attempts to create an integrated framework are not new. In fact, two have been 
drawn upon in this thesis: advocacy coalition frameworks in political science and regulation 
theories in regional studies. Although placed in two different disciplines, respectively political 
and economic, both approaches attempt to cultivate relevance with the complementary 
dimensions. The difference between those approaches and our proposed methodology is that 
instead of seeking to clearly de-construct the dimensions first, they proceed immediately to a 
comprehensive, re-constructed picture, where the divisions between cognitive, political and 
political events get blurred rather than are explicitly identified In an interactive manner. 
Secondly, our framework does not remedy the basic drawbacks of present policy analysis, 
namely the lack of clear and unambiguous causal relationships or clearly normative or 
predictive capacities (Shapiro, 2002). In addition, as sketched here and examined in the 
thesis, the framework is depicted as static. Further work (e. g. proposed in Section 7.6) is 
needed to try to rectify those drawbacks, though it should be noted that complex systems 
are, by their very nature, incapable of being forecast, since their future states depend 
critically on both accurate representation of their current states as well as precise 
artrticulation of the transformation processes acting to convert these present states into their 
future condition (independently of any changes in external conditions). Neither of these two 
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conditions is ever likely to be achieved in practice, while even if the inevitable inaccuracies 
and imprecisions can be reduced to classical confidence limits, their consequences in a 
dynamic, far-for-equilibrium interactive and non-linear system cannot be deduced from these 
starting-condition confidence limits. 
Nonetheless, the distinct value of our proposed framework is that it shows how multiple 
disciplinary approaches can be operationally related. Under each of the dimensions, 
reductionism is employed for uncovering the principal relationships for academic rigour, yet 
the practical concerns for realism call for re-construction of multiple rationalities. As a result 
the proposed framework does not aspire to be a grand theory in a predictive sense. Rather, it 
seeks to provide a grounded explanation, as a necessary precursor to sensible mind-modeling 
or intuitive analysis of options and alternative actions, and for forensic deconstruction of past 
histories and their sensible re-construction, much as archeological re-construction throws light 
on our ancestors' capacities and innovative capabilities. 
7.4. Regionalisation conceptualized under integrated policy analysis 
framework 
In this Section we apply our synthetic new framework to the rural policy regionalisation 
questions. Table 7.2 shows how policy regionalisation can be depicted in our proposed 
integrated policy analysis framework. 103 Table 7.2 presents our empirical findings in the basic 
structure of the new framework. 
103 Please note that issues related to the efficiency of policy implementation, transaction costs etc. are missing 
from the analysis for lack of empirical data. 
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Table 7.3. Empirical results: core rationalities and their relative strength 
regionalisation of Polish EU structural and rural policies 
Core rationalities for regionalisation of Polish EU structural and rural policies 
Dimension (relative strength) 
Short-term analysis Likely long-term forces 
-/+ Spatially differentiated pattern of rural + Increased importance of non agricultural 
resources (albeit not by region - more rural development calling for linkages 
meta-regions and antra-regions); with urban economies and policies 
Economic 
- Utilise economies of scale; + Growing importance of environmental, 
- Address major rural/urban resource cultural and social goods best provided on 
differentials rather than inter-regional. area basis (but not necessarily regional) 
Cognitive + : ocalist sentiments (also of central policy 
makers) for europeanisation and + Development of regionalist discourses and 
democratisation search for uniqueness 
- Weak territorial identities and loyalties + Defensive Identities adapted to successful 
translated into weakly differentiated policy regeneration 
preferences 
Political - Central-sectoral nature of EU structural and 
rural development policies 7 Reform In EU rural policy 
- Ministry of Agriculture linked with central + Transition from government to governance 
agencies for power basis - Path dependency (linkages with past, 
- Difficulties in Inter-institutional cooperation centralised policy) 
- Weak Input of regions into rural policies 
As seen in Table 7.3, based on the mobilized empirical data, in the short-term the 
rationalities for rural policy regionalisation In Poland are generally weak or contrary. The 
strongest disincentives are located at the political level, especially due to the central 
sectoral EU policy set-up and the Ministry of Agriculture linkages with the central agency 
powers. The economic dimension appears slightly less negative: there is a pattern of 
differentiation at the meta-regional level. But making multiple separate regional rural 
development plans would mean failing to use the economies of scale, and would also 
ignore or heavily discount the strong rurality distinctions which exist within present 
administrative regions. At present, the key positive signals for regionalisation are located 
at the cognitive levels, where even central bureaucrats exhibit "'localist sentiments". 
In the long-term, the rationalities for territorial (and, specifically regional) tier in rural 
development policies are expected to increase, according to this analysis. The major 
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transformation, as indicated in regulation theories, is likely to occur in the economic 
regime. With the relative growth of non-agricultural rural business, often based on 
endogenous potential that is largely spatial, area-based policy provision is likely to be 
demanded (albeit not necessarily at the present regional level). The examined debate on 
regionalisation indicates the slowly rising input of regional governance to the overall 
governing structures, an indication of a more general trend in the Western democracies 
shifting from the strictly hierarchical government system to more inclusive governance. 
Indeed, the transition from government - as the reliance on the exogenous, and 
hopefully benign dictatorship of central government (exaggerated in this case by the 
superimposition of the super-state of the EU) - towards a more inclusive and 
participatory governance - necessarily multi-faceted and multi-level, inclusive of 
stabilizing checks and counter-balances born from social interaction and bottom-up 
responses, rather than based on ex cathedra top-down rules and protocols, is a critical 
and fundamental element which emerges from this analysis and conceptual approach. 
Such a trend in the Polish rural setting still appears embryonic, not least due to 
patriarchal traditions and expectation of top-down solutions104, partly an inheritance of 
the communist tradition (Brussis, 2002). It is also argued that the EU rural development 
policy should be shifting towards territorialisation (albeit clearly different from 
regionalisation) and decentralisation (Saraceno, 2002; AgriCultural Convention: 2002) at 
least in its territorial instruments. This shift is partly necessitated by the decreasing role 
of the primary agricultural sector and the growth of rural value added based on cultural, 
social, and environmental capital, best provided collectively on a territorial basis (i. e. 
explicitly spatial). The reform, however, is unlikely to be rapid, mostly due to the strong 
interests associated with the status quo, and the associated sectoral lobbying efforts 
coupled with defence of established bureaucratic (conceptual) territories. On the other 
hand, increased pressures on financial control may narrow down the scope for future 
reforms, especially if the responsibility for misuse is also not carried down to the 
operational level. 
104 The desired for top-down solutions does not preclude the existence of bottom-up dissatisfaction and voices, 
exemplified for example by Samoobrona party (Self-Defence) chaired by Mr. Lepper. However, this activity is seldom 
translated into specific policy technocratic inputs, which is not surprising, given the analysis here - the conditions are not 
yet conducive to such developments. 
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7.5. Policy relevance and recommendations 
7.5.1. General policy conclusions 
What does this research effort imply for policy making? What, if anything has been 
learnt and can be incorporated in the debate on and development of Polish rural 
development and policies? 
While clear prescriptive recommendations might be desired, they are unlikely to be 
implemented, or to be effective as anticipated, even if implemented, since they 
necessarily lack legitimacy"', or systematic coherence. Prescriptive solutions frequently 
suffer from a single-minded and necessarily blinkered perspective, as with the much 
criticized managerialism (Minogue, 1986). As shown here, it has to be recognized that 
practical policy-making remains an art of complexity, with multiple rationalities, reflected 
in interactive economic, political and cognitive paradigms, rather than a science of pure 
reason. The role of the policy analyst is more to help establish a common understanding 
of the complex development and policy processes (Harvey, 2000), than to replace 
political processes in "knowing" what to do (Minogue, 1986). After all, "policy 
knowledge" is perceived in some literature more in terms of structural power (Strange: 
1988) than as an objective phenomenon. Policy knowledge grows from and is cultivated 
by the mechanisms and systems employed by the participants. Such a fundamental 
recognition is even more important in countries with central planning traditions (and 
consequent dependency cultures) than elsewhere. The notion of government (at 
whatever level) as the exogenous, rational and benevolent dictator, requiring 
a foundation of scientific reason for its actions, is as outdated and unfounded 
as the failed system of central planning. The result of pursuit of such an 
exogenous rationality is self-re-enforcing mistrust and lack of demand for efficient 
political and bureaucratic systems (as pointed out in the Polish press, e. g. 
Rzeczpospolita, 7 Oct. 2002). Thus, in the most fundamental sense, what matters more 
than a specific policy (either as input or output) are the processes through which policy 
evolves and is evaluated and re-selected. 
pos This limitation is increasingly recognised in the area of policy evaluation. Its discourse has been gradually moving 
towards participative evaluation" with few normative prescriptions, as pointed out by Dr. Sara Batterbury from 
Glamorgan University for pointing this out to me, during Regional Studies Association Conference Regional policy 
evaluation" in Aix-en-Provence. 
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Underneath the deconstructed value-laden regional discourses, regionalisation of rural 
policies can be more adequately conceptualized as a socio-economic process, taking 
place in and as a result of economic, political and cognitive paradigms rather than as a 
political desiderata suggested, for example, by Cork Declaration (CEC: 1996). In the 
economic paradigm, the construction of rural space is linked to regimes of production 
(Harvey, 1996). A relative decline in the importance of commodity agriculture is likely to 
be coupled with the non-agricultural business development in at least some rural areas. 
With developments elsewhere in the economy, the growing demand for more 
differentiated rural products (with environmental, amenity, and culture components 
becoming part of products' added value) will encourage territorially differentiated 
provision to exploit on to specific capabilities of the local resources and their specific mix 
(Saraceno, 1999; Pezzini, 2001), though the local scale is obviously considerably smaller 
than the present adminstrative regional level, especially as NUTS 2 regions in bigger 
countries (such as Poland) are large and diverse. However, these market forces are still 
considerably weaker in Poland than in the more developed EU-15 (Piskorz, 2001). 
The bottom-up demands for regionalisation of rural policy making are still relatively 
weak in Poland. Regional governance processes obtain little legitimacy from regional 
identities and, consequently exhibit deficits in credibility, even internally. In the absence 
of historically shaped loyalties, regional governance tends to use participative 
techniques, in particular, to tap onto local government and community networks, where 
they exist. 
Empirical evidence suggests that the political paradigm for regionalisation of Polish rural 
development policies is largely a reflection of a special EU logic. As both the literature 
(Saraceno 2002; Bryden, 2000) and practical experience suggests, the EU rural 
development policy suffers from deficits in coherence, as it has evolved from the 
sectoral CAP. A mix of territorial and sectoral approaches, a myriad of conflicting signals 
from CARPE, LEADER and regional policies, have confused the applicant states (Bauko 
and Gurzo, 2001; Grabbe, 2002), which are nonetheless given little choice but to comply 
and thus copy evolved practices from different (if not more advanced) communities. 
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However, in the longer run, postulates are heard in the EC arena for integrating EU rural 
policies on territorial basis (Saraceno: 2002), for example by means of regional rural 
development programmes. These, however, can pose bureaucratic disputes on 
competences at the junction of agricultural, rural and regional matters (Depoele, 2000; 
Bryden, 2000). Only if (when) such solutions are adopted at the EU levels'06, can some 
scope be offered for involvement of Polish regions, though the literature suggests that 
the Structural Funds provide only an opportunity rather than a guarantee for regional 
entrepreneurship (Smyrl, 1997). In addition, evaluation of the Structural Funds indicates 
that in the beginning of the policy learning processes common administrative templates 
are used to reduce risks, and that they differentiate over time107. On the other hand, 
centralizing pressures certainly come from present financial accountability conventions 
and are likely to persist in the enlarged EU. Finally, regionalisation under the cognitive 
paradigm is not to be overlooked. EU discourses and ideologies of subsidiarity as well as 
Polish "self-governments" impact the perceptions of Polish decision makers who almost 
univocally admit that some "training field" needs to be given to the regions, as 
regionalisation is implicitly perceived to be strongly associated with the break-up of 
central planning regimes and paradigms. 
The notion that policy is embedded within the initial resource base, especially with 
respect to the social capital needs to be kept in mind. Even scarce evidence from 
SAPARD implementation suggests that (new) institutions are still embedded within the 
current levels of social capital (cf. Box 7.1. ). 
106 Notwithstanding that rural development programmes have a possibility of regionalisation so does the SAPARD 
Programme. Yet in practice, the secondary legislative requirements have made it virtually Impossible to regionalise 
SAPARD (not least due to elaborated procedures, expensive audits and the concept of payment agencies). Only in 
objective 1 areas does the rural programming have to be coordinated with regional programmes. 
107 As kindly pointed out by Prof. John Batchler, University of Strathclyde; seminar 2 October 2002. 
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BOX 7.1. Policy embeddness/feedback in social capital constraints 
(illustration of negative feedback) 
The Agency of Restructuring and Modernisation of Agriculture (ARMA) was established in 1994 as 
a strongly centralized hierarchical organization. In 2002, following its accreditation as the 
SAPARD Agency, the new management of the Agency decided to replace a large number of core 
management staff with their political affiliates. A resultant scandal followed as the EU 
Commission requested the Agency to minimise the political influence and explain the change, 
threatening programme suspension. Similarly, ARMA has appointed politically chosen district 
advisers for IACS. Following the media critique, the district advisors were required to take a merit 
exam, which they mostly failed, but still kept their jobs. Despite a letter of Commissioner Fischler 
requesting explanation, and significant media critique, the Agency showed little response. At the 
same time, the personnel of ARMA grew from 200 in 1999 to 3150 in 2003. Whilst in 1999 70% 
of the Agency budget was earmarked to beneficiaries; in 2003 it is only planned at 36%. 
This is only one of the many examples to show that the policy-making is embedded in a larger 
social culture (and associated levels of social capital), opposing demands for change. 
(Rzeczpospolita, 27 ]an. 2003; 31 Aug 2002; 13 Aug 2002) 
Failure to acknowledge such constraints is likely to breed "cathedrals in the desert", 
unsustainable and costly. Despite this assertion, the Commission agents sometimes 
assume ambitious missions to create organisations beyond the capacities of even the 
current member states. An example is given in Box 7.2 below. 
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BOX 7.2: Policy embeddness in the resource constraints: 
example of ignorance of the constraints in policy practice 
It is important to acknowledge the policy embedness with respect to the current levels of 
resources, including institutional and social resources. 
On one hand, the Commission has repeatedly voiced its concerns about the poor level of 
institutional and social stocks in Poland, not least in its regular reports. On the other hand the 
Commission appears to expect levels of institutional performance, often above the current EU 
standards. As confessed by an official: "The Commission believes it is of paramount importance 
to build an excellent system of coordination (... ). This is an ambitious task, often above the levels 
of current member states. It is important to build a truly transparent democratic system whereby 
participation and information in the decision making process is open to all stakeholders. (... ) I am 
not interested in projects. If there was a clear system with audit trail and no projects, I would 
still consider it as a success". Whether or not such ambitions are representative of the 
Commission as a whole is an open question. However, the Commission would tend at least to 
emphasise the ability to implement EU rules more than the volume spent. 
Such ambitions, ignoring the realities of transitions are unlikely to sustainable, though no doubt 
costly. 
(based on interviews) 
The definition of accountability is crucial. As the replacement of trust with procedures 
has proven unsatisfactory (at least partly as seen in Box 7.1), an alternative system of 
checks and balances might be worth considering. It has been argued repeatedly (also In 
research interviews), that a dispersal of power (or Tullock's notion of competition in 
bureaucracy) might be far more effective than audit. A new, refined notion of 
accountability might be considered to rest on a balance between the regional and 
central checks, represented by the marshal and voivods. Such a solution has been 
proposed for the regional funding (ERDF). Tenders for implementation functions could 
also serve prevent the oversupply of bureaucratic services (Tullock, 1976). ARMA, on the 
other hand, remains in a predominantly monopolistic position with the typical behaviour 
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of self-replicating bureaucracy (cf. Box 7.1), seeking to defend and enlarge its policy- 
territory at almost any cost. 
Equally important is the notion of policy feedback on the stock of resources, especially 
social capital. What matters is not only which policy is implemented, but also how it is 
done. The perceptions of institutional performance (also cf. Box 7.1) impact people's 
trust in the collective systems. By the same token, policy implementation, as a non-exit 
repetitive behaviour pattern, can enhance the stocks of social capital (cf. example Box 
7.3). 
BOX 7.3: 
Policy feed-back on resource endowment 
(example of positive feedback loops) 
The Monitoring Committee for the SAPARD programme, officially established in May 2001, was 
one of the first cases in Poland where representatives of central ministries, regional and social 
partners as well as experts were given an official opportunity to co-decide on rural issues. The 
initial debates, often initially high jacked by dominant speakers or modes of argument, were 
slowly replaced by consensus building approaches. When faced with non-exit situation, a 
bureaucrat in charge of coordinating efforts has admitted: "we had to learn to decide, not merely 
argue. We had no time for non decisions". 
This brief example demonstrates how the policy process feeds back positively on the stocks of 
social capital. 
(from semi-structured interviews) 
So far, the core research and policy advice on agricultural and rural adjustment in CEECs 
has concentrated on economic or political economy aspects (e. g. Hartell, Swinnen, 
2000; Majewski, Dalton, 2000), with considerable gaps on political, institutional and 
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cognitive discourse processes. For example, in late 90s considerable efforts were made 
to create area-based rural strategies in Poland, yet little direct use has been made of 
them in EU programmes. In the post-communist institutional vacuum, attention to 
institutional processes (North, 1990), and building networks, partnerships and 
consensus for rural change remains overlooked in both research and practice. So far, 
the majority of policy processes remain non transparent with little procedural logic. More 
research, and especially information, about the nature of policy processes (so far largely 
confined to corridors of the central offices) would ease the access of multiple 
stakeholders. More fundamentally it would create the demand for such participation, 
especially in crucial early stages of the policy formulation. Nevertheless, access to policy 
making needs to be learnt by both sides. A structured and effective policy input requires 
technical expertise and on-time reaction. The EU practice suggests that the structural 
funds policies (with resource dependencies such as information or co-financing) 
encourage the development of multi-level governance. Although likely to be resource 
consuming, it creates a sense of policy co-ownership, and feeds back on the levels of 
social capital. 
The Polish discussion about the most proper geographical unit as a target for rural 
policies has so far evolved mostly between the regional and central level. However, this 
discussion should involve smaller levels of policy reference. There is considerable 
evidence of variation on the level of rural localities in Poland. The deliniation of areas of 
homogenous resources, matched by political structures and territorial loyalties, is hard 
to do in a top-down way. The essential point of the debate so far focusing on central- 
regional dilemma could be profitably re-phrased into the top-down versus the bottom-up 
policy choices. Indeed, if the horizontal policies were to address major horizontal 
resource inequalities between the rural and urban zones, their natural complementation 
appears to support specificity and locally endogenous resources, most likely defined at 
the lower levels (cf. Box 7.4). 
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BOX 7.4. A dynamic rural territorial unit for policy purposes 
Example of LEADER and associations of localities 
This research has shown how difficult if not impossible it is, top-down, to delineate maps of 
territorially specific resources at the same time matching them with political preference formation 
and territorial loyalties. Most likely, such a close match only emerges through bottom-up 
initiatives. The boundaries of area-based LEADER groups are defined by people themselves, 
based on their own evaluation of joint opportunities, political affiliations and loyalties. The 
evaluations of LEADER programme shows that such a match appears to be successful, although 
time consuming. In Poland, dynamic rural units are defined for policy initiatives by associations of 
communes (zwiazki gmin) legally established for specific projects. 
The establishment of appropriate models of the rural development process in the CEECs 
remains a crucial, yet so far open question. So far, the current discourses, policy 
documents, and statistical data have concentrated on agriculture as the major backbone 
of rural communities in Poland. However, whilst farming is estimated to provide 
employment to about 40 per cent of rural population, it provides only 20% of rural 
household income in Poland. Already more rural income comes from non-agricultural 
activities than from farming. More than a half of Polish rural households do not have any 
land. Yet, the statistics, obviously guided by historic policy demands, offer little 
information on non-agricultural activities in rural areas. There are still many questions 
on the realistic model for Polish rural development. Options for development based on 
high value added, natural amenity and environmental products applied in post-industrial 
societies are currently questionable in Poland, where an average disposable income per 
capita is merely 150 EUR per month. The high share of the rural population and huge 
un(employment) coupled with limited work opportunities in urban and regional 
economies raises a question about where the impulses (e. g. capital) for development 
are likely to come from. The EU logic suggests that originally the impulses come from 
exogenous forces, followed by more endogenous trends. If the common trajectory of 
development is to be followed, Polish rural development processes are likely to be 
closely related to developments elsewhere in the economy. More discussion and critical 
analysis is needed to assess the linkages between regional and rural policies, most likely 
critical to the rural development process. 
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The development process, and hence, any rural development policy has to focus on and 
emphasise an unavoidable risk. Both business and social development is essentially 
dynamic and evolutionary. Progress (whether ultimately judged to be purposive and 
beneficial or otherwise) depends on mutation, adaptation and innovation. The incentive 
to innovate and adapt depends on the prospect of a risk premium. The question is only 
who pays the costs, who provides the venture capital, to cover the inevitable and 
fundamentally necessary risk. If the risk is pushed on to the beneficiaries (for example 
by means of producing sophisticated business plans, if not by financial guarantees), the 
programme access might be prohibitive, even for good projects. On the other hand, 
providing fundamental security to every experiment (innovation) will encourage 
inefficient profligacy of wasteful innovations, which can never survive the tests of 
commercial viability or social acceptability. Central institutions, distanced from 
beneficiaries, tend to have less resource dependencies with potential prospective 
beneficiaries and might be encouraged to make entry barriers too high (type 2 error: 
Bardham, 1997) at the expense of programme absorption rates (see Box 7.5. for an 
example). 
BOX 7.5. Entry barriers for the SAPARD Programme 
The EU FEOGA-Guidance funds manage risk by requiring the implementing national agency to 
handle cases of the beneficiaries failing to fulfill the contract, which might lead to withdrawal of 
funding by the EU Commission. Such cases include failures to complete the investment or 
business plans. The costs of preventing such risks are usually distributed amongst the 
implementing system with significant requirements being placed on the beneficiaries, with the 
balance to be decided by the national authorities. 
In 2001-2002, ARMA prepared the implementation system for the SAPARD programme, placing 
the majority of costs upon the beneficiaries. Requirements for detailed business plans, 
inspections and controls were placed in conjunction with the double-security, namely the bank in- 
blanco bonds which ARMA is entitled to keep for a year following the investments. The result was 
a very low uptake of the programme by private beneficiaries. A broad discussion on lowering the 
entry barriers and easing programme's access has followed, albeit inconclusive to date. 
(from participant experience) 
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7.5.2. Regionalisation of rural development programmes in Poland: specific 
policy implications 
Now we move on to synthesize the specific policy question addressed in this thesis: 
what is a potential added value of the regional level for EU rural development policies in 
°8 Poland? For lack of specific comparator1, this question has been addressed by means 
of specific propositions. To re-iterate these here: 
No evidence has been found to support the hypothesis than Polish regions necessarily 
(objectively) need regionally differentiated rural development policies for reasons of 
noticeable regional patterns in spatial resource endowment. Indeed, although Polish 
rural resources are spatially differentiated (in particular with respect to settlement and 
farm patterns, business development), the areas of homogeneity are at meta-regional 
level, or between localities within the present administrative regions. Also current 
economic theory fails to establish a link between rural resource endowments and an 
optimum policy mix. 
The distribution of rural resources and structures is, however, linked to the potential 
distribution of policy benefits. For example, most of FEOGA-Guidance finance is only 
eligible to farmers. In fact, most Polish rural households do not have any land: those 
landless and farmless are geographically concentrated in Western and Northern Poland, 
generally corresponding to areas of high registered unemployment. On the other hand, 
areas of Eastern (especially South-Eastern Poland) suffer from high hidden 
unemployment, but due to scarce spatial capital their potential for business development 
appears low: indeed the past policy distribution indicates that those regions take less 
than their "fair" share of funding. Those concerns should be addressed by regional 
policies, clearly highly linked with the rural instruments. 
However, the top-down map of rural resources is not sufficiently detailed to identify 
patterns of specificity, especially cultural, natural and social capital. No doubt area based 
108 An original idea of this research as set out In 2000 to provide a comparative analysis of partially regionalised Rural 
Development Programme and centralised SAPARD programme, has been abandoned due to delays in SAPARD 
implementation. The programme was only launched in July 2002, some 2.5 years after its planned start. 
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policy packages are useful as a complementary measure. However, they are better 
defined in a bottom up way at a level lower than NUTS 2. 
The second proposition examined holds that Polish rural development policies need to 
be regionally differentiated due to strong, regionally differentiated rural policy 
preferences. Little evidence of such phenomenon has been found in the course of critical 
examination of Polish rural development policy preferences, and questions have been 
raised as to the legitimacy of regional rural preferences for reasons of weak regional 
identities and policy participation. Indeed, any regional policy differentiation is more 
likely to include the differentiated funding allocations between measures (reflecting their 
differentiated importance) rather than the choice of measures per se. 
The third proposition has examined the validity of budget regionalisation on the grounds 
of territorial fairness. It has been concluded that whilst regional budgetary envelopes 
have a limited usefulness as a territorial equity mechanisms, they can be used as a 
useful territorial benchmark for policy evaluation. However, the intra-regional differences 
in the patterns of development (typology of ruralities, identified in Chapter 3) are likely 
to be transferred into intra-regional inequalities in policy absorption, though this 
inference should be tested through case studies. 
Finally, the analysis of Polish-EU rural policy arena has concluded that Poland is merely a 
taker (responder or copier) of EU centralized rural policies, and Polish regions have 
currently limited capacities or incentives for active participation in the process. 
Indeed, though a territorial angle in rural development policy appears uncontestable, 
there is little evidence for the relevance of the regional scale for rural policy making in 
Poland. Indeed, the menu approach adopted at the central level appears adequate to 
provide the local policy clients with the choices to cater for their needs and integrate 
them with local strategies. This finding is in line with more general research on the 
relevance of the regional level to EU rural policy, carried out by the LEI (Terluin, 
Venema, 2003). 
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Last but not least, as the considerations above show, the rural development process and 
policy making feature essential complexity. As in any other social system, it needs to 
consist of a core of static "contingent necessities", coupled with openness and self- 
corrective mechanisms. Only with evaluation and audit mechanisms implemented 
regularly... can it survive and improve. However, the design and implementation of 
these evaluation and audit mechanisms will inevitably condition the responses generated 
by the system - it is self-referential. To what extent the system's corrections are allowed 
and encouraged to develop and evolve in the course of bureaucratic and political 
intergovernmental management appears crucial for policy success. However, there is a 
conflict between the essential flexibility of the programme and strict requirements for 
accountability and control connected with intergovernmental arrangements. The right 
design and balance seems to be a major key to success. 
One final comment seems appropriate. The search for improved forms of governance to 
replace failed systems of government must necessarily involve both practitioners and 
researchers (as disinterested observers and analysts). Systems of rules and protocols 
need to be commensurate with the deployment of rewards and incentives. Competences 
need to be harnessed to and commensurate with capacities. It is presently extremely 
ironic that the competencies of the European Union for rural development, as expressed 
by its Commission, are severely at odds with the capacities of the Union to mobilize 
resources (especially finance) to assist in the development processes, which are 
currently limited to no more than 1.3% of European GDP. 
7.6. The End... and the beginning 
Although this thesis has brought some conclusive results in terms of evaluating the 
validity of propositions referring to regionalisation (as described in Section 7.2. ), as well 
as policy recommendations (Section 7.5), its resultant inductive synthetic theoretical 
framework (sketched in Section 7.3), leads to a re-definition of the major questions 
raised by the option of regionalisation, of both a theoretical and practical nature. The 
aim of the final section is to state clearly what it is that we still do not know (Table 7.4). 
109 The Structural Funds are subject to ex-ante, interim and ex-post evaluation, but the corrections implied 
in evaluation can typically be made only once in a programming period if at all. 
237 
Chapter 7: Synthesis, conclusions, policy implications and new questions 
The integrated policy analysis framework needs further development, in particular in 
terms of adding a dynamic change. Which paradigms of the system change first? How 
and when do changes in one paradigm get transferred into other policy paradigms? 
Where does change originate for rural policies: inside or outside the system? Which 
modes of governance cope best with rural change and resist rural conflicts? Which 
political patterns decrease social capital? How does the system employ self-reflexive 
mechanisms? How are territorial identities related to territorial inequalities? Is regional 
governance efficient in creating territorial identities and do positive territorial identities 
encourage economic mobilization? If not, why not? Does the reinforcement of territorial 
logic need to take redirect actors' loyalties from the sectoral issues? More questions will, 
no doubt, arise as the research proceeds, much as has been the case here. 
Table 7.4. Areas for further research on regionalisation of Polish rural 
development policies 
Economic dimension 
" Agricultural support policies for transition economies 
Agricultural policies in developing economies need to strike a 
delicate compromise between improving agricultural productivity 
and encouraging resources especially land and labour, to flow out 
of the sector. The design of such policies has never been easy, yet 
lessons might be learnt from past mistakes. 
" Transaction costs: central v. regional rural development policy. 
A comparative study of transaction costs of centralist SAPARD 
versus the regionalized World Bank Rural Development Programme 
could usefully be undertaken as and when data becomes available. 
" Rural development discourses in regions 
Cognitive aspects of development strategies vary across Polish 
regions (as indicated in Chapter 4). In particular, construction of 
specificity, identity and image ("us"), the nature of the development 
process and its relation to the aspirations of the target population, 
Cognitive dimension the role of the public sector in the development process, the role of 
EU (external public) funds, the role of inward investment flows, are 
all important factors shaping the perceptions and behaviour of the 
main actors. - However, the relationships between the factors and 
cognitive development are, as yet, not at all well understood. 
" Regional & rural policy networks 
This research has shed some light on regional rural networks based 
on discourse on regional development strategies (created in 2000) 
(Chapter 4). Yet, the networks are a dynamic phenomenon. More in 
Political dimension depth research is needed to identify and evaluate network 
participation (and non participation), key interests represented, 
political representations, and motives. Comparative case studies 
among different types of policy delivery systems seems a promising 
approach, in conjunction with the assessment of transactions costs 
mentioned above. 
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" Regional rural governance and its impact on social capital 
stocks 
Identification and measurement of social capital, its impact on trust, 
and hence on transaction systems and costs, is at a practically non- 
Feedback and existent stage. Yet, according to this analysis, it could prove to be a 
embeddness critical discriminant between successful versus unsuccessful policies 
and programmes (case study). 
" Geography of impact of SAPARD programme in Poland 
Absorption and impact evaluation of the SAPARD programme in 
Poland, across regions, and intra-regionally (in different classes of 
ruralities) should provide important and useful information as and 
when it becomes possible to do. 
" Geography of Polish rural resource base (dynamics) 
The analysis here (Chapter 3) has been confined to currently 
measured indicators. Social and spatial capitals need to be more 
Rural resource base carefully identified and measured. More dynamic analysis of 
development trajectories of Polish ruralities, where the relative 
weights and salience of capital types for development prospects 
could be assessed, is needed, for example based on comparative 
case studies. 
However, as noted above, answers to these questions depend on comparative studies, 
which in turn imply that experiments and trials of different policy approaches and 
perspectives are needed for adequate assessment. In fact, since there is no unique 
recipe for successful development, such experiments are taking place as a natural 
outcome of ignorance and uncertainty. 
As Jessop (1997: 99) has noted: 
"Since the real world is infinitely complex, however, it is inevitably analytically 
inexhaustible (... ) as more analytical planes are introduced in order to produce 
increasingly adequate explanations". 
The researcher needs to choose, to use Jessop's term, "contingent necessity", a 
minimum level of complexity to provide explanation adequate to a question raised. I 
choose to pause at this point, having met (at least to a limited extent) my initial 
objectives, and, perhaps more importantly, because of limits to my resources. However, 
I am more than aware that this point could be a yet another (new) start. Meanwhile, the 
tasks of the practical policy advisors, designers and administrators (to which I now 
return) remain necessarily complex, and inherently ill-conditioned for a purely rational 
and scientific analysis or methodology. This is frustrating but inevitable. In similar terms 
to Jessop's researcher, practical policy design and management can only be disciplined 
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by contingent necessity. Nevertheless, the results and analysis of this study should 
provide such practitioners with a "road map' that can be used to identify potential road- 
blocks, alternative routes, needs for road upgrading and by-passes. The original 
intention to provide an unambiguous route to successful development has proved 
impossible. But the search has proved instructive and illuminating. 
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Appendix 1: Past studies of spatial dimension of Polish rural areas 
Appendix 1 
Past studies of spatial dimension of Polish rural areas 
Szemberg (1999) classified rural areas in Poland based on the following criteria: farm 
structure, share of private farmland, population per farm, population with mainly farm 
income; total share of rural population, rural landless population, infrastructure 
development, intensity of agricultural production, tractor per farm, value marketable 
production per farm, and finally, average total farm sales. The resultant classification 
into 7 megaregions however, reveals lack in discipline. The aggregation of criteria is not 
explicit neither is the objective of such classification. 
Heller (2000) categorised Polish rural regions, in terms of what he labeled as standards 
of living, yet measured in purely agricultural terms of gross value added per hectare, 
which Heller calls also "socio-economic potential of rural areas". A regression analysis of 
value added per hectare with independent variables of intensity of agricultural 
production, population density, and unemployment, led Heller to determine relative their 
weights and arrive at three compounded megaregions with the fourth subregion. The 
first megaregion (I, marked black on the map) features high population density; the 
second megaregion (II, marked gray on the map) is characterised by high (registered) 
unemployment, and the third megaregion (III, marked white on the map) has a high 
intensity of agricultural production. The fourth subregion (marked light gray on the map) 
is that of "Eastern part of Poland". Though Heller (2000) called for a regional dimension 
of rural development policies, his methodology lacks non agricultural angle, rigour and 
finally does not lead to clear policy recommendations. 
Michna (2001) developed yet another divisions of regions, largely on arbitrary or indeed, 
undisclosed criteria, arriving at three megaregions, aggregated of the present 
voivodships (cf. Map 3.3.2). He (2001: 52) described megaregions in the following way: 
"megaregion 1 (marked gray on the map) is characterized with very small farms and 
expectations of rural population for non-agricultural employment; megaregion 2 (marked 
gray on the map) features big farms that need to have clarified ownership rights, and, 
defined concepts for development. megaregion 3 (marked white on the map) has 
medium farms, with slow evolution but expectation for state impulses for transformation 
or productive growth. A large body of Michna's analysis is prescriptive in nature with 
little justification or explicit methodological foundations 
Rosner (ed) (1999) made a comprehensive descriptive analysis of Polish rural areas 
across regions in terms of economic development, demographic trends, infrastructure 
levels, settlement patterns, and natural environment at the commune level, employing 
clusters analysis. In particular, Rosner (1999, cf. Map 3.3.5. ) produced an economic 
analysis of communes based on the following indicators: registered unemployment, 
hidden unemployment in farming, percentage of farm with marketable production, 
number of registered economic units, percentage of farms with diversified economic 
activities outside agriculture, and local tax revenue arriving at five classes of 
communities. This research is useful in that it is involves methodological statistical 
analysis demonstrated on visual representations. However, no aggregations or analysis 
at the regional (voivodship) level are carried out. No policy implications are given. Most 
data is also quite outdated (as of 1996). 
Heijman (et al) (1999) performed regional analysis of Polish "small voivodships" ranking 
them in terms of their level of development. The analysis, measuring the level of 
3 
Appendix 1: Past studies of spatial dimension of Polish rural areas 
development in three ways, namely with a traditional method (GDP per capita), an 
economic method (as indicated by GDP per capita and unemployment), and, finally, an 
extended method (based on ten socio-economic indicators of income, health, welfare 
and education). The scores depend on the method. Finally, the principal component 
analysis used for an extended method revealed that regions with bigger cities and 
regions in the West of Poland tend to score higher than those in the East. The distinct 
advantage of the study, which examines the regional, rather than purely rural 
circumstances, is that it offers a strict methodological grounding. 
Recent Polish policy documents, such as Coherent Structural and Rural Development 
Policy (MARD: 1999), encompass the regional dimension in its analytical part (cf. Map 
3.3.3. ). Three supraregions (magaregions I, II, III) are differentiated based around big 
(II), medium (III) and small farm (I) structure patterns. Additional subregional 
structures (a, b) in the small-farm megaregion (I) are identified based on the level of 
development of non-agricultural enterprises. In the medium-size farm megaregion (III), 
three subregions are delimitated based on the level of agricultural culture and technical 
progress (a, b, c). No direct policy implications are identified based on this analysis. 
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Appendix 4: List of indicators used in the spatial analysis 
Appendix 4 
List of indicators used in the spatial analysis 
Indicator Level of data 
availability 
Use in rural 
resource 
index* 
Use in 
commune 
cluster 
analysis 
Resource variables 
Agricultural labour per 100 ha (1996) R X 
Average farm size (R: 1999; C: 1996) R. C X X 
% of environmentally protected areas (2000) R. X 
Telephone subscribers per 100 rural population 
(1999) 
R C X X 
% of rural households connected to main water 
stem (R: 2001; C: 1999) 
R. C X X 
Density of local paved roads (1999) R C X X 
Rural population density (2000) R C X X 
Index of natural conditions for agricultural 
production 
C X 
Value added per agricultural employee/worker R. X 
Registered rural businesses (REGON) per 1000 
population (R: 1999; C: 2000 
R C X X 
Registered rural unemployment 
(R: 2001; D: 2000) 
R D X X 
Rural commune own revenue (G index) (2000) R C X X 
Exogenous(regional) variables 
Share of rural (%) in population (1999) R X 
GRP/capita (1999) R 
Share of agriculture in employment 
(R: 1999; C: 2001) 
R C X 
Share of non market services in employment 
(R: 1999; C: 2001 
R C X 
Appendix 5: Anova: rural regions (by groups of rural resource index) 
Appendix 5: 
ANOVA: typology of Polish rural resource and structures (groups of regions by rural 
resource index) 
Sum of Squares df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
AG_EM_HA Between Groups 2323.350 3 774.450 16.001 . 000* Within Groups 580.799 12 48.400 
Total 2904.150 15 
WAT_UPDA Between Groups 2045.234 3 681.745 9.930 . 001* Within Groups 823.855 12 68.655 
Total 2869.089 15 
FARM_SIZ Between Groups 503.142 3 167.714 10.793 
. 001* Within Groups 186.466 12 15.539 
Total 689.608 15 
UN_RUR_2 Between Groups 400.986 3 133.662 11.282 
. 
001* 
Within Groups 142.164 12 11.847 
Total 543.150 15 
SH_RUR_P Between Groups . 106 3 3.539E-02 7.572 . 
004** 
Within Groups 5.608E-02 12 4.674E-03 
Total . 162 15 
VA_AG_E Between Groups 336.836 3 112.279 7.285 . 005** Within Groups 184.942 12 15.412 
Total 521.778 15 
M_SER VA Between Groups 119.482 3 39.827 2.619 . 099 Within Groups 182.515 12 15.210 
Total 301.998 15 
GDP C Between Groups 35402280.071 31 1800760.02 1.288 
. 
323 
_ 4 
Within Groups 109971479.367 12 9164289.947 
Total 145373759.438 15 
POP_DEN Between Groups 4993.273 3 1664.424 3.337 
. 
056 
Within Groups 5985.312 12 498.776 
Total 10978.584 15 
COM_POP Between Groups 320.661 3 106.887 1.971 . 172 Within Groups 650.846 12 54.237 
Total 971.507 15 
ROAD Between Groups 7.541 E-02 3 2.514E-02 4.649 . 022 Within Groups 6.489E-02 12 5.407E-03 
Total . 140 15 
TEL Between Groups 13.784 3 4.595 1.948 . 176 Within Groups 28.307 12 2.359 
Total 42.091 15 
COM REV Between Groups 14091.237 3 4697.079 5.339 
. 
014 
Within Groups 10558.013 12 879.834 
Total 24649.250 15 
ENVIRON Between Groups 799.644 3 266.548 1.939 
. 
177 
Within Groups 1649.826 12 137.486 
Total 2449.470 15 
SHAGR_EM Between Groups 700.447 3 233.482 1.655 
. 229 Within Groups 1693.382 12 141.115 
Total 2393.829 15 
SHSER_EM Between Groups 430.360 3 143.453 2.303 
. 
129 
Within Groups 747.415 12 62.285 
Total 1177.774 15 
* significant at 1%, **significant at 5%; Source: own calculation 
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Appendix 6: Anova: groups of regions by business development 
Annex 6 
ANOVA: classes re gions in terms of rural business develop ment 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
GDP_C Between Groups 88122131.354 3 29374043.785 6.157 . 009 Within Groups 57251628.083 12 4770969.007 
Total 145373759.438 15 
COM_REV Between Groups 11691.650 3 3897.217 3.609 . 046 Within Groups 12957.600 12 1079.800 
Total 24649.250 15 
SHAGR_EM Between Groups 991.269 3 330.423 2.827 . 083 Within Groups 1402.561 12 116.880 
Total 2393.829 15 
SHSER_EM Between Groups 491.687 3 163.896 2.867 . 081 Within Groups 686.088 12 57.174 
Total 1177.774 15 
VA_AG_E Between Groups 209.370 3 69.790 2.681 . 094 Within Groups 312.408 12 26.034 
Total 521.778 15 
POP DEN Between Groups 684.977 3 228.326 . 266 . 848 Within Groups 10293.608 12 857.801 
Total 10978.584 15 
M_SER VA Between Groups 105.985 3 35.328 2.163 . 145 Within Groups 196.012 12 16.334 
Total 301.997 15 
IND_VA_L Between Groups 206.994 3 68.998 2.349 . 124 Within Groups 352.466 12 29.372 
Total 559.460 15 
Total 145373759.438 15 
AG_EM_HA Between Groups 344.394 3 114.798 . 538 . 665 Within Groups 2559.755 12 213.313 
Total 2904.150 15 
UN_RUR_2 Between Groups 31.937 3 10.646 . 250 . 
860 
Within Groups 511.212 12 42.601 
Total 543.150 15 
FARM_SIZ Between Groups 59.751 3 19.917 . 379 . 770 Within Groups 629.856 12 52.488 
Total 689.608 15 
TRAC_HA Between Groups 96.801 3 32.267 . 679 . 582 Within Groups 570.628 12 47.552 
Total 667.429 15 
WAT_UPDA Between Groups 558.446 3 186.149 . 967 . 440 Within Groups 2310.643 12 192.554 
Total 2869.089 15 
WATER Between Groups 9.931 3 3.310 . 298 . 826 Within Groups 133.219 12 11.102 
Total 143.151 15 
ROAD Between Groups 1.995E-02 3 6.650E-03 . 663 . 591 Within Groups . 120 12 1.003E-02 Total . 140 15 TEL Between Groups 3.817 3 1.272 . 399 . 756 Within Groups 38.274 12 3.189 
Total 42.091 15 
ENVIRON Between Groups 535.922 3 178.641 1.120 . 379 Within Groups 1913.548 12 159.462 
Total 2449.470 15 
SHIND_EM Between Groups 107.554 3 35.851 1.421 . 285 Within Groups 302.725 12 25.227 
Total 410.279 15 
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Appendix 7: Anova: characteristics of clusters of communes 
Annex 7 
ANOVA : characteristics of clusters of communes (cirouas of ruralities 
Sum of df Mean Square F Sig. 
Squares 
Population density Between Groups 61.185 4 15.296 276.558 . 000 (per ha) 
Within Groups 110.618 2000 5.531 E-02 
Total 171.802 2004 
Companies per Between Groups 259440.891 4 64860.223 266.875 . 000 1000 population 
Within Groups 486072.660 2000 243.036 
Total 745513.551 2004 
Unemployment rate Between Groups 38795.206 4 9698.801 436.216 . 000 in district 
Within Groups 44467.891 2000 22.234 
Total 83263.096 2004 
Telephone Between Groups 1818910.241 4 454727.560 148.685 . 000 Within Groups 6116673.929 2000 3058.337 
Total 7935584.170 2004 
WATER Between Groups 99555.945 4 24888.986 40.992 . 000 Within Groups 1214335.271 2000 607.168 
Total 1313891.216 2004 
Index of natural Between Groups 125945.939 4 31486.485 234.234 . 000 
conditions for 
agriproduction 
Within Groups 268846.974 2000 134.423 
Total 394792.913 2004 
Farm size (ha) Between Groups 24457.660 4 6114.415 377.195 . 000 Within Groups 32420.432 2000 16.210 
Total 56878.092 2004 
% of employed in Between Groups 15.976 4 3.994 117.234 . 000 manufacturing 
Within Groups 68.138 2000 3.407E-02 
Total 84.114 2004 
% of employed in Between Groups 22.842 4 5.711 266.488 . 000 non market services 
Within Groups 42.858 2000 2.143E-02 
Total 65.701 2004 
% of employed in Between Groups 2.907 4 . 727 69.119 . 000 market services 
Within Groups 21.031 2000 1.052E-02 
Total 23.938 2004 
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Annex 8 
Factor analysis of regions - options 
OPTION 1: only endogenous rural variables 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. . 427 Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 164.700 
df 66 
Sig. . 000 
Component 
Attribute 1 2 3 4 
TRACTORS . 963 - 5.210E- 
02 
. 119 - 3.221 E- 
02 
FARM SIZE . 958 - 5.407E- 
02 
- 
4.321 E- 
03 
-. 127 
AGRI EMPLOY/LAND -. 885 - 
6.693E- 
02 
. 433 6.847E- 02 
ROAD PER HEAD -. 859 . 309 . 147 . 189 
UNEMPLOYMENT . 841 -. 241 . 243 . 230 
POPUL DENSITY -. 690 . 427 . 459 . 132 
AGRI VALUE PER 
LABOUR . 
680 . 472 1.698E- 02 . 
372 
COMMUNE REVENUE . 482 . 752 - 9.033E- 
02 
- 
1.108E- 
02 
COMPANIES 
. 286 . 871 . 113 - 6.018E- 
02 
TELEPHONE -. 445 . 330 -. 491 -. 640 
SEWAGE 
. 324 . 232 . 483 -. 376 
WATER -. 233 . 233 -. 586 . 520 
Eigenvalue 5.682 2.110 1.331 1.092 
Variance 47.350 17.582 11.093 9.096 
Cumulative 47.350 64.931 76.024 85.120 
Clear factors: 
1: farm and settlement pattern; 
2: business development; 
3: infrastructure 
Commonality 
. 945 
. 936 
. 980 
. 891 
. 877 
. 886 
. 823 
. 807 
. 857 
. 959 
. 533 
. 721 
Appendix 8: Factor analysis of regions (options) 
OPTION 2- endogenous variables plus urbanisation 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. . 445 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 193.130 
df 78 
Sig. . 000 
Component 
Attribute 1 2 3 4 
TRACTOR . 951 -. 158 . 122 - 3.212E- 
02 
FARM SIZE . 944 -. 162 5.034E- -. 127 03 
AGRI LABOUR/LAND -. 896 - . 414 6.936E- 1.064E- 02 
02 
UNEMPLOYMENT . 812 -. 332 . 225 . 231 ROAD PER HEAD -. 812 . 422 . 151 . 189 
AGRI VALUE /LABOUR . 716 . 371 7.408E- . 371 02 
POPUL DENSITY -. 664 . 418 . 499 . 132 
RURAL POP RURAL -. 579 -. 689 . 109 - POPULA 2.314E- 
03 
COM REV COMMUNE . 551 . 681 - - REVENUE 1.093E- 1.250E- 
02 02- 
COMPANIES . 378 . 845 . 185 - 6.102E- 
02 
WATER -. 203 . 285 -. 557 . 518 SEWAGE . 331 . 136 . 514 -. 
376 
TELEPHONE -. 403 . 404 -. 461 -. 642 
Ei envalue 5.964 2.368 1.347 1.092 
Variance 45.880 19.757 10.363 8.397 
Cumulative 45.880 65.637 76.000 84.397 
Interpretation 
: ommonality 
. 
945 
. 933 
. 
979 
. 873 
. 
896 
. 
793 
. 
883 
. 
822 
. 768 
. 896 
. 
701 
. 533 
. 949 
Factor 1- settlement patterns and farm structures 
Factor 2- urbanisation and business development 
Factor 3- infrastructure 
Factor 4- infrastructure, too (so can be neglected - also Eigenvalue almost 1) 
Appendix 8: Factor analysis of regions (options) 
OPTION 3 
- plus 2 exogenous variables (urbanization and 
GDP per capita (regional) 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. . 386 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 207.540 
df 91 
Sig. . 000 
Component 
Attribute 1234 
TRACTOR . 945 -. 184 . 115 - 6.355E- 
02 
FARM SIZE . 937 -. 197 - -. 
113 
1.086E- 
03 
AGRI LABOUR/LAND -. 896 1.170E- . 414 3.144E- 02 02 
UNEMPLOYMENT . 795 -. 402 . 229 . 
189 
ROAD PER HEAD -. 800 . 418 . 173 . 220 
AGRI VALUE /LABOUR . 725 . 304 . 104 . 399 
POPUL DENSITY -. 652 . 403 . 518 . 147 
RURAL POP RURAL -. 604 -. 667 8.855E- - 
POPULA 02 7.073E- 
02 
COM REV COMMUNE . 573 . 636 1.339E- 
7.321 E- 
REVENUE 02 02 
GDP PER CAPITA . 178 . 792 - -. 
259 
6.237E- 
02 
COMPANIES . 410 . 844 . 204 - 6.333E- 
03 
WATER -. 201 . 207 -. 506 . 671 SEWAGE . 330 7.390E- . 521 -. 
237 
02 
TELEPHONE -. 386 . 447 -. 472 -. 526 
Eigenvalue 5.989 3.102 1.350 1.143 
Variance 42.778 22.158 9.643 74.580 
Cumulative 42.778 64.937 74.580 82.742 
commonality 
. 944 
. 930 
. 788 
. 
882 
. 893 
. 
788 
. 878 
. 
823 
. 
848 
. 
730 
. 923 
. 
789 
. 
442 
. 848 
Factor 1- settlement patterns and farm structures 
Factor 2- urbanization and GDP per capita and business development 
Factor 3- infrastructure 
Factor 4- infrastructure, too (so can be neglected - also Eigenvalue almost 1) 
But factors less correlated. 
OPTION 4 
- increased number of indicators (plus share of environmentally sensitive areas, and 
regional employment patterns) 
Covariance Matrix 
a This matrix is not positive definite. 
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Annex 10 
Cluster analysis of communes (options) 
The following analysis seeks the most informative classification of Polish ruralities in 
terms of their resource and production structure, ultimately underlying the level of 
development of a given area. 
OPTION 1 
The following variables are used: 
1. population density (POP-DEN), 
2. business density (BUS_DEN), 
3. unemployment (UNEMPL), 
4. commune own revenue per capita (COM_REV), 
5. telephone provision (TEL DEN), 
6. road density (ROAD_DEN), 
7. water provision (WATER), 
8. natural conditions for agricultural production (AGRI_COND), 
9. farm size (FARM_SIZE) 
The correlation table is as follows: 
POP_DEN BUS 
DEN 
UNEMP COM 
RE 
TEL ROAD WATE AGRI 
CON 
FARM 
SIZE 
POP_DEN 1.00 
BUS_DEN 
. 
121 1.000 
UNEMP -. 34 -. 013 1.000 
CO M_RE -. 03 . 318 . 074 1.000 TEL_DEN 
. 152 . 348 -. 142 . 232 1.000 ROAD_DEN 
. 509 . 
086 -. 232 . 
012 
. 
122 1.00 
WATE 
. 091 . 117 -. 151 . 123 . 172 . 048 1.00 AGB 
CON . 
17 -. 09 -. 00 . 10 . 007 . 112 . 028 1.00 
FARM SIZE -. 56 . 005 . 497 . 10 -. 064 -. 37 -. 113 -. 058 1. O0 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy. 
. 679 
Bartlett's Test of Approx. Chi-Square 2937.044 
Sphericity df 36 
Sig. 
. 000 
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The factor analysis has yield the following results: 
Component 
Communality 
1 2 3 
POP DEN . 810 -. 122 . 144 . 674 
FARM S -. 77 . 28 . 124 . 589 
ROAD . 672 -7.817E-0 . 19 . 533 
UNEMPL -. 648 . 16 . 32 . 572 
BUS DEN . 21 . 720 -. 15 . 631 
COM REV 4.384E-0 . 70 . 311 . 314 
EL . 34 . 623 -. 11 . 534 WATER . 274 . 319 -. 167 . 259 
GRI CON . 18 -4.487E-02 . 868 . 682 
Eigenvalue 2.189 1.534 1.064 
Variance 24.32 17.039 11.827 
Cumulative 24.32 41.366 53.193 
Three factors underlying the variance between communes can be identified as follows: 
Factor 1, broadly labeled farm and settlement pattern, explaining 24% of variance, 
includes population density related to farm size, road density, and unemployment 
patterns. Factor 2, business development, includes business density related to commune 
revenues and telephone subscription (17% of variance), and, the final factor 3 contains 
conditions for agricultural production. Noticeably, infrastructure variables do seem 
significant. Moreover, the three factors only explain 53% of variance. Based on the 
above factor solution, the following five cluster solution has been generated. 
Clus ters: Option 1 
1 2 3 4 5 
Factor 1 -. 0280 . 98645 -1.1487 . 14994 . 1670 Farm and settlement pattern + - + + 
Factor 4.7198 -. 35801 -. 1222 1.42781 -. 30963 
Business development ++ ++ 
Factor 3 1.74651 1.0457 . 55441 -. 4775 -. 7576 Natural conditions for agricultural ++ ++ + 
production 
Clusters: option 1 
Cluster 1: Most prosperous communes with average population density and farm patterns, 
very good business development and very good conditions for agricultural 
production 
Cluster 2 Communes with high population density, small farms, low business development 
and very good natural conditions for agricultural production 
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Cluster 3 Communes very low population density, high farm size, high unemployment, low 
business density but good conditions for agricultural production 
Cluster 4 Communes with high business development, average population density, 
average farm size, yet poor natural conditions for agricultural production 
Cluster 5 Communes with average farm and settlement patterns, poor business 
development, poor conditions for agricultural production 
The membership is each cluster is as follows: 
Cluster 
1 
Number 
of commune 
24 
2 409 
3 504 
4 247 
5 833 
Valid 2017 
Missing 10 
The cross tabulation below indicates cluster membership in each region. 
Number 
cluof 
represen 
led 
Number of Communes Total 
Region Cluster I Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster 
5 DOLNOSL 24 6 21 11 131 
4 KUJ - POM 1 66 12 3 127 
5 LUBELS 1 86, 97 19 
3 LUBUS 5 12 9 74 
4 LODZKIE 24 24 104 1551 
3 MALOPOL 73 7 32 112 
5 MAZOW 2 1 40 18 268 
4 OPOL 2 16 7 14 64 
3 PODKARP 681 5 53 126 
3 PODLAS 1 14 89 104 
5 POMOR 1 5 13 2 97 
4 SLASK 1 1 18 3 681 
5 WIETOKRZ 1 2 2 3 6 9 
3 ARM-MAZ 95 14 1 100 
5 IELKOPOL 2 3 54 81 204 
3 CH-POM 8 10 
Tota l 2 409 504 247 833 201 
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OPTION 2 
The same variables are used: 
1. population density (POP-DEN), 
2. business density (BUS_DEN), 
3. unemployment (UNEMP), 
4. commune own revenue per capita (COM_REV), 
5. telephone provision (TEL), 
6. road density (ROAD), 
7. water provision (WATER), 
8. natural conditions for agricultural production (AGRI_CON), 
9. farm size (FARM_$) 
but the clusters are generated based on original variables, not on factors (since the three factors 
only explain circa 50% variance). Z-scores have been used for data standisation. Outliers, have 
again, been excluded from the analysis. The following cluster centres have been generated: 
Cluster and its Cluster I Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 
interpretation 
POP_DEN . 28428 1.00261 -. 50848 -. 0100 -. 0369 + ++ 0 0 
BUS_DEN 2.18095 -. 09090 -. 05477 -. 34184 -. 1002 
++ 0 0 0 
UNEMP -. 34961 -. 53560 1.34823 -. 30563 -. 48104 
++ 
COM_RE . 56789 -. 04388 . 04365 -. 16275 -. 
0429 
+ 0 0 0 
TEL 1.67472 . 17035 -. 18325 -. 93857 . 
5767 
++ + + 
ROAD -. 00420 2.14409 -. 49486 -. 14923 -. 11734 
0 ++ 
AGRI_CON -. 31606 . 64593 . 16567 -. 0496 -. 19671 
++ + 0 
FARM_S -. 11316 -. 67071 . 77016 -. 31462 -. 1247 
++ 
Cluster 1: very well developed business, associated with very high telephone subscription; 
high commune revenue and high population density. 
Cluster 2 Densely populated, very small farm pattern, very good conditions for agriculture, 
poor business development 
Cluster 3 very high unemployment; low population density; big farms, low-mid business 
development 
Cluster 4 average population density; very poor business density, poor commune revenue, 
low unemployment, few telephone subscribers, small farm pattern 
Cluster 5 average population density, poor business development, low unemployment, few 
telephone subscribers. 
No 
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mber of Cases in each Cluster 
Cluster 1 94.000 
2 179.000 
3 488.000 
4 552.000 
5 702.000 
Valid 2015.000 
Missin 12.000 
Location cluster members in regions (cross-tabulation) 
Region 1 4 3 2 5 Total 
, DOLNOSL 12 8 64 11 3 131 
KUJ- 4 71 24 22 12 
LUBELS 12, 761 104 192 
LUBUS 4 5 6 74 
LODZKIE 11 6 70 155 
MALOP 1 70 16 2 112 
MAZOW 2 9 12 130 88 26 
OPOL 12 1 10 2 64 
PODKAR 3 19 1 7 33 126 
PODLAS 3 3 21 77 104 
POMOR 4 61 7 2 9 
SLASK 3 20 8 37 68 
SWIETOK 1 12 59 22 94 
ARM-MAZ 99 1 10 
IELKOP 14 2 14 4 129 204 
CH-POM 1 89 1 10 
9 179 488 552 702 201 
This method of classification appears more effective than Option 1 for factors only 
account for 52% of variance, and, also, the clusters themselves are easier to interpret 
(unlike with factors where opposite forces are balanced off). 
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OPTION 3 
In option 3, three structural variables on employment have been introduced. 
1. population density (POP-DEN), 
2. business density (BUS_DEN), 
3. unemployment (UNEMP), 
4. commune own revenue per capita (COM_REV), 
5. telephone provision (TEL), 
6. road density (ROAD), 
7. water provision (WATER), 
8. natural conditions for agricultural production (AGRI_CON), 
9. farm size (FARM_S) 
10. % employed in manufacturing (EMP_MAN) 
11. % employed in market services (EMP_M_SERV) 
12. % employed in non market services (EMP_N_M_SER) 
The analysis starts from factor analysis. Validity tests are positive as seen below: 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure o 
Sampling Adequacy . 
584 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericit Approx. Chi-Square 6438.019 
d 66 
Sig., . 00 
Correlation matrix between the variables is as follows: 
EMP 
POP BUS UNEMP COM TEL ROAD WATE AGRI FARM EMP EMP_M N_M 
DEN DEN RE CON MAN SER SE 
POP_D 1.00 
EN 
BUS-Dl . 121 1.00 EN 
UNEM -. 34 -. 013 1.000 
co m _ 1.00 . 318 . 074 1.000 E 
TE 
. 154 . 348 -. 142 . 233 1.000 1 ROAD) 
. 513 . 085 -. 232 . 012 . 123 1.00 WATE 
. 093 . 117 -. 151 . 123 . 173 . 051 1.000 AGRI_ -. 013 . 261 . 179 . 233 . 151 -. 04 . 016 1.000 ON 
FARM -. 566 . 00 . 497 . 099 -. 06 -. 371 -. 114 . 198 1.00 EMP 
. 151 . 251 . 032 . 297 . 161 . 03 . 119 . 120 -. 05 1.00 MAN 
EMP_M 
. 09 . 110 -. 132 -. 001 . 117 . 037 . 017 . 017 -. 07 -. 382 1.000 SER 
EMP 
. 009 -. 303 -. 163 -. 394 -. 19 . 051 -. 106 -. 177 -. 128 -. 716 -. 050 1.000 N_M 
SE 
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Component Communality 
1 2 3 4 
EMP NM SER -. 759 . 24 . 184 5.903E-0 . 
676 
EMP_MAN . 73 -8.476E-0 -. 
584 -2.334E-0 . 88 
BUS DEN . 638 2.955E-02 . 34 . 10 . 53 
COM_REV . 
632 -. 17 . 131 -3.143E-02 . 449 
EL . 52 . 
191 . 371 -. 131 . 46 
FARM S -3.254E-0 -. 813 . 17 1.774E-02 . 692 
POP DEN . 234 . 
766 -9.909E-02 . 286 . 733 
UNEMP 7.158E-0 -. 700 -3.390E-02 . 297 . 579 
ROAD) . 15 . 
642 -6.085E-02 . 398 . 598 
EMP_M_SERV -4.581 E-0 . 20 . 757 -4.633E-02 . 618 
WATER . 29 . 19 6.018E-0 -. 70 . 627 
GRI CON . 39 -. 26 . 323 . 401 . 492 
Ei envalue 2.523 2.434 1.372 1.025 
Variance 21.022 20.283 11.435 8.539 
Cumulative 21.022 41.30 52.740 61.279 
Four factors have been identified underlying the resource and structural differences between 
regions: 
Factor 1, business development, linked with employment in manufacturing, community revenue, 
and telephone density with irreversible proportion to employment in public sector (non- 
marketable services), accounts for 21% of variance. 
Factor 2, settlement and farm structure, consisting of farm size, linked to population density, 
road density and (registered) unemployment, covers 20% of variance. 
Factor 3, principally employment in market services, covers 11% of variance. 
Factor 4, includes mainly, water provision (10% of variance), but of eigenvalue of very close to 1. 
Those factors account for 61% of the variance. 
Based on new factor based values the following 5 cluster solution has been generated: 
Final Cluster Canters nnfinn 3 
Cluster 
1 2 3 4 5 
Factor 4: wate . 35726 1.45726 . 46721 -. 4877 -. 5556 
provision + + + 
Factor 3: employmen 1.73552 -. 39844 -. 1281 . 3993 -. 8477 in service ++ + 
Factor 2: settlemen -. 0579 1.2906 -1.1948 . 30274 . 09784 and farm structure 0 ++ + 0 
Factor 1: busines 1.53094 -. 1329 -. 2149 -. 6613 . 7412 developmen ++ + 
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Cluster 1: very well developed business, associated with good water provision; very high 
employment in services, and average farm/population density 
Cluster 2 densely populated, very small farm pattern, poor business development, very 
high water provision and small employment in services 
Cluster 3 very high unemployment; low population density; big farms, low business 
development 
Cluster 4 average population density; very poor business density, poor commune revenue, 
low unemployment, small farm pattern 
Cluster 5 average population density, poor business development, low unemployment, few 
telephone subscribers. 
Number of Cases in each Cluster 
Cluster 1 157 
2 23 
457 
4 700 
474 
Valid 2018.00 
Missin 9.00 
Cluster Members Total 
1 2 3 4 5 
DOLNOSL 28 10 40 14 38 130 
KUJ - 9 3 46 34 35 127 
LUBELS 4 12 7 137 32 192 
LUBUS 5 42 10 17 74 
LODZKIE 5 7 4 73 66 155 
MALOP 4 87 4 15 4 114 
MAZOW 28 25 33 137 45 268 
OPOL 3 4 7 26 24 64 
PODKAR 5 46 6 49 20 126 
PODLAS 5 18 65 16 104 
POMOR 9 61 12 15 97 
SLASK 4 20 20 24 68 
SWIETOK 1 14 9 44 27 95 
WARM- 
MAZ 
5 89 2 4 100 
WIELKOP 22 2 17 60 103 204 
ZACH- 
POM 
20 74 2 4 100 
Total 157 230 457 700 474 2018 
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OPTION 4 
Given the fact the four clusters only explain 62% of variance, another way of conducting the 
analysis is to use the original variables (as follows) 
Variables: 
1. population density (POP-DEN), 
2. business density (BUS_DEN), 
3. unemployment (UNEMP), 
4. commune own revenue per capita (COM_REV), 
5. telephone provision (TEL), 
6. road density (ROAD), 
7. water provision (WATER), 
8. natural conditions for agricultural production (AGRI_CON), 
9. farm size (FARM_S) 
10. % employed in manufacturing (EMP_MA) 
11. % employed in market services (EMP_MA) 
12. % employed in non market services (EMP_N_M_SER) 
Based on standardized Z-scores are applied. 
Final Cluster Centers 
Cluster 
1 3 2 4 5 
score: POP_DEN . 35860 1.08609 -. 50307 -. 16635 . 1829 
+ ++ + 
score: BUS_DEN 1.8976 -. 11732 -. 05936 -. 31751 . 02667 ++ 0 0 
score: UNEMP -. 64981 -. 51809 1.28710 -. 32307 -. 4155 
++ 
score: COM REV 
_ . 
5652 -. 16116 . 07876 -. 20954 . 0598 ++ 0. 0 
score: TEL 1.89251 . 04770 -. 21963 -. 29959 . 23658 ++ 0 + 
score: ROAD . 12274 2.36710 -. 47217 -. 24271 . 05051 + ++ 0 
score: WATER . 41184 -. 43423 -. 36925 -. 18119 . 58192 + ++ 
score: AGRI_CON -. 28868 . 52047 . 14105 -. 10572 -. 0649 ++ + 0 
score: FARM_S -. 1939 -. 71680 . 73090 -. 13450 -. 27008 
++ 
score: EMP_MA . 50947 -. 16704 . 24461 -. 78042 . 74204 ++ + ++ 
score: EMP_MA SER 1.37526 . 09808 -. 32207 . 16976 -. 23268 ++ 0 + 
Zscore: EMP_N_M_SER -1.13797 . 39377 -. 53489 . 91035 -. 60867 + ++ 
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Cluster 1: very well developed business, associated with good water provision; very high 
employment in services, and average farm/population density, low 
unemployment 
Cluster 2 densely populated, very small farm pattern, poor business development, very 
high water provision and small employment in services 
Cluster 3 very high unemployment; low population density; big farms, low business 
development 
Cluster 4 average population density; very poor business density, poor commune revenue, 
low unemployment, small farm pattern 
Cluster 5 average population density, poor business development, low unemployment, few 
telephone subscribers. 
Number of Cases in each Cluster 
Number of cases in each cluster: 
Cluster 1 91 
Cluster 2 144 
Cluster 3 485 
Cluster 4 727 
Cluster 5 569 
Valid 2016 
Missing 11 
Cluster membership in reqions: 
Cluster Number o f Case Total 
1 3 2 4 5 
DOLNOSL 7 5 67 19 32 130 
KU)- 3 2 54 38 30 127 
LUBELS 5 4 3 132 48 192 
LUBUS 2 55 12 5 74 
LODZKIE 4 7 5 55 84 155 
MALOP 3 70 27 12 112 
MAZOW 25 6 13 169 55 268 
OPOL 5 16 13 30 64 
PODKAR 2 19 4 62 39 126 
PODLAS 6 1 76 21 104 
POMOR 3 57 20 17 97 
SLASK 4 17 16 31 68 
SWIETOK 1 8 3 51 32 95 
WARM- 
MAZ 
1 94 4 1 100 
WIELKOP 16 1 23 32 132 204 
ZACH- 
POM 
9 90 1 100 
Total 91 144 485 727 569 2016 
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OPTION 5 
Option 5: Clust er 
1 2 3 4 5 
Zscore: Population . 2104 . 4219 -. 53712 . 05912 -. 06167 density (per ha + 
Zscore: Companies per 1.27316 -. 23784 -. 1033 -. 23419 -. 12416 
1000 population ++ 
Zscore: Unemployment -. 43646 -. 41662 1.35398 -. 38769 -. 36328 
rate in district ++ 
Zscore: Index of own . 32683 . 0173 . 05049 -. 18947 -. 08957 
commune tax base 
Zscore(TEL. 1.32974 . 14859 -. 27134 -. 49119 . 05992 ++ 
Zscore ROAD . 13909 . 5972 -. 5046 -. 03252 -. 10717 Zscore WATER . 40962 . 2558 -. 3136 -1.13951 . 71427 Zscore: Index of natural -. 27097 1.42159 . 0822 -. 43931 -. 48559 
conditions for ++ 
Zscore: Farm size (ha) -. 09749 -. 39809 . 79693 -. 2864 -. 17043 
+ 
Zscore: % of employed 1.49106 -. 08500 -. 31378 . 07741 -. 20144 in market service ++ 
Number of Cases in each Cluster 
Cluster 1 162 
34 
462 
4 404 
63 
Valid 2006 
Missing 3 
Option 5 Total 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 
DOLNOSL 14 36 52 12 16 13 
KUJ- 7 20 61 10 29 12 
LUBELS 7 80 4 65 192 
LUBUS 4 56 4 10 74 
LODZKIE 11 20 3 16 105 15 
MALOP 7 38 52 9 10 
MAZOW 3 11 9 128 80 26 
OPOL 2 28 11 1 22 64 
PODKAR 38 46 36 126 
PODLAS 11 1 4 29 59 104 
POMOR 4 2 59 5 27 97 
SLASK 10 13 13 30 6 
SWIETOK 1 28 1 35 30 9 
ARM-MAZ 2 97 1 10 
IELKOP 28 33 19 , 13 111 204 CH-POM 10 90 L-- i 10 
162 348 462 404 630 200 
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Regional rural profiles (options) 
Option 1 
Regional rural profile (1) 
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Option 3 
Regional rural profile (3) 
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Option 5 
Regional rural profile (5) 
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Appendix 12 
Regional distribution of ARMA national rural development schemes 
Regional distribution of infrastructure grants of ARMA scheme 
1999 2000 
Region Number of 
approved 
applications 
Funds granted 
(thous. . PLN) 
Number of 
applications 
Funds granted 
(thous. PLN) 
DOLNOk SKIE 21 2,198.7 35 7,000. 
KUJAWSKO-POMORSKIE 47 6,231.7 28 6,000. 
LUBELSKIE 164 17,416.2 35 6,500. 
LUBUSKIE 10 1,213.0 42 6,536. 
LODZKIE 133 12,620.5 40 6,000. 
MALOPOLSKIE 136 17,409.1 25 4,699.2 
MAZOWIECKIE 219 26,609.0 40 7,627.9 
OPOLSKIE 19 2,441.9 32 5,100. 
PODKARPACKIE 103 18,681.0 36 6,762.7 
PODLASKIE 82 8,038.3 41 67473.3 
POMORSKIE 43 7,244.3 27 5,900.0 
SL SKIE 69 11,643.1 24 4,900.0 
SWI TOKRZYSKIE 97 9,381.1 42 6100. 
WARMIIVSKO-MAZURSKIE 15 1,573.4 47 7,200. ( 
WIELKOPOLSKIE 118 16,190.6 35 6,100. 
ZACHODNIOPOMORSKIE 27 4,506.9 42 7,100. 
Source: ARMA (electronic communication) 
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Regional distribution of support for non-agricultural business in Poland 
(ARMA) 
1999 2000 
Reg n Labour Fund 
(Scheme 1) 
Rural Business 
Scheme 
(Scheme 2) 
Labour Fund 
(Scheme 3) 
Rural Business 
Scheme 
Scheme 4) 
DOLNOS`L SKIE 1,16 400. 2,161 1,705.1 
KUJAWSKO-POMOR 1,48 435.5 1,665 830. 
LUBELSKIE 1,873 110. 4,041 1,253. 
LUBUSKIE 2,898 210. 1,97 894.8 
ÖDZKIE 1,24 390. 7,003 1,999.3 
MALOPOLSKIE 64 470. 4,77 1,759. 
MAZOWIECKIE 2,72( 230. ( 3,578 2,284. 
POLSKIE 1,30( 80. ( 26 690. 
PODKARPACKIE 52( 305.0 4,809 885. 
PODLASKIE 24( 100.0 2,125 510. 
POMORSKIE 44 420. ( 1,78 580. 
SL SKIE 24 60.0 2,975 650. 
SWI TOKRZYSKIE 24 190.0 1,19 160. 
WARMINSKO-MAZ 872 80.0 991 590. 
WIELKOPOLSKIE 2,571 1,105. 6,091 2,698. 
ACHOD-POMORSKIE 1,12 0.1 775 , 627. 
Source: ARMA (electronic communication) 
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Regional distribution of subsidized credit on farm development and 
processing across Polish regions (as administered via ARMA) (2000) 
Basic 
Investment Sectoral Land purchase Young farmer Total 
Credit line Credit line credit line Credit line 
value value value value 
Total 
value number (000 number (000 Number (000 Number (000 Number 000 ( PLN) PLN) PLN) PLN) PLN) PLN 
DOLN09L SK1E 12 16,551 6 23,98 278, 7,79 165 25,008, 63 73,339 
UTAWSKO- 
OMORSKIE 31 32,86 95 19,35 805 24,98 349 37,595 1,561 8 114,79 
UBELSKIE 444 27,73 231 23,99 865 12,36 79 64,013 2,338 9 128,09 
UBUSKIE 3 11,021 9 8,78 2 57 6 12,145 141 32,526 
ÖDZKIE 27 22,59 80 25,423 39 6,485 58 63,113 1,336 8 117,61 
ALOPOLSKIE 10 16,30 1 7,12 98 1,77 158 17,89 37 43,108 
AZOWIECKIE 45 44,719 42 40,70 779 13,65 1,21 120,49 2,873 219,576 
POLSKIE 5 5,903 4 11,86 339 12,241 128 16,912 56 5 46,92 
ODKARPACKIE 6 8,013 22 2,73 5 78 11 9,271 24 20,808 
ODLASKIE 301 13,823 493 25,73 397 6,27 433 36,20 1,624 82,038 
OMORSKIE 12 26,541 55 11,571 16 4,31 232 27,382 585 69,81 
SL SKIE 7 15,99 21 7,93 43 1,71 9 21,732 23 47,37 
SWI TOKRZYSK 11 5,76 3,715 20 3,12 20 13,21 52 25,8091 
ARMINSKO- 
AZURSKIE 81 18,54 102 13,94 181 4,40 281 28,722 645 65,6151 
IELKOPOLSK 45 45,269 160 40,21 911 31,17 77 110,902 2,299 227,563 
ZACHO D IOPO 
ORSK E 6 16,628 30 13,472 99 2,61 11 15,06 313 47 778 
OTAL 3,10 328,261 1,845 280,57 5,64 134,28 5,707 619,665 16,29 1,362,78 
Note: data for the processing and primary sector cannot be disaggregated. 
Source: ARMA (electronic communication) 
Appendix 13: Participant observation : activities in brief 
Appendix 13 
Participant observation: activities in brief (November 1996- March 
2001) 
1996 
November Co-organised and interpreted conference: Polish Agricultural and Rural 
Policy Pre-EU Accession. Participants included key Polish and EC rural 
and agricultural policy practitioners, advisors, analysts and academics 
1997 
ongoing Liaison between Know-How-Fund Consultancy project on integrating 
Polish - EC agricultural and rural policies and the Ministry of 
Agriculture: dept for EC integration, working groups for dairy, beef, 
cereals, and the Structural funds. The project provided training and 
technical assistance. The groups consisted mainly of civil servants 
from the Ministry and central agencies. 
1998 
spring Coordinated the drafting of National Programme of Preparation of EU 
Membership (in the area of agriculture and rural development). The 
document has been drafted based on the inputs from the Ministry 
Working Groups. 
April Participated in conference on the EC Structural Funds - first 
presentation of SAPARD Programme to the Applicant Countries 
(Brussels). The presentation of key SAPARD principles to 10 countries. 
May-Jun Prepared materials and workshops to disseminate SAPARD 
information for the staff of Ministry of Agriculture - mainly for 
Working Group for Structural Funds. 
May-Dec Participated in preparing Special Preparatory Programme for the 
Structural Funds in Poland (interministerial meetings) and In the 
preparation for twinning cooperation with the Irish Ministry of 
Agriculture. The SPP operated as Institutional Building programme at 
central level to assist in the structural funds preparations. 
Tune-Sept. Prepared background report for the Ministry: "Implications of 
SAPARD for MAFE. " for the Ministry, for Interministerial coordination, 
for Decentralised Rural Development" (commissioned by Ministry of 
Agriculture and Know-How-Fund). 
Sept. Participated in tailored made course for Polish negotiations on EC 
negotiation practices (Maastricht - Institute of Public Administration) 
Appendix 13: Participant observation : activities in brief 
Oct. Assisted in organisation of SAPARD seminar (with EC Commission) to 
present SAPARD instrument to Poland (mostly central level 
participants) 
Nov. Participated in working meetings with Irish administration on Structural Funds 
(Dublin) 
1999 
Jan-Feb. Prepared and participated in consultancy mission on regionalisation of 
SAPARD programme in Poland (meetings with key central and regional 
players, incl. Marshal Office in Malopolska) 
January Participated in preparing lobbying on procedural changes in SAPARD 
Programme (applicant countries, Member States and the European 
Commission) - attempts to lobby for more favourable procedural 
codes for SAPARD. 
February Assisted in organizing seminar of accreditation of payment agencies 
(with Austrian/Swedish participation) 
March Participated in meeting and training for all applicant countries on 
Structural funds (East Germany) 
March Participated in European workshop on EU rural development policies 
and Eastern enlargement post-Agenda 2000 - Arkleton Trust, 
Scotland. Round table discussion of EU and CEECs policy practitioners, 
policy makers and academics. 
March-Apr Prepared the format of regional consultation process (seminar 
materials, working group discussions, questionnaire) for SAPARD In 16 
Polish Regions. Conducted 6 regional seminars (Zachodniopomorskie, 
Opolskie, Slaskie, Mazowieckie, Malopolskie) 
from May Participated in works of working groups for SAPARD programme: 
on in particular: measure: diversification of rural activities in rural areas 
July Coordinated visit by Head of Independent Evaluation Unit, DAFF, 
Ireland to establish the system for SAPARD Evaluation 
July Prepared brief on the key SAPARD plan and measures (for Ministry 
management) 
August Coordinated Commission's visit to Poland (incl. meeting with regional 
level - Podkarpacie region) 
Sept. Coordinated preliminary ex ante evaluation of SAPARD programme 
(internal coherence, linkages with national and other programmes etc) 
Appendix 13: Participant observation : activities in brief 
Sept. Participated in meeting of all applicant countries and training on the 
structural funds in Finland (mainly forestry and diversification 
measures) 
October Drafted SAPARD Operational Programme for Poland (based on input 
provided from the Ministry) 
Nov. Assisted in internal process of SAPARD agreement in Poland 
Dec. Assisted in the process of ex - ante evaluation of SAPARD Programme 
2000 
March Presentation and discussion of the draft SAPARD Programme. Przysiek 
Participants: regional authorities and advisory centers (from all over 
Poland) 
April-Sept. Participated in negotiating the Operational SAPARD Programme with 
the European Commission 
Septem. Presentation of SAPARD Programme to the EU Agricultural Attaches, 
Jablonna. 
Septem. Participated in observer's capacity in STAR Committee (Council) to 
adopt the SAPARD programme 
Oct. -Dec. Participating in developing implementing procedures for SAPARD 
programme (in particular in internal audit processes, especially for 
rural diversification) 
2001 
January Negotiation of implementing procedures for SAPARD Programme, 
National re-consideration of strategic approach in view of the newly 
emerging auditing standards revealed by EC Commission 
February Provision of training / examination to the management of ARMA - 
regional offices all over Poland 
March Re-consideration of measure and project investment criteria for 
diversification of economic activities. A series of workshops with the 
regional staff of extension centers, NGOs, enterprise development 
agencies in Cracow, Radom, Poznan and Warsaw 
March Provision of training for Podkarpackie region: SAPARD programme, 
subsequent discussion 
Appendix 14: List of semi-structured Interviews 
Appendix 14 
List of semi-structured interviews 
January 2002 
CentralIeveI (carried out in Warsaw) 
K. Romanowska, SAPARD Coordination Unit, ARMA 
B. Kasprzak-Lublinska, Director for Monitoring and Analysis, ARMA 
M. Safin, Formerly Officer for Agriculture and Rural Development, World Bank 
M. Paradowski, Deputy Director, Dept of Structural Funds, MARD 
M. Nowicka, Head of Programming Unit, Dept of Structural Funds, MARD 
W. Lyson, Deputy Director, Department of Structural Funds, MARD 
RegionalIeveI (carried out in Szczecin/Zachodniopomorskie) 
I. Kaliszewski, Director of Rural Development Department, Marshall Office 
A. Zabinski, Director of Regional Development Department, Marshal's Office 
A. Bladoszewski, Director, Regional Unit for Implementation of Rural Development 
Programme 
June 2002 
EUIeveI (carried out in Brussels) 
J. Jutte, Socio-Economic Analysis of the Regions and Enlargement, DG REGIO 
E. Saraceno, Group of Policy Advisers, European Commission 
C. Sauvaget, Administrator, Rural Development, Enlargement, DG AGRI 
A. Wilkinson, Head of SAPARD Unit, DG REGIO 
January 2003 
CentralIeveI (carried out in Warsaw) 
M. Nowicka, Head of Programming Unit, Dept of Structural Funds, MARD 
March 2003 
EUIeveI (carried out in Brussels) 
J. Jutte, Socio-Economic Analysis of the Regions and Enlargement, DG REGIO 
M. Dewit, Rural Development Programming - Poland, DG AGRI 
J-M. Courades, Rural Development (Transition SAPARD-Structural Funds), DG AGRI 
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Appendix 16: Guide for Semi-Structured Interviews 
Indicative problems covered by semi-structured interviews 
1. What is the current state of play of preparation of Polish FEOGA- 
Guidance Programmes? How is it planned to progress? 
- timing 
- procedure 
- institutions 
2. How do you see the role of regions in the SAPARD programme and 
why? (programming, implementation) 
3. How do you think the SAPARD experience is likely to condition the 
preparation and implementation of FEOGA-Guidance? 
4. What would be the key advantages of involving regions in the FEOGA- 
Guidance programming/implementation? 
5. What would be the key problems/disadvantages of involving regions in 
the FEOGA-Guidance programming/implementation? 
